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NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL,
NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT
IN THE POST-COLD WAR
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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OPENING REMARKS

Professor Sidney Picker, Jr.
Seth Grae

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THE CANADIAN REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEW CENTURY*

*Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.***

I would like to thank all of you for being here. It is very reassuring to know that outside of Washington there are many people concerned with the security of our national, as well as world, community and who want to take action to improve it where they can.

I would like to give special thanks to Elizabeth Rindskopf for her tireless efforts and for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today. She cannot be here, as was stated earlier, because of a death of a family member. Thanks also to Sidney Picker, without whom none of this could have taken place, and Mrs. Louise Walker, for pointing us in the right direction and making all of this possible.

It is a great pleasure for me as well to share this panel with Ambassador Peggy Mason, former Canadian Disarmament Ambassador, and Ambassador Carvalho-Soto, Senior Advisor on Disarmament for Mexico, both of whom have done so much to advance the security of

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** President, LAWS. Ambassador Graham served as Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, from 1994 to 1997. He led U.S. government efforts to achieve a permanent Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) leading up to and during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. He headed the U.S. delegation to the 1996 Review Conference on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and the 1993 ABM Treaty Review Conference. Ambassador Graham was General Counsel of the U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA) from 1977 to 1981 and from 1983 to 1993. From January 1993 to mid-1994, he served as Acting Deputy Director and Acting Director of ACDA. Other assignments include service as Legal Advisor to the U.S. SALT II Delegation, Senior Arms Control Agency Representative to the U.S. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Delegation in 1981-92, Legal Advisor to the U.S. Nuclear and Space Arms Delegation (1985-88), and the Senior Arms Control Agency Representative and Legal Advisor to the U.S. delegation to the CFE Negotiations in 1989-90. In addition, Ambassador Graham served as Legal Advisor to the U.S. delegation to the 1980 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the U.S. delegation to the 1988 ABM Treaty Review Conference, the 1991 U.S. START I delegation, and the 1992-93 U.S. START II delegation.

their respective countries, as well as the security of the global community.

For those of you who are unfamiliar with the topic of this panel, I should explain at least that part which I am going to address. In December 1998, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade of the Canadian House of Commerce, chaired by Mr. Bill Graham (to whom, sadly, I am not related), issued a report entitled *Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the 21st Century*.¹ As was stated earlier by our moderator, Mr. Graham has submitted a paper to this conference explaining the evolution of the Canadian Report, which I very much commend to you.² The purpose of the report was to identify policies that the Canadian Government could adopt to help prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The committee under Bill Graham's inspiring leadership succeeded brilliantly.

Many argue that the danger of nuclear weapons being acquired by states other than weapons allowed them under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons³ is a grave risk to international security exacerbated by the artificially high political value of these weapons. This excessive significance was largely a product of the Cold War demand for security that has not receded since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The report of the Canadian Parliament's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade⁴ is a significant contribution to the debate over how nuclear proliferation can be discouraged and how the security of Canada, the United States, the NATO Alliance, and the entire world community can best be protected. This report addresses one of the central issues for international peace and security in the years that lie ahead.

As an aside, if I may, the United States is, in my opinion, fortunate in the neighbors that it has. In different ways, Canada and Mex-

¹ *Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the 21st Century*, Standing Committee on Foreign Aff. & Int'l. Trade, House of Commons, Canada, at 76 (Dec. 1998) (visited Sep. 17, 1999) <<http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfocomDoc/36/1/FAIT/Studies/Reports/fairtp07-e.htm>> [hereinafter Canadian Report].

² See William Graham, *Analysis Of The Canadian Report*, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 689 (1999).

³ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, *opened for signature* July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, *extended* May 11, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 959 [hereinafter NPT].

⁴ Canadian Report, *supra* note 1.

ico have both been world leaders in the cause of arms control, disarmament, and world security.

As I have already stated, nuclear weapons were given an exceedingly high political value during the Cold War. Although the Cold War passed into history nearly a decade ago, the high political value of nuclear weapons remains. The five nuclear weapon states are co-terminous with the permanent membership of the Security Council.⁵ This is more an accident of history than a deliberate design, and yet, it is a fact. Thus, many states see a direct link between the status of a country and whether or not it possesses nuclear weapons.

For example, in the House of Lords in London in 1997, a conservative party spokesman, addressing plans to reduce further the United Kingdom's Trident force, declared that this force cannot be reduced further. Otherwise Britain would cease to be a first-class nuclear power and would lose its permanent seat on the Security Council, with the right of veto.⁶ This link was asserted again, when the former U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, stated in a newspaper column in 1997 that nuclear weapons are central to the security of the United States and that we must stop saying bad things about them.⁷ To paraphrase the 1991 NATO Strategic Concept Document,⁸ nuclear weapons are described as the essential link between North America and Europe, the "supreme guarantors" of NATO security and "unique to peace."

It bears noting that if the NPT had not been concluded and selective nuclear proliferation had continued to be the policy of the United States, as it had been in the early 1960s, then two of the countries

⁵ The five members of the Security Council are the United States, Great Britain, China, France, and Russia (collectively referred to as "the five nuclear weapon states"). U.N. CHARTER, art. 5, para 23.

⁶ Lord Trefgarne said in a Nov. 6, 1997 speech:

Indeed it is often said, and, I believe, rightly, that our position at the top table of world affairs, as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council—what my noble friend Lord Hurd has described as our ability to punch over our weight—is due, in no small measure, to our nuclear status. In that context, I ask the noble lord, Lord Gilbert, to assure us in the plainest terms that there is no question of any reduction of our Trident Fleet.

(visited Aug. 18, 1993) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/lords97/text/71106-04.htm#71106-04_spnewo>.

⁷ Henry Kissinger, *No Carrots for Saddam*, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1997, at C7.

⁸ *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Nov. 8, 1991, reprinted in NATO OFFICE OF INFORMATION & PRESS, NATO HANDBOOK (1995) [hereinafter *Strategic Concept*].

most likely to have received nuclear weapons under such a policy would have been Yugoslavia and Iran. Governments change, but if Serbian President Milosevic had nuclear weapons at his disposal today, the United States would be in grave danger. It is a valuable exercise, therefore, to ask what really stands between Milosevic and this capability.

The best answer to this question is the norm of international behavior established by the NPT. Clearly, it is in our interest to keep this norm strong. If we as the world community do not find a way to reduce the political significance of nuclear weapons, if we cannot break the link between the status and position of nuclear weapons, then the long-term viability of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will be in serious jeopardy. Nuclear weapons will simply be too attractive politically, and the 1945-era technology on which they are based, too simple for many states in the world to continue to forswear them. Widespread nuclear proliferation is the likely result.

The Canadian Report sets forth fifteen recommendations as to how Canada can begin to help the world community move away from the high political value attached to nuclear weapons and to strengthen the NPT regime. First, the Committee recommends that Canada should work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination. Not only is this recommendation wise and important, it is very much in the spirit of the legally binding commitment Canada shares with all the signatory nations of the world under Article 6 of the NPT to work toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. It is an excellent first principle from which to make policy regarding nuclear weapons.⁹

The second recommendation, which I believe is an important step, is that Canada should link its non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament policies to all other aspects of international relations. The third and the fourteenth steps suggest that Canada, in cooperation with other states, should step up its efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. Canada has done much in the past, and more of this effort in the future will be continue to be valuable.

The fourth recommendation advocates further parliamentary study of the issue and promotion of public awareness within Canada. This is needed in the United States as well. The fifth recommendation is that Canada should endorse a verifiable lowering of the alert status

⁹ See NPT, *supra* note 3, at art. 6 (stating that each NPT signatory nation "undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race . . .").

of nuclear forces. Taking the Cold War-generated strategic nuclear forces off hair-trigger alert is certainly an idea whose time has come, and it should be carefully examined.

The sixth point supports the START process between the United States and Russia. Unfortunately, the prospects for the development of this program are not good at the present time. The seventh point advocates exploration of the hotline connection between NORAD¹⁰ and the Russian Missile Early Warning System—certainly an interesting idea.

The eighth point recommends the rejection of the burning of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in Canada, and the ninth recommendation seeks to encourage the involvement of the United Kingdom, France, and China in the nuclear disarmament process. A five-power nuclear disarmament discussion and negotiation is something that must happen in the near future. The Report's tenth point seeks to find a way to include the threshold states—India, Israel, and Pakistan—in the process. This, of course, is a long-term important objective. The eleventh recommendation addresses efforts to prevent proliferation of chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles. While not as great a threat as nuclear weapons, it is important to constrain these dangerous technologies.

Points twelve and thirteen suggest the setting of higher standards of participation in international safeguard regimes for countries with which Canada conducts nuclear cooperation. Given the importance of NPT verification, I believe this would be a useful step. Finally, the fifteenth recommendation is that Canada should argue forcefully within NATO for a thorough review of the Alliance's Nuclear Weapon Doctrine and an update of the Alliance Concept Document.¹¹ At this time, this is perhaps the most important of the many important recommendations in the report. A review of the NATO Nuclear Weapons Doctrine is overdue and should happen after the 50th Anniversary summit in Washington later this month.

The Standing Committee's report has made a significant contribution to world peace and security, comparable to the 1997 releases of reports by the Canberra Commission¹² and the United States National Academy of Sciences,¹³ both of which addressed the future of U.S.

¹⁰ See North American Aerospace Defense Command (visited July 8, 1999), <<http://www.spacecom.af.mil/NORAD/index.htm>>.

¹¹ See *Strategic Concept*, *supra* note 8.

¹² *Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons* (visited Aug. 24, 1999), <<http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html>>.

¹³ NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, *THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY* (1997).

nuclear weapons policy. The recommendations in the Canadian Report should be carefully considered by the government of Canada, as well as those of other nations, and should be acted upon.

The Cold War is over, and nuclear proliferation has become the primary threat to the world community. The civilized world's principal defense against the spread of nuclear weapons to irresponsible states, terrorist organizations, or criminal conspiracies is the NPT regime.

Concluded in 1968, the NPT is the legal framework that establishes the international norm against nuclear proliferation and serves as the foundation for all other efforts to control weapons of mass destruction. When the NPT was being negotiated, many predicted that there could be as many as thirty nuclear weapon states by the end of the 1970s, and who knows how many today if the trend toward nuclear proliferation had been left unchecked. The NPT then gave the world a thirty-year respite from nuclear proliferation. Even India, Pakistan, and Israel, who remained aloof from the treaty, were careful not to openly defy the regime during the three decades prior to India and Pakistan doing so last year. Nuclear proliferation in South Asia amid denunciation of the NPT as a discriminatory regime and other onerous developments now threatens to upset the delicate balance on which both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament depend.

The original 1968 NPT signatories and those countries that have joined since, which form a nearly global non-proliferation community, agree that the number of nuclear weapon states should be limited to the five states that already possess nuclear weapons. The nuclear arsenals of these five were not approved by the NPT (they are specifically challenged by Article 6),¹⁴ and their reduction and ultimate abolition is mandated by the treaty. However, the performance of the nuclear weapon states in moving toward nuclear disarmament has been insufficient in the eyes of many non-nuclear weapon states. Many of those that have voluntarily forsworn the nuclear arms option on the conditions that only five states would have nuclear weapons and that those five would work toward disarmament, may reconsider their own commitments in light of changes in these conditions. Many of these nations have said as much, and if any were to leave the treaty regime, more would surely follow.

The NPT regime is indeed in trouble. In 1995, at the time of the indefinite extension of the NPT, to which the United States, Canada, and Mexico contributed greatly, the NPT parties, including the nuclear weapon states, committed themselves to a Statement of

¹⁴ NPT, *supra* note 3.

Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation, to which Ambassador Carvalho-Soto referred earlier,¹⁵ and which, among other things, called for vigorous pursuit of nuclear weapons reduction. This Statement was an integral part of the extensive decision, and yet we are likely to reach the 2000 Review Conference with no further progress in negotiating the nuclear weapons reduction.

Also, as a central underpinning of the now permanent NPT, the five nuclear weapon states, pursuant to a Resolution of the U.N. Security Council in 1995,¹⁶ committed themselves never to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, which is now almost universally accepted by some 181 countries.¹⁷ The only exception to this commitment is if one of those states attacks a nuclear weapon state in alliance with another nuclear weapon state. There was no exception for chemical or biological weapons. This commitment, referred to as a Negative Security Assurance, was found to be legally binding by the World Court in 1996 for the following year.¹⁸

So how do we strengthen the NPT regime, our principal defense against the most serious threat that faces us? How do we reduce the political value of nuclear weapons? The Canadian Report has shown a way with its fifteen recommendations. Beyond this, it is imperative for the five nuclear weapon states to reduce the levels of nuclear weapons as much as possible to be consistent with security and stability. The United States and Russia need to move past START II,¹⁹ which is currently stalled in the Duma, and attempt to negotiate an agreement to reduce their nuclear arsenal to, say, 1,000 strategic weapons—a level where the Russians soon will be anyway due to financial reasons. This agreement could contain a commitment to a further reduction to 1,000 total weapons.

Once this level is reached, the stage would be set for a five-power negotiation to ensue that would address the arsenals of the five nuclear weapon states, with special account taken of India, Pakistan, and

¹⁵ See Perla Carvalho-Soto, *Mexican Perspectives on Nuclear Disarmament*, 31 CASE W. J. INT'L L. 647 (1999).

¹⁶ S.C. Res. 984, U.N. SCOR, 3514th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/984 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Security Council Resolution].

¹⁷ See *Non-proliferation Treaty Signatories* (visited July 7, 1999) <<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt3.htm>>.

¹⁸ See Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8, 1996).

¹⁹ See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Jan. 3, 1993, U.S.-Russia, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-1.

Israel. An appropriate and conceivable endpoint of the negotiations could be a 300-weapons limitation each for the United States and Russia, and fifty weapons each for the United Kingdom, France, and China. India, Pakistan, and Israel would agree to reduce their weapons to zero and to join the NPT, while retaining their fissionable material on their territory under International Atomic Energy Safeguards (as did South Africa) as a hedge against failure of the agreement. These limits would be the residual levels until the world has changed sufficiently to permit the negotiations of the treaty on the ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapons.

There is also a second part to the effort to reduce the political value of nuclear weapons—the over-arching purpose of the Canadian Report—which Ambassador Mason referred to in her remarks.²⁰ The five nuclear weapon states should agree to limit the role of nuclear weapons to the core deterrent function of simply deterring their use by others. Nuclear weapons should not be given additional roles such as deterring, either overtly or implicitly, chemical and biological weapons. To do so would be at least inconsistent with the centrally important 1995 Negative Security Assurances,²¹ which support the NPT, to which I referred earlier.

This means that the five nuclear weapon states should declare that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in future conflicts. In this regard, the language in the 1991 NATO Strategic Document seems singularly out of place. It extols the value of nuclear weapons rather than downplays their significance, and contributes to the high political value of nuclear weapons. Hopefully, it will be revised at the April Summit.

Beyond this, of greatest significance now in the effort to lower the political value of nuclear weapons and strengthen the NPT regime would be for NATO to decide to limit the role of nuclear weapons to its core deterrence function: deterring their use by others. In other words, NATO should pledge that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into future conflicts and that it will adopt a no first-use policy. The rationale for the current policy of the option to use nuclear weapons first, the conventional strength of the Warsaw Pact, has long since passed into history. Hopefully, the concept of NATO's no first-use policy will be seriously studied by NATO as part of a review to commence after the April Summit, as was recommended by the Canadian Report.

²⁰ Peggy Mason, *The NATO Alliance, No First Use and Nuclear Nonproliferation*, 31 CASE W. J. INT'L L. 633 (1999).

²¹ See generally 1995 Security Council Resolution, *supra* note 16.

In conclusion, widespread nuclear proliferation would place security beyond the reach of any nation. No amount of retaliatory power will protect human civilization from the miscalculations, accidents, and misdeeds that nuclear arms, in the hands of many, would make possible. The prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation must be our highest priority. In the Canadian Report, Canada has shown us the road we must follow. I commend all fifteen recommendations, and I hope the Government of Canada will decide to act upon them to the fullest extent possible and that others will heed them as well.

**NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS**
Question and Answer Session

QUESTION, CONFERENCE PARTICIPANT: I was wondering if either you or any of the panelists from the first session would speak to two propositions that I plan to put forward in my class. The first idea is that the only way nuclear disarmament is ever going to occur is if proliferation occurs. Only then will the existing powers ever agree to give up nuclear weapons. The second is that the only way other states will ever permanently agree to forswear nuclear weapons is if they have some kind of guarantee of conventional powers, which I have not heard addressed all day.

Can any of you address either of these two propositions, so that I can report your statements back to my students?

ANSWER, AMBASSADOR MASON: As to your second point, the overwhelming majority of states have already permanently forsworn nuclear weapons. I suppose as to your argument about permanency, there is always an exit to the treaty. I do not think that the choices are that stark. I think that most countries would like to believe that the current nuclear non-proliferation regime can be made to work. When we are talking about no first use, we are talking about a very modest step by NATO with tremendous symbolic value for others by essentially reaffirming that these others have a say or a role to play.

Allow me to return to harp about the issue of leadership. One of the things about leadership is actually allowing the broad community to participate in some way, however modest, in these decisions. That is part of what this debate is all about.

So, in terms of the second proposition, I think that the vast majority of non-nuclear weapon states who are parties to the NPT believe very strongly that it is in their interest not to have nuclear weapons and that is in their interest not to have them proliferated. But they also

believe that it is in their interest that the five nuclear weapon states reduce. Since reduction by these five states is viewed in part as an encouragement to others, the non-reduction by these five states undermines the position that they would like to see.

COMMENT, CONFERENCE PARTICIPANT: I was tying it back to U.S. conventional forces, which is another issue altogether.

ANSWER, AMBASSADOR MASON: Again, one of the most frustrating things about the current state of U.S. nuclear policy is that there is a kind of blind reliance, when in fact, it will not be relied upon at all. If we are talking about conventional forces, it gives me the opportunity to say, from the perspective of every other country in the world, that if there is one thing that will not be a consequence of further reductions in nuclear weapons, it would be the need for the United States to build up its conventional forces further. I feel you are so far out there.

I love it when we have discussions of the evolution of military affairs because I keep wanting to ask my colleagues in the United States: Who is the other side? They are not out there.

So, I think the real issue with conventional weapons is not to add more of them, but how such forces are going to be used. This is what is going on in Kosovo right now. Will you put troops on the ground? Those kinds of hard questions are not going to be taken away by yet more R&D programs, which is the current elusive technical answer. It is how the United States uses the force that it has now. I think the real questions are right down there in the trenches, the hard kind of slugging-it-out type issues, not the sort of grand design that obscures this kind of questioning and debate.

So what are we going to do? Role-playing I think would be good. Take away all the nuclear weapons; what are you going to do now?

COMMENT, AMBASSADOR GRAHAM: I would reject any link between conventional forces and nuclear weapons. Nothing would more undermine the security of every country in the world, and I do mean *every* country in the world, than for nuclear weapons to spread globally. That would mean a conflict in Central Asia would involve nuclear weapons, and a conflict in Southeast Asia would involve nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is not in anybody's interest for nuclear weapons to spread all over the world. I think they should be considered by themselves, unlinked to anything else, including another type of weapon.

QUESTION, CONFERENCE PARTICIPANT: My question is for Ambassador Mason. NATO at the moment is in a rather arrogant mode. The power of the United Nations has been decreasing, while

NATO has been enlarging, taking on actions that it had not previously decided to do. That is not normally a very good time to ask an organization to impose restrictions upon itself without some very positive payoffs for that action.

So my question is, if we are asking NATO to adopt a no first-use policy and restrict its actions, what are the specific payoffs you see them receiving for this action?

ANSWER, AMBASSADOR MASON: I think that is a very good question, as one of the peculiarities of foreign ministries is the separation of various groups of officials working on things. One of the biggest of these separations seems to be between the NATO bureaucrats, the NATO officials, and the nuclear non-proliferation ones.

The first payoff in the bluntest terms for NATO, by which I mean the heads of NATO, the NATO foreign ministers, and the prime ministries of our countries, is that it would cease being in contravention of its legally binding obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Where do we go from here in terms of having some kind of conference where you actually force these groups to come together and address this? The debate really does go on parallel lines. We see this constant contradiction all the time, most directly with trade, between our non-proliferation goals on the one the hand and our trade goals on the other. It is always a balancing act. NATO members and the foreign ministers should have to face this contradiction.

But, in terms of non-proliferation by NATO, it is so stark that getting the debate going is really the issue. I suppose the short answer is, if the debate starts in any kind of meaningful way, this kind of contradiction cannot really be sustained.

Canada's position on this issue, we have been quite categorical, is that there was one unanimous finding in the International Court of Justice's decision,²² which was the legally binding obligation negotiated under Article 6 of the NPT. It was to have real meaning. All of these countries reaffirmed this in 1995.

So, really, it is quite extraordinary the way we discuss NATO as somehow being its own kind of separate thing and not as our foreign ministers, our prime ministers, and so on. Quite aside from everything else, it would actually help on the arrogance front. I would argue that it is a thin veneer there with NATO. Yes, they have all the power. In a way, it is like the United States itself, with all this power, but what do you do with it? And, again, the unilateral bombing by NATO, is it

²² See *Advisory Opinion*, *supra* note 18.

going to be sufficient? Frankly, that is why I think the United States is not interested in a debate taking place.

There was a kind of pressure that the Canadian government was put under—the foreign minister wrote a letter to the Parliamentary Committee, which is fairly unique in our system because it is independent, that essentially asked if they would consider this, and they took it on. The pressure, the level of rhetoric, the diplomatic arm-twisting that took place when our friends and allies found out about this was extraordinary, which suggested to me all the more reason to do it.

So getting the debate going is actually nine-tenths of the battle. It also leads into another very important aspect of the debate and that is the de-linking aspect. It is quite clear that the United States is really out of step, I would say, with the other NATO members in terms of this potential new role for nuclear weapons, the chemical deterrent, and chemical and biological weapons. If that issue really does start to get discussed, which it would have to be if there was a good review of the nuclear doctrine, then it would be clear that almost every one of the other members simply does not want to add new rules. They are uncomfortable enough with the position now.

QUESTION, CONFERENCE PARTICIPANT: My question is somewhat related, and it is a *who* kind of question. Without meaning to in any way discount the sheer power of inertia with regards to the maintenance of policy since 1989, you have two outsider views and one insider view. What are the social constituencies that block discussion of the reduction, elimination, or declaration of a no first-use policy, first in the United States, but also in Britain, France, and within NATO, who, I assume, is also a prime mover in this regard? They are at least democracies, and their foreign ministers, in some way, answer to constituencies somehow.

What, then, are the potential constituencies in favor of a reduction or elimination in these nations?

ANSWER, AMBASSADOR GRAHAM: I will have the first try at that question. When I used to negotiate with the Soviet Union, they had a phrase they often used that went something like this: To ask the question is to answer it. It is the bureaucracy everywhere, not just in Washington, but in Brussels, in London, and everywhere else.

In the United States at least you look at every poll that has ever been taken on this subject, and there is no question where the American people stand on this issue. The public is not in favor of large numbers of nuclear weapons and threatening other countries with them. It is the other way around: Seventy percent want drastic reductions in nuclear weapons, thirty percent think they are gone already,

and so forth.²³ The American public is just not engaged on this issue, and I suspect it is true in the other countries as well. However, I think that the Canadian public is more engaged on this issue.

QUESTION, CONFERENCE PARTICIPANT: Before we go on to an external view, would a better way to attack the problem be to start instead a grass roots campaign to mobilize the portion of the public that knows and to educate that portion that does not, rather than by mobilizing groups of ossified bureaucrats to trot out the same arguments?

ANSWER, AMBASSADOR GRAHAM: It is good to talk about, but it just never seems to happen. It is a lot more difficult than one would think and particularly difficult in the United States. People are interested in whatever—the Simpson trial, Monica Lewinsky, basketball playoffs, the stock market. It is very difficult to get people interested over a period of time in these issues, although they should be. As I said, Canada is more attuned to these issues than we are.

COMMENT, AMBASSADOR MASON: But that is another argument, I would say, for getting the debate under way. You need a focal point for public pressure. This kind of debate gives us an ability to focus.

You mentioned Britain and France. It is quite extraordinary the change that is taking place with the change in leadership in Britain and France. A lot of people were a bit disappointed that the British Review did not go quite as far as they thought. But, nonetheless, it went a fair distance. Also, there is the change in Germany. So, again, it builds.

When the debate starts, there is a kind of multiplier effect, and groups can then organize and mobilize and focus. Again, I think that is the reason why there is so much effort to not have a debate at all. The biggest argument, of course, is it is going to undermine the Trans-Atlantic link. Of course, I would argue the opposite, that by not having a debate and not resolving some of these things, particularly the business of new roles for nuclear weapons with respect to chemical and biological weapons, this link is in jeopardy. So we want to get that sorted out before we have a big crisis. We do not want to try to maintain NATO Alliance unity on that basis when there has been no debate whatsoever on them.

²³ See e.g. *Majority of Americans Support Nuclear Weapons Reductions/Elimination* (visited July 8, 1999) <<http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/rel82798.htm>> (reporting on a study that found that nearly 50 percent of Americans support the elimination of worldwide nuclear arsenals and 25-33 percent support the reduction of nuclear weapons).

COMMENT, AMBASSADOR GRAHAM: Going back to your suggestion about a grass roots campaign, that is why we are here. That is what this conference is all about. Of course, considering Mexico, they do not have to do a grass roots campaign; they are already there. It is just difficult, very difficult.

COMMENT, AMBASSADOR MASON: Congress plays a role too. Look at the CTBT.²⁴ You are really caught because, after all, in Canada it was not a government report and the bureaucrats were not enthusiastically behind it. Rather, this is a parliamentary report. There is no discounting that side. Likewise in Europe you will probably see, if the debate engages, you will see the parliaments getting involved.

²⁴ Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, *opened for signature* Sept. 24, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/50/1027/Annex (1996), 35 I.L.M. 1439.