

“The 1997 Multilateral Arms Control Agenda and ACDA Priorities”

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The last few years have been a time of unprecedented success in arms control. We have seen the cornerstone of United States and Canadian efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons -- the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) -- indefinitely extended. A significant step towards reducing the overarmament of the Cold War was taken when START II was ratified by the U.S. Senate. And the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ended the era of nuclear testing, a goal that had been sought for more than forty years.

Despite this string of successes, however, the world remains a dangerous place. The spread of technology has made it possible for dozens of states, many of whom we believe view the United States as an enemy or whose interests are inimical to those of the United States, to possess or seek nuclear, biological or chemical weapons capability.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has created new fears about nuclear materials leaking out to terrorists or criminals and the efforts of rogue states such as Iran and Iraq to acquire weapons of mass destruction has become more threatening in recent years. We know now how close Iraq was to building a nuclear weapon just prior to the Gulf War, and Saddam Hussein continues to hide information concerning the Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear weapon programs from

UN inspectors. In Libya, construction has ceased for the time being on what we think is a massive chemical weapons plant at Tarhunah, but who knows how long this halt will last? These states, and several others, who have time and again shown that they operate outside the circle of civilized nations by supporting terrorism, must be prevented from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Clearly, much more remains to be done to reduce the threat posed to peace and security by weapons of mass destruction. As President Clinton has noted, we are engaged in “the most ambitious agenda to dismantle and fight the spread of weapons of mass destruction since the dawn of the nuclear age.” On this agenda are several important items that will reduce this threat and hopefully, the next few years will bring as much success and security as have the last few.

The primary areas of concern in the next year will be the ratification and strengthening of existing treaties. We expect and hope that the Russian Duma will soon ratify START II, thus bringing the strategic nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia down two-thirds from their Cold-War high. Decisions must be made on how to effectively implement the strengthened NPT review process and negotiations must also continue on how to enhance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). It is also vital that the ratification process of the CTBT move forward so as to bring this landmark treaty into force as soon as possible. Perhaps most importantly, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) must be ratified by the United States soon to ensure continued U.S. leadership in the fight against the spread of chemical weapons.

START II

I will address each of these agreements in turn, but let us begin with START II. Although the Soviet Union has collapsed and the United States no longer views Russia as an enemy, the huge nuclear arsenals left over from the Cold War pose a serious potential threat. The United States and Russia have attempted to lessen this threat through the negotiation of bilateral disarmament treaties such as START I and START II. The START I Treaty, which mandated reductions in the total number of deployed strategic warheads to 6,000 on each side (roughly a one-third cut), entered into force on December 5, 1994. The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to the START II Treaty in January 1996. Unfortunately, over a year later, we are still waiting for the Russian Duma to follow suit. Building on the disarmament progress made under START I, START II will leave each side with 3,500 deployed strategic warheads. Entry-into-force of START II will also facilitate negotiation of further reductions -- leading perhaps to a START III. President Clinton reaffirmed this commitment last year in his speech before the UN General Assembly, when he stated that "When Russia ratifies START II, President Yeltsin and I are ready to discuss the possibilities of further cuts." The President also called for the limiting and monitoring of nuclear warheads and materials to help make deep reductions irreversible. Although the Russians have concerns about NATO expansion and U.S. commitment to the ABM Treaty, I am optimistic that they will recognize their security interests are best served by ratifying START II.

CTBT

A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a bulwark against the spread and further development of

nuclear weapon capabilities. The CTBT places a profound and permanent new constraint upon nuclear weapon capabilities, with particular impact on the nuclear weapon states. It will constrain any nation from improving its existing arsenal and prevents the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons. It also keeps new states from becoming nuclear powers by preventing them from testing in order to learn how to build nuclear weapons more efficiently, or to make more advanced weapons. Both of these results ensure that the arms race is over once and for all and are essential prerequisites to further progress toward nuclear disarmament. As President Clinton recently remarked, the CTBT points us “toward a century in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced, and ultimately eliminated.”

Now that the CTBT has been opened for signature and 142 countries have signed the treaty, we must begin work to secure ratification by the required parties to bring the treaty into force. The goal of the Clinton Administration is to work towards achieving entry-into-force of the CTBT at the earliest possible date: September 1998. Of the 44 countries whose ratification is necessary for entry-into-force, 41 have already signed the treaty, including all five of the declared nuclear weapon states, as well as Israel. While it is obviously of extreme importance that the remaining three countries -- India, Pakistan and North Korea -- sign and ratify the CTBT, it is crucial that the other signatories begin the ratification process as well. A strong international consensus against nuclear explosive testing already exists, but each signature and ratification serves to further codify this international norm and make it stronger.

In the United States, the CTBT likely will be submitted to the Senate in a few months, and although

the treaty will be subject to serious debate, I am confident that the Senate will give the CTBT its advice and consent to ratification. The day all states are legally bound to forego nuclear weapon testing is a day which will see the world become a much safer place.

NPT

The indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995 was a significant step forward in fighting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. With 185 countries party to the now-permanent NPT, it is clear that the international community has taken a stand against the further spread of nuclear weapons. Before the NPT entered into force in 1970, the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability had often been a point of national pride. The NPT has made it tantamount to a violation of international law and has added immeasurably to the security of the United States, Canada and of the entire world.

Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, periodic Review Conferences (RevCon) have been held, which provide Treaty parties with the opportunity to review the operation of the NPT to ensure that the preamble and provisions of the treaty are being realized and observed. The next RevCon will take place in the year 2000. The first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting leading to the 2000 NPT Review Conference will be held next month. This is the first PrepCom under the post-1995 NPT Conference regime and it will be an important step toward the “strengthened treaty review process” called for at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The meeting will address exactly how the “strengthened treaty review process” should be implemented. The PrepCom will make both the substantive and procedural preparations for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Over

the next several weeks, attention will be increasingly turned toward this issue as states parties begin their assessment of how to strengthen the NPT regime. The United States is looking forward to a constructive, cooperative process leading to the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

BWC

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) entered into force in 1975, and has 138 parties who have pledged never under any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. The United States has passed legislation making violation of the BWC a criminal offense, and the Anti-terrorism Act of 1996 improves controls over potential biological warfare agents. However, unlike other regimes, the BWC contains no provisions for on-site inspection activity, a source of increasing criticism in recent years. In an effort to strengthen the BWC, many of the parties currently are actively participating in an effort to draft a legally binding protocol that will enhance openness and transparency and thereby improve compliance. This instrument will hopefully set forth measures that provides for off-site and on-site inspection activities and should strengthen compliance by making certain national information declarations mandatory. By 1998, well before the Fifth Review Conference in 2001, we hope to achieve such a legally binding instrument in the form of a Protocol to the BWC.

CWC

Last but definitely not least, we come to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993, which

will ban the stockpile, transfer, and production of chemical weapons, eliminate stockpiles now in existence, and require parties to submit to intrusive on-site inspections. Due to its comprehensive verification regime, this treaty, which was drafted in consultation with representatives from our chemical industry, is a landmark in the struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Convention will make it tougher for rogue states to acquire chemical weapons and will reduce the threat to our citizens at home as well as our troops in the field.

With more than the 65 states necessary to trigger the 180-day countdown toward entry-into-force now having ratified the CWC, the Convention will enter into force at the end of April 1997. As I'm sure many of you know, certain individuals on Capitol Hill in Washington are not fond of this treaty, and as a result, the United States has not yet ratified the CWC. Despite their opposition, President Clinton has vowed that the U.S. "will join the ranks of nations determined to prevent the spread of chemical weapons." Although the United States has unilaterally renounced the use of chemical weapons and is destroying its own chemical weapon stockpiles, failure to ratify the CWC would have disastrous consequences. The CWC was specifically designed to punish those countries who choose to flout the international norm against chemical weapons, thus providing additional incentives to join the regime. They will be subject to restrictions on their chemical trade -- restrictions which will also apply to United States chemical industry if the United States does not become a part of the CWC regime.

Aside from the hundreds of millions of dollars in sales and thousands of jobs the United States would lose from CWC parties being forced to apply trade restrictions to chemicals that originate in

the United States, or are being shipped to the United States, U.S. leadership in the international nonproliferation regime would be undermined. U.S. credibility in the fight to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction would be eroded were the United States to fail to join the CWC regime. In the words of retired General Norman Schwarzkopf, “by not ratifying the treaty, we align ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea, and I’d just as soon not be associated with those thugs...”. If the United States does not join the CWC, the U.S. would be, in effect, legitimizing the possession of chemical weapons by such states.

One of the most oft-heard criticisms of the CWC in Washington is that rogue states have no intention of signing the treaty, and that therefore, the United States should not, either. This is a most unconvincing argument. The United States is already committed under laws passed by Congress in 1985 and 1992 to destroying its chemical weapons. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili testified, “Desert Storm proved that retaliation in kind is not required to deter the use of chemical weapons . . . Our ability to deter the use of chemical weapons in a post-Cold War world will be predicated upon a robust chemical weapons-defense protection program and the ability to rapidly bring to bear superior and overwhelming force in retaliation against a chemical attack...”. Since the U.S. has already decided to destroy its own chemical weapons, the rationale that we should refrain from ratifying the CWC because a few nations may continue to pursue them is illogical. The CWC will make it harder for those countries to acquire the ingredients they need for chemical weapons.

The Convention will also require those states who become party to it to adopt domestic legislation

making the manufacture or possession of chemical weapons illegal. Currently, many states lack such laws. It is worth pointing out that within weeks of the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, Japan quickly ratified the CWC and approved accompanying domestic legislation. The U.S. Administration's proposed CWC implementing legislation, which must accompany ratification of the Convention, will significantly improve U.S. ability to investigate and prosecute those who try to produce chemical weapons.

ACDA

Unfortunately, in order to meet these priorities, we must simultaneously pursue another, most-unwanted mission: fending off attempts to abolish the independent arms control advocacy voice of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the agency created and entrusted to negotiate arms control agreements.

The original legislation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act that created ACDA stated that “the horrors of nuclear warfare, combined with the existence of the United Nations to focus world opinion on arms control and disarmament and to facilitate negotiation, assure that the United States will be increasingly concerned with problems of the limitation, reduction, and control of armaments.” Thirty-five years later, the world has changed drastically, but arms control has become an even more important means of strengthening our national security. In the words of former Secretary of Defense Perry, arms control is “defense by other means.” Every weapon we take or keep out of the hands of a potential enemy through negotiation is one we don't have to defend

against. Every agreement reached helps replace international security autarky with security based on international norms, rule of law and common understanding.

Vice President Gore concluded two years ago that there were some areas of overlap and duplication among the Department of State, ACDA, the Agency for International Development (AID), and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), where efficiencies in operations and program cost savings could be achieved. The President's Management Council also reviewed the structure of all government agencies operating overseas in order to increase effectiveness and reduce costs, and the four foreign affairs agencies were instructed to establish common administrative services. A number of actions have already been undertaken pursuant to these instructions: under the President's reform plan, the agencies have reduced staff by 4,700 positions, cut bureaucratic layers, and established common administrative services, all resulting in more than \$500 million in cost savings.

Despite these actions, some on Capitol Hill remained determined to eliminate the three agencies and last year passed legislation they claimed would "Revitalize" foreign affairs by abolishing ACDA, AID, and USIA. President Clinton vetoed the Act, noting that the three agencies had already streamlined to save money, and stated that a consolidation would "damage our ability to assure the future security and prosperity of the American people."

The issue of consolidation has recently resurfaced, partly due to the controversy surrounding the CWC and partly due to Secretary Albright's appropriate comment during her confirmation hearing that she had an "open mind" on the issue. Some people have construed this as meaning she would

not oppose efforts to eliminate ACDA, USAID and USIA. However, Secretary Albright also stated that, "We need a structure which best serves our foreign policy interests. We also need to assure maximum value to the American taxpayer. I am confident that we can do both." In my own opinion, the optimal way to do that is to keep ACDA as a strong, vital and independent organization.

An independent advocate for arms control in the United States government is important. When the President must make a decision on important matters concerning national security, it is in his best interest and the best interest of the United States that he hear as many options as possible. An independent ACDA keeps arms control high and visible on the nation's agenda. Were ACDA to be completely merged with the State Department, arms control and nonproliferation would be forced to compete with many other foreign policy issues, and would necessarily get less attention at senior levels at a time it needs increasingly more. The dominant day-to-day mission of the Department of State is country relations -- an entirely legitimate and necessary responsibility -- of which arms control and disarmament issues are only one part. Arms control may not always win out over these broader foreign policy considerations, but since it deals with such serious issues such as nuclear weapons limitation and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it deserves to be heard and taken into consideration in the formulation of national security policy.

It should also be pointed out that a lean ACDA, with less than 250 employees and a budget of less than \$50 million, is a national security bargain. The fact that approximately \$100 billion has been saved by the implementation of arms control treaties already negotiated by ACDA make this agency

one of the most effective uses of tax dollars in the history of the United States.

Those who would eliminate the independent voice of ACDA either do not understand that arms control is a valuable tool for strengthening U.S. security or have chosen to subordinate peace and security to their own ideological goals. Claiming ACDA to be a “Cold War relic” when our agenda and our missions are in fact, greater than they have ever been, is at best misleading. As Secretary of State Albright commented during her Senate confirmation hearing, “Arms control and nonproliferation remain a vital element in our foreign policy framework.”

The only people who would benefit from the elimination of the arms control advocacy of ACDA are those who believe the United States should succumb to a “bunker mentality” -- that we should arm ourselves to the teeth and forego all communication or cooperation with other nations. Fortunately, the American people do not subscribe to these ideas.

The United States will, in the next few years, address arms control missions that will fundamentally shape its own and others security for decades to come. Those that I have described here today represent only the tip of the iceberg. I believe that the optimal way to accomplish these missions is with an independent agency dedicated to their success. However, whether or not ACDA endures, arms control will continue to play an important part in U.S. defense and foreign policy. I hope that these next years are as successful as the last few have been. If so, then not only Canada and the United States, but the rest of the world will be a safer place.