

**Remarks by Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.
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The Cold War balance of terror has been replaced by a fundamentally unstable situation in which even the superpower nuclear arsenals, which arguably deterred war for decades, now contribute to the general disequilibrium of devastating force in the world.

The possibility of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states, violent sub-national groups, terrorist organizations, religious cults, and criminal conspiracies, combined with other emerging trends in world politics, international terrorism, and organized crime, constitute a grave threat to human civilization. During the Cold War, the world lived under the threat of a global thermonuclear war between the superpowers so devastating that it could have ended civilization as we know it. Now that the Cold War has ended and that threat has receded, humanity has a unique opportunity and an urgent need to reduce the risk to its own existence born with the first atomic explosion in the Nevada desert in 1945. But this is not a simple task. The two bombs that instantly burned Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the ground were the first change in the face of conflict wrought by the nuclear age, but hardly the last. During the intervening decades, the United States and the former Soviet Union built scores of thousands of such weapons, some as much as a thousand times more powerful, and enough weapons-useable nuclear material to build hundreds of thousands more. With the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, many of these nuclear weapons and materials are not maintained and protected as robustly as they were in the past. The prospect that such weapons or

materials could fall into the hands of rogue states, terrorists, or international criminals is real. There have already been six reported incidents involving the smuggling of weapons-useable nuclear material, and it is possible that this is only the tip of the iceberg.

At the same time, terrorism has taken on alarming new dimensions. The sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway demonstrated that modern terrorists may be willing to employ against unarmed civilians even the most morally reprehensible weapons banned in war. The possibility that a terrorist could use a nuclear weapon against a major city -- that the next bomb under the World Trade Center could be one that would kill millions and leave Manhattan in ruins -- cannot be dismissed. The next generation may live in a world in which it will not be unknown for a whole city to burn to ashes in seconds as a result of nuclear terrorism. These new potential nuclear aggressors may not be responsible for civilian populations against which a deterrent threat could be leveled. They probably will not be tractable with the horrible logic of mutual assured destruction. No one nation, no matter how powerful, can exclude the possibility of evil deeds by irresponsible people. The world community has very few tools available to address these new transnational threats, those that we do have require cooperation to be effective.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT, is the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT defined the international non-proliferation regime. The United States acquired nuclear weapons in 1945; the Soviet Union followed suit in 1949, followed by the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960, and China in 1964. This increase in the number of nuclear weapon states took place against the background of predictions during the 1960s

of 25 - 30 nuclear weapons states -- meaning states with nuclear weapons being integrated into their military arsenals -- by the late 1970s. If such a trend had continued unchecked that number could probably be doubled for 1997. Imagine for a moment a world in which 60 countries had independent nuclear arsenals. That is the reality we averted by negotiating the NPT, and that is the reality we could face again if the NPT regime does not remain strong. But today the threat would be immeasurably worse because if we cannot limit the spread of nuclear weapons among states we also cannot limit the spread of nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations or criminal conspiracies. We cannot stop the diffusion of 1945 technology forever. And fissile material may be for sale. If we deal with nuclear proliferation as a technical problem, we will, eventually, fail.

Not all of the news about the end of the bipolar world order is bad news. The successful outcome of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference demonstrated the capacity of the nations of the world to look beyond the narrow bloc politics which confined the effectiveness of the multilateral fora during the Cold War. In preparation for that Conference, I traveled to a large number of state party capitals to discuss the importance of the NPT and found the vast majority now willing to put aside the dysfunctional dynamic of bloc politics when their own security is at stake.

The consensus decision to extend the NPT indefinitely and without conditions demonstrates that the international community's skepticism that gave the NPT an initially limited duration has given way to confidence that nuclear non-proliferation should be an enduring norm and that the ultimate goal of all nations is a world without nuclear weapons as contemplated by the NPT.

The NPT Review and Extension Conference did more than extend the NPT indefinitely. It adopted a set of principles and objectives on nonproliferation and a framework for a strengthened review process that will guide our future efforts. The victory in New York in May 1995 was a common victory. It established a permanent landmark on the arms control horizon that we will be blessed to have in years to come. It represents a change in the conditions under which multilateral discussions on security will occur; broadening the responsibility for security but also the opportunities for international leadership. It also committed, pursuant to the statement of principles, the nuclear weapons states to vigorously pursue nuclear weapon reductions with the ultimate objective being zero. If this commitment is not met, the all-important NPT regime will be in jeopardy. In 1995 a number of prominent third world countries privately said they would reexamine their commitments to the NPT if significant progress toward nuclear disarmament is not achieved in the short to medium term. More specifically there could be real trouble if there is continuing dissatisfaction with the nuclear weapons states' compliance with their disarmament commitments at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

New leaders can and, in some cases, already have emerged. Countries like Japan, Germany, and South Africa, just to name a few, have great potential to assume enlarged global leadership roles in the protection and promotion of international security. As the only country ever to be attacked with nuclear weapons, Japan has a special responsibility to make sure that the world never forgets the horrible effect of these weapons. As an emerging entrepot for nuclear smuggling toward the West, Germany is challenged to set the standard for the prevention of illicit traffic in nuclear materials. South Africa is the

only country to have ever built and then dismantled a nuclear arsenal and President Mandela enjoys high moral stature throughout Africa and the world; South African leadership could play a pivotal role in rallying the developing world against nuclear weapons. Other traditional leaders among the developing world like Mexico and Indonesia could also play increasingly important roles on the international security scene.

Threatening mass destruction no longer defines a great power, if it ever did. The day in which the potential sources of nuclear peril could be identified is quickly passing into history. Small groups or even individuals may now threaten to gain access to weapons of mass destruction and I want to reiterate that deterrence may mean nothing to these people. Choosing the responsible course and working to prevent mass destruction will be an essential component of great power status in the next century. One, two, three, or five superpowers would not be enough to keep the peace; all nations will have to step up and share global responsibility. The stakes are immeasurably high, but we have taken several steps on the right path. We must take many more.