



RELIGIONS *for* PEACE  
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WORLD CONFERENCE  
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ON RELIGION AND PEACE  
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*Standing Commission on Disarmament and Security*

*The Promise of Commitments Made*

H.E. MR. THOMAS GRAHAM, JR.

MODERATOR

*It is now my privilege to introduce Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., who is presently the President of Lawyers Alliance for World Security. Ambassador Graham was Special Representative of the President of the United States for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation from 1994 to 1997. During that time he led the United States delegation in the negotiations to obtain indefinite extension of the NPT at its Review Conference in 1995.*

*Ambassador Graham's record of working to control weapons of mass destruction is decades long. From 1977 to 1981 and then, again from 1983 to 1993, he was the General Counsel for the United States Arms Control Disarmament Agency. There is hardly an arms control treaty that has been obtained in the last few decades that he has not been instrumental in helping to create. He is now an active leader of an NGO and brings knowledge, experience and wisdom to his analysis of where we are and of where we need to go.*

*Ambassador Graham exemplifies the importance of engaging NGOs in the arms control and disarmament process.*



Let me begin by saying what a pleasure it is to be here this afternoon. Thank you, Jonathan, for once again participating in putting together an excellent program.

If you don't mind, I would like to begin with a short, somewhat personal digression about the irony or coincidence, I'm not sure which, that brings me to a panel co-sponsored by the World Conference on Religion and Peace at this time.

Concurrently with my annual pilgrimage home to Louisville for the Kentucky Derby, I had the opportunity earlier this week to visit the Trappist monastery where Thomas Merton was for many years a monk. I recently read his magnificent book, *Seven Storied Mountain*, which impressed me so much that I decided to pay a visit. While there, I learned that the Trappist monks are not supposed to speak much of the time, which some would suggest would be a good model for today's politics. But, presumably, people who opt to live and work at a monastery do so when they want to get away from the world; when they believe all that is left to do is to pray for the world. Sometimes, but not often, it seems to me this is where we are with the NPT regime.

Now, three weeks into the 2000 Review Conference, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty states parties have again an opportunity to strengthen the regime.

A similar effort was taken in 1995, when indefinite extension of the NPT was achieved and the parties reaffirmed the central bargain underpinning the Treaty. To alleviate concerns on the part of certain non-nuclear weapon states that indefinite extension of the Treaty not entail an indefinite legitimization of the possession of nuclear weapons by existing nuclear weapon states, the NPT member states agreed in 1995 to a Statement of Principles and Objectives on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. This Statement set specific goals to demonstrate commitment on the part of all NPT parties to Article VI of the Treaty.

It is no secret that we have not fully implemented the agenda contemplated in 1995. Further, in 1998, India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons, which coupled with repeated skirmishes has brought South Asia closer to the brink of nuclear confrontation and set a precedent for nuclear proliferation. Additional negotiated reductions in nuclear weapons have stalled, although Russia's recent ratification of START II is a step forward, its entry into force is still far off as the Treaty will return to the U.S. Senate where it is likely to get caught up in the debate on national missile defense. However, the forthcoming United States-Russia Summit meeting may provide the opportunity for a commitment to significantly deeper reductions going well beyond the 1997 START III undertaking.

Russia has recently ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as well, but this alone cannot undo the damage done by the U.S. Senate rejection of the Treaty last year. Recently, a senior European diplomat stated that the rejection of the CTBT by the country that championed its negotiation, if combined with a unilateral putting aside of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, could severely jeopardize the entire edifice of non-proliferation and arms control.

In addition, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran remain issues of concern with respect to the proliferation of nuclear and missile-related technology. Perhaps in the Middle East, the peace process will represent a first step toward a conflict resolution process that will eventually include discussions on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. In the case of North Korea, continued dialogue between the North and the South such as the meeting planned between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il next month will also represent an opportunity to address proliferation concerns. But these paths toward increased stability will take time.

The last few years have not been used to build the strong foundation needed to preserve and strengthen the NPT. Some argue that arms control and non-proliferation, like many other things in life, follow a cycle, and that we should expect periods of progress, as well as periods of stagnation. But if significant progress is not achieved in the next few years, there is a risk that the NPT regime could unravel to a point of no return. International security can not afford such a development.

In order to prevent such an outcome, the central objective should be to implement fully the Statement of Principles and significantly reduce the political prestige value of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons should cease being central security instruments and gradually fade into the background. The way to accomplish this task is to reduce the number of nuclear weapons to as low a level as is practical, and strictly limit their role. Further reduction in nuclear weapons should be pursued to levels well beyond those currently planned for START III. The United States and Russia should aim to reduce to 1,000-1,500 strategic nuclear weapons on each side as some experts have suggested in the last day or two, and then both sides should pursue negotiations to attain a level of 1,000 nuclear weapons overall. Subsequently, the nuclear weapon states should pursue negotiations toward residual levels in the low 100s for the United States and Russia, and below 100 for the other three. In this context India, Pakistan and Israel should go to zero with perhaps fissile material retained on their territory under IAEA safeguards as a hedge against breakdown of the agreement. These three states should then join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. All non-nuclear weapon states could declare again their non-nuclear status and all NPT parties could agree to take joint action against any violator.

Another crucial step in reducing the prestige value of nuclear weapons is fulfilling the commitment in the Statement of Principles to pursue legally binding negative security assurances. In this context, the only role for nuclear weapons at this time should be one of core deterrence—detering the use of other nuclear weapons. When the nuclear weapon states reaffirmed their pledge not to use nuclear weapons against NPT non-nuclear weapon states, no exception was made for chemical and biological weapons. Four of the five nuclear weapon states and the NATO Alliance still retain the option to use nuclear weapons first, a policy that is potentially inconsistent with the negative security assurances.

Accordingly, the nuclear weapon states should pledge not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into future conflicts, and NATO should consider the adoption of such a policy in the context of its on-going review. In my personal judgement, most NATO member states at this time could go along with such a policy change. This is essentially the same thing as negative security assurances except it applies to all states, not only to the NPT non-nuclear weapon states, and it would strengthen the 1995 NSAs and help ease increasing tensions.

With respect to the CTBT, I am confident that the U.S. Senate rejection will not be the final word on this important landmark of the non-proliferation regime. Efforts are being pursued within Congress and the Administration to enhance the prospects of successful ratification when the next Administration takes office. The CTBT has long been regarded as the litmus test of commitment to Article VI and it should be brought into force as soon as possible.

I would add in conclusion that this Conference represents a valuable opportunity to reflect on the current status of the regime and on the progress made, and on the progress which should be made as we look ahead. It is also a chance to realize the immeasurable significance the NPT bears on our continued security as we enter the new century and new millennium which will undoubtedly be fraught with persisting conflicts of ideology, religion, culture, territory and international standing. I should note that it appears the first three weeks of the Review Conference have been constructive.

Many delegations have done well thus far. We must bear in mind that it will be essential to the long-term viability of the NPT regime for the NPT states parties, in particular the nuclear weapon states, to pursue deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, bring CTBT into force, preserve the ABM Treaty, and agree to legally binding negative security assurances. However, it is of paramount importance that there be strong and continued support for and understanding of the role of the NPT in world security, and I hope that all NPT parties always will have this as a cornerstone of their foreign and security policy.

MODERATOR

*Thank you, Ambassador Graham. The premises of realpolitik wherein the stability of the state is placed as the supreme point of reference over the importance of human security and wherein morality is marginalized in the analysis of the relationship between states has always seemed inadequate to me. If one were to run a family with this comportment in relationships, it would not work. Families must operate such that the well being of others is considered a necessary part of ones own well being.*

*Cooperation strengthens the well being of all. States must begin to practice this attitude in security matters.*

*Many challenges cannot be met by even the most powerful nations alone. The world summits of the 1990s, such as the Summit on the Environment in Rio, the Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen, the Summit on Population in Cairo, the Summit on Gender-Equity in Beijing, and the Summit on Human Settlements in Istanbul, set forth programs addressing global problems which can only be solved by cooperation among states.*

*Our common fate is largely based on our ability to respond appropriately to real global threats which require our working together to solve. The most basic ethical and moral principle found in every religious tradition articulates a principle of cooperation. We call it the Golden Rule. It can be understood as the principle of reciprocity: Do unto others, as you would have them do unto you. It is a practical principle well tested over millennia. It is inadequate for several nations to claim an exception to this rule with regard to nuclear weapons. It is impractical as well as inconsistent with morality for several states to say that nuclear weapons provide them with a unique security benefit while depriving others of this alleged benefit. The correct moral posture is for states to do unto other states as they would have them do unto them.*

*Before Rev. Sugitani speaks, I want to acknowledge Myrna Peña, Director of the Disarmament Program of the World Conference on Religion and Peace. She envisioned and organized this symposium.*