

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.  
Special Representative of the President for Arms Control,  
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament  
Speaking at the Asahi Shimbun  
May 31, 1995

The Trinity test, almost fifty years ago, changed the world forever, affirming for the first time our potential capacity to extinguish life on Earth. The most important -- and in many respects the most difficult -- challenge that emerged was not how to design and build more and better nuclear weapons, but how to control them. Most importantly, how to stop them from spreading. It became clear that this could be achieved only through an effective common, that is multilateral, effort.

I am pleased to report that multilateral arms control works, and while we still have a long way to go, we have reason to hope for a world free of nuclear weapons. The states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely without a vote earlier this month at the United Nations in New York. This decision to make

the cornerstone of international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons permanent bodes well for all future efforts to control weapons of mass destruction.

By the time the NPT was negotiated, five countries had openly tested nuclear weapons: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France. Estimates at the time suggested that this number might be as high as 30 by the late 1970s and who knows how high by now if this emerging trend had been left unchecked. Many argued, and in fact still do, that the impetus for worldwide nuclear weapons proliferation is an unstoppable force. If that is so, then it met an immovable object in the NPT. Although a small (and diminishing) number of "threshold" states have muddied the waters, the 25 years the NPT has been in force have been free of a single addition to this list of declared nuclear powers. It may be difficult to prove that the NPT dissuaded even one state from building a nuclear arsenal, but in light of the marked change in global attitudes toward nuclear proliferation, it is indefensible to contend that it did not. In 1970, a state's declaration of having created a new nuclear arsenal stopped being a point of national pride. The NPT made it a violation of international law. This month, that law became permanent.

The consensus decision to extend the NPT indefinitely and without conditions demonstrates that the international community's skepticism that gave the NPT an initially limited duration has given way to confidence that nuclear nonproliferation should be an enduring norm and that the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons as contemplated by the NPT is what all nations support.

We should recall the world in which the NPT came into force a quarter-century ago. The Cold War struggle had created a nuclear standoff that threatened the survival not only of the United States, the Soviet Union and their allies -- but that of every nation. That struggle also contributed to a costly and dangerous global nuclear arms race. The prospect of ten or more new nuclear powers seemed just over the horizon. It was a world in which fear outpaced hope.

Today, we live in a safer, freer, and better world, The Cold War is over: the strategic forces of the superpowers are standing down while their nuclear arsenals are shrinking dramatically. The international community has done its part to reduce the nuclear danger for the entire world. The heart of this effort has been the NPT. Simply put, the NPT has worked.

The NPT is truly one of the most important treaties of all

time. Many of the NPT's achievements cannot be quantified -- the weapons not built, the nuclear materials not diverted, and the wars not started. But the results are nonetheless impressive. Since coming into force the NPT has kept the number of nuclear powers far lower than initially forecast. It has given the parties confidence in the nuclear intentions of other nations. It has reduced the risk of nuclear conflict. It has advanced nuclear disarmament. It has bolstered regional security. It has promoted the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy. It has undergirded the international community's efforts to halt the spread of all weapons of mass destruction.

The consensus decision to extend the NPT indefinitely and without conditions was a collaborative victory, not a competitive one. The NPT Review and Extension Conference was not similar to a football game with winners and losers. Rather it was a debate over how best to make this Treaty, the centerpiece of international peace and security, strong and durable. All the nations and peoples of the world are winners as a result of the decision in New York.

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference did more than extend the NPT indefinitely. It adopted a set of principles and objectives on nonproliferation and a framework for a strengthened

review process. These decisions give us the framework for our future efforts and guiding principles by which we can judge our success. The United States is fully committed to the effective implementation of these documents. It is particularly satisfying that the impetus for two of these decisions -- the principles and the strengthened review -- came from a recent adherent to the NPT, South Africa.

The United States Government is resolutely committed to do its part to support the decisions taken in New York and the terms and obligations of all the articles of the NPT. In the short run, this will mean redoubling our efforts to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a fissile material cut-off agreement, but at the same time we will be exploring ways to move beyond the significant reductions to which we have committed ourselves in the START I and START II Treaties. We will not -- we cannot -- walk away from this process.

While the review of the Treaty did not produce a final review document, it did reveal large areas of agreement. NPT parties agreed to give Conference endorsement to the "93+2" plan for strengthened and cost effective safeguards. They also endorsed the value of increased cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including particularly the safe and efficient

utilization of nuclear energy. NPT Parties agreed to pursue the creation of more nuclear weapon free zones (such as the emerging African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty) and have agreed on the importance of nuclear weapon state support for such zones through their implementing protocols, the universal adherence to the NPT, and the early attainment of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Let me again stress that the outcome of the Review and Extension Conference was not a victory for any country or region but rather was a significant achievement for all the parties to the NPT, indeed for the whole world. On March 1, 1995, President Clinton noted that the United States believes that nothing is more important to international security than the achievement of the indefinite extension, without conditions, of this Treaty. In that view, the United States associated itself with an overwhelming majority of the states parties to the Treaty. Every sovereign nation at the 1995 NPT Conference rendered an historic judgement; the United States is hopeful that all states parties will now work together toward the Treaty's ultimate goal: a world without nuclear weapons.

Let me turn to some specific disarmament issues. Through the agreed enhanced review process, the nuclear weapon states have given their commitment for nuclear arms control and

disarmament progress in the future. The United States intends to keep its pledge.

In recent years the United States and the former Soviet Union have: destroyed over 2,500 intermediate-range missiles, thus eliminating an entire class of weapons systems through the implementation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty; decided unilaterally to withdraw and dismantle thousands more tactical arms (90% of the US stockpile of such weapons); and agreed in the START I and START II agreements to take more than 17,000 nuclear weapons off missiles and bombers. The United States and the former Soviet Union are engaged in nuclear disarmament in as ambitious a time-bound framework as technical limitations will permit, the United States alone dismantling its arsenal at the rate of up to 2,000 nuclear weapons a year. By the year 2003, 80% of the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile will have been eliminated, including 70% of strategic weapons added to the 90% of tactical weapons already eliminated. At present, 60% of the overall stockpile has already been eliminated. Through the leadership of Senators Nunn and Lugar, we are aiding Russia in its effort to safely and securely dismantle the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. Just to implement reductions already agreed to, we will need to continue this rapid dismantlement into

the next century. When START II is fully implemented, both the United States and Russia will each have fewer than 3,500 nuclear warheads remaining. On March 1, President Clinton took another significant step on the road to disarmament by permanently removing 200 tons of fissile material -- enough for thousands of nuclear weapons -- from the U.S. nuclear stockpile. He took this action specifically in the context of his reaffirmation of the United States commitment to compliance with Article VI.

A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has been the central objective of nuclear arms control since the late 1950s. All five of the declared nuclear weapon states are committed to achieving a CTBT by 1996. The United States is prepared to conclude that we have already conducted our last nuclear test. President Clinton is committed to delivering this Treaty, which has been the elusive principal object of the arms control quest for over forty years. Achievement of this all-important goal will close and double lock the tomb of the Cold War forever.

The United States will continue exercising global leadership toward the conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes. The United States no longer produces fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes and is working to help Russia obtain alternative power sources



for its three remaining military production reactors. Last year, the United States placed a substantial quantity of nuclear material under IAEA safeguards, including 10 tons of highly enriched uranium from the Department of Energy's Y-12 facility, and this effort is expanding. A fissile material cutoff treaty would cap the amount of material available for nuclear explosives and it would bring the unsafeguarded nuclear programs of certain non-NPT states under some measure of international restraint for the first time. Perhaps most importantly, it would prevent any further production of separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for weapons or other explosive purposes.

The United States is committed to the establishment and strengthening of nuclear weapons free zones. South Africa's unprecedented dismantlement of its nuclear weapon program, as I indicated earlier, has cleared the way for an African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. The United States Government has been on record since 1964 in support of the denuclearization of Africa and supports the concept of this being achieved through a nuclear weapon free zone treaty. The text of this treaty is not yet final, but we hope to be in a position to become a protocol party to the final treaty soon assuming it meets longstanding U.S. criteria for such zones, as we are with the Latin American

Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We recognize the great importance attached to U.S. adherence as a protocol party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone by our negotiating partners from that region and we are actively studying that course of action. The United States supports the establishment of regional nuclear weapon free zones that meet our longstanding criteria for such zones, and encourages progress toward this goal in the different regions of the world.

President Clinton has informed President Soeharto of Indonesia that, in principle, the U.S. would support the creation of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, assuming it meets longstanding U.S. criteria for such zones. We understand that global solutions can start with regional approaches.

If there is one lesson of the NPT Review and Extension Conference it is that the Treaty and the nonproliferation regime it supports become stronger and better with each new adherence. The NPT enjoys the widest adherence of any arms control agreement in history. As the only nuclear nonproliferation agreement of global reach, the treaty has codified an international standard of behavior against which even states outside the regime are measured. Each new member brings the Treaty one step closer to universality and makes the danger of nuclear proliferation more

improbable. The United States supports universality for the NPT and looks forward to the day when this goal is achieved.


The consensus decision to extend the NPT indefinitely and without conditions was a team effort that required numerous contributions that could only be made by partners from diverse perspectives. Vice President Gore demonstrated United States leadership by reaffirming that complete nuclear disarmament remains the ultimate goal of the United States. South African Foreign Minister Nzo played an indispensable role in bridging the gap between the developed and the developing world and providing the basis for the discussion of principles and objectives on nonproliferation and of beneficial enhancements to the NPT Review Process. Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas demonstrated great diplomatic leadership through his proposal to establish a direct relationship between the arms control and nonproliferation principles and objectives and strengthened review process which empowered the conference to reach the consensus which will be beneficial to all. Above all, the farsighted leadership and steady hand of Conference President Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala guided the Review and Extension Conference to the best outcome, locking in a larger area of general agreement among the states parties than almost anyone thought possible on the eve of the

Conference. As I said, the United States is committed to all three documents of the Conference, the Extension Decision, the Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation, and the Strengthened Review Process, and to seeing that they are carried out. We are very grateful to all of our partners around the world who helped us arrive at these historic decisions and look forward to continuing to work with these partners, and all NPT parties, to ensure that their concerns are addressed.

The victory on May 11 was a common victory. It established a permanent landmark on the arms control horizon that we will be blessed to have in years to come. In the last twelve months alone, the headlines and attention of the world have been drawn repeatedly to the grim specter of nuclear proliferation. North Korea's nuclear program, the smuggling of fissile materials out of the former Soviet Union, and the apparent Iranian decision to seek nuclear weapons capability have each reinforced the gravity of the problem. The international community will have to continue to work together to keep nuclear proliferation in check and, to this end, it is important to the United States that all states parties to the NPT feel a part of our common victory.

Reflecting on this month's historic decision to make the NPT permanent, it is important for us to ask ourselves what the

essential elements of this decision are, what made it possible and what will make it work? The answers include peace, cooperation, and the conscious decision to establish the permanent basis for efforts to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons.



国際シンポジウム

核拡散を止めよう

# *Beyond The NPT Regime*

1995年5月31日(水) 午前10時～午後5時

東京・有楽町朝日ホール

May 31 (Wed), 1995 10:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m.

Yurakucho Asahi Hall, Tokyo

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主催：米国カーネギー財団、朝日新聞社

Sponsored by

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Asahi Shimbun



### トーマス・グレアム


軍備管理・軍縮・核不拡散問題米大統領特別代表

今回のNPT延長・再検討会議で、米国代表を務めた。1983年から94年まで米軍備管理軍縮局の法律顧問。このほか、第二次戦略兵器制限交渉(SALT II、74-79年)、中距離核戦力全廃交渉(81-82年)、第一次戦略兵器削減交渉(START I、91年)、START II(92年)で、米代表団の法律顧問などを務めてきた。61歳。

### Thomas Graham, Jr.

Special Representative of the U.S. President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament

Thomas Graham, Jr. served as Special Representative of the President in the 1995 Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. From 1983 to 1994 he was General Counsel of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Ambassador Graham served as Legal Advisor to the U.S. SALT II Delegation (1974-1979), Senior Arms Control Agency Representative to the U.S. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Delegation (1981-1982), and Legal Advisor to the U.S. START Delegation (1991) and START II Delegation (1992).



### クリシュナ・スブラマンヤム


前防衛問題研究所(ニューデリー)所長

タイムズ・オブ・インディア編集顧問。研究所所長は、1968年から75年と80年から87年の期間務める。この他、インド政府共同情報委員会委員長、国防省防衛産業担当次官などを歴任。国連では、80年から81年に、軍縮と開発の関係に関する政府間専門家グループのメンバー、85年から86年には核抑止研究グループの議長。66歳。

### Krishna Subrahmanyam

Former Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (New Delhi)

Krishna Subrahmanyam is Consulting Editor of *The Times of India*. He served as Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses for two terms (1968-1975 and 1980-1987). Among other assignments, he has served as Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Government of India and Secretary (Defence Production) of the Ministry of Defence. He has held several positions in the UN, including as member of the Intergovernmental Experts Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (1980-1981) and Chairman of the UN Study Group on Nuclear Deterrence (1985-1986).



### イアン・アンソニー

ストックホルム国際平和研究所(SIPRI)主任研究員

ロンドン大で歴史学、軍事学を学んだ後SIPRIに参加。現在は武器移転問題プロジェクト・リーダー。「国際武器取引:インドおよびパキスタンのケース・スタディ、1947-86年」で同大博士号。著書に『海軍武器取引』、『中央および東ヨーロッパの防衛産業の未来』など。他にSIPRI年鑑などに研究報告書多数。35歳。

### Ian Anthony

Project Leader on Arms Transfer Project for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Ian Anthony received a B.A. in History, an M.A. in War Studies and a Ph.D. from the University of London. His Ph.D. thesis was entitled *The International Arms Trade: Case Studies of India and Pakistan 1947-86*. His publications include *The Naval Arms Trade* and *The Future of the Defence Industries of Central and Eastern Europe*. Dr. Anthony, now 35, has also contributed many articles to the *SIPRI Yearbook*.



### 今井 隆吉

元軍縮会議日本政府代表部大使

杏林大学教授。世界平和研究所主席研究員。朝日新聞記者を経て日本原子力発電(株)に移り技術部長などを務める。その後、クウェート、メキシコ大使などを歴任。軍縮会議大使は、1982年から4年間務めた。85年のNPT再検討会議では議長。著書に『核軍縮』『科学と外交』など。66歳。

### Ryukichi Imai

Former Permanent Representative of the Japanese Government to the Conference on Disarmament

Ryukichi Imai is a professor at Kyorin University and Distinguished Scholar of the Institute for International Policy Studies. After working as a science reporter for the *Asahi Shimbun*, he moved to the Japan Atomic Power Co., where he held such positions as General Manager. He then became Ambassador of Japan to Kuwait and Ambassador to Mexico. From 1982 to 1986, he served as Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament. He chaired the 1985 NPT Conference. He is the author of such books as *Nuclear Disarmament*.



### 范 国祥

元中国軍縮大使

北京外交学院教授。国連人権小委員会委員も務める。1949年中華人民共和国成立直後に外務省入り。国連本部、ジュネーブの代表部に勤務し、83年から85年まで国連安全保障理事会の中国副代表。軍縮大使は86年から89年まで。その後89年から92年まで、ジュネーブ代表部大使。93年から中国人民政治協商会議全国委員会委員。66歳。

### Fan Guoxiang

Former Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs

Fan Guoxiang is a professor at the College of Diplomacy in Beijing and a member of the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights. He joined the Chinese Foreign Service in 1949 and has been posted to UN headquarters. From 1983 to 1985 he served as Deputy Representative of China to the UN Security Council. Between 1986 and 1989 he was Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, and from 1989 to 1992 he was Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the UN's Geneva Office. Since 1993 he has been a member of the National Committee of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference.



### セリグ・ハリソン


カーネギー財団主任研究員

1968年から72年まで、ワシントンポスト紙の北東アジア局(東京)主任を務めた。72年には、朝鮮戦争終結後アメリカ人として初めて、朝鮮民主主義人民共和国(北朝鮮)を訪問。94年にも再訪し、故金日成主席から核開発凍結と最終的な中止の約束を取り付けた。同財団の「国際安全保障と日本」問題研究の責任者。68歳。

### Selig Harrison

Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Selig Harrison served as Northeast Asia Bureau Chief of *The Washington Post*, based in Tokyo, from 1968 to 1972. In 1972 he became one of the first Americans to visit North Korea since the Korean War. In 1994 he met the late Kim Il Sung and won agreement to the concept of a freeze and eventual dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program. Mr. Harrison is Director of the Endowment's Program on Japan's Role in International Security Affairs.



### 中馬 清福 (司会)

朝日新聞論説主幹

政治部記者として取材活動の後、政治部次長、調査研究室主任研究員などを歴任。1983年から84年、マサチューセッツ工科大学客員研究員として、安全保障と軍備管理を研究。論説委員などを経て、現職。59歳。

### Kiyofuku Chuma (Moderator)

Chairman, Editorial Board of *Asahi Shimbun*

Starting as a political reporter for the *Asahi Shimbun*, Kiyofuku Chuma has held several positions at the newspaper, including Deputy Political Editor and Senior Researcher of the Research and Analysis Center. From 1983 to 1984 he studied security and arms control as a visiting scholar at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. After working as Editorial Writer for the *Asahi Shimbun*, Mr. Chuma assumed his present position in 1994.

## プログラム

## Program

10:00～ 開会、中馬清福氏のあいさつ、講師紹介

10:00 *Introductory Remarks* Mr. Kiyofuku Chuma, Moderator

### 午前の部「世界の動向」

### Morning Session: "The Global Scene"

10:15～ 基調講演  
トーマス・グレナム氏  
35～ クリシュナ・スブラマンヤム氏  
55～ イアン・アンソニー氏  
11:15～ 今井隆吉氏  
35～ 討論 参加者全員  
12:45～ 昼食休憩

10:15 *Keynote Speech* Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.  
10:35 *Keynote Speech* Mr. Krishna Subrahmanyam  
10:55 *Keynote Speech* Dr. Ian Anthony  
11:15 *Keynote Speech* Ambassador Ryukichi Imai  
11:35 *Panel Discussion* All participants  
12:45 *Lunch Break*

### 午後の部「東アジアでは」

### Afternoon Session: "The East-Asian Scene"

14:00～ 基調講演  
セリグ・ハリソン氏  
20～ 范国祥氏  
45～ 討論 参加者全員  
16:15～ 休憩  
30～ 総括  
17:00 終了

14:00 *Keynote Speech* Mr. Selig Harrison  
14:20 *Keynote Speech* Ambassador Fan Guoxiang  
14:45 *Panel Discussion* All participants  
16:15 *Break*  
16:30 *Conclusion*  
17:00 *End of Discussion*



# NPT(核不拡散条約)

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty


条約の主な内容は①加盟国の核拡散防止義務②非核国が原子力を平和利用する際の国際原子力機関 (IAEA) による保障措置 (核査察) 受け入れ義務③原子力平和利用の権利保障④核軍縮条約に向けた「誠実な交渉」の義務など。

1970年3月に発効。現在の加盟国は百七十八カ国(外務省調べ)。ことし4月から5月にかけてニューヨークで、延長・再検討会議が開かれ、無期限延期と、以下の骨子を決めた。

- 1、核不拡散条約を無期限に延長
- 1、核兵器の廃絶が究極の目標であることを再確認
- 1、非加盟国の早期加盟を促進
- 1、包括的核実験禁止条約交渉を1996年中に終えることなどが重要
- 1、非核保有国への核兵器の使用、威嚇が行われないよう拘束力のある措置も検討

## 核拡散の現状

The Present State of Nuclear Proliferation



- 核兵器保有国
- 核兵器保有または開発が伝えられる国
- ▨ 核兵器開発を中止した国

(注) ウクライナ、カザフスタン、ベラルーシに残された旧ソ連軍の核兵器はロシア軍が管理

(米議会技術評価局の資料などから)

※同時通訳聴取用のレシーバー (イヤホン) は、ご昼食やご帰宅で会場を出られる時、必ず受付にお返し下さい。再入場の際に、またお渡しします。

※ご昼食休憩後の再入場は、受け付け時にお渡ししたバッジを拝見させていただきますので、上着等にバッジをご着用のうえ退席されるようお願いいたします。