

# Cologne: Nuclear Cuts, Limited Missile Defenses

Thomas Graham Jr. and Alexander S. Yereskovsky  
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The statement that the U.S. and Russia issued June 20 in Cologne, Germany, regarding the discussions they pledged to have later this summer on strategic arms signals a crucial opportunity to make real progress toward a more secure and stable world in the 21st century. Of overriding importance to this security is a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons while accommodating strong pressures to address the threat to both the U.S. and Russia of ballistic missile attacks by rogue states. Linking strictly limited Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty modifications to steep reductions below the currently agreed START III levels of 2,000-2,500 warheads would enhance the security of both nations.

We would suggest the U.S. and Russia pursue a three-stage effort to limit their nuclear arsenals. The first and immediate stage would consist of steps to reduce the size of each nation's strategic nuclear arsenal to 1,000 warheads. Specifically, this stage would include the following steps:

- Agreement this summer to a START III level of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads.
- Agreement in principle to carefully designed amendments to the ABM Treaty to permit a limited missile defense against a small attack by a rogue state.
- Duma approval of the START II/III package.
- A pledge by the Clinton Administration to submit to the U.S. Senate for ratification the START II/III package, including the earlier agreements on ABM demarcation, immediately after Duma approval.

In this first stage, the U.S. would, in effect, agree to an immediate lower START III level, which would lead to less pressure on Russia for force modernization, in exchange for Russian agreement to amendments to the ABM Treaty that would allow some protection against potential rogue state threats. While we believe the extent of the rogue state threat and the demonstrated effectiveness of the national missile defense (NMD) response are exaggerated, we think the political realities are such that the U.S. will make a missile defense deployment decision next summer and seek agreement on ABM Treaty amendments by then.

The key issue is how to manage NMD deployments so as not to abrogate the ABM Treaty or interfere with the arms reduction process. A return to the original concept of the ABM Treaty--two sites with 100 fixed, land-based interceptors at each site--should be acceptable and would not affect the viability of either side's strategic deterrent. Moreover, Article I, which prohibits the deployment of a nationwide defense as well as the base for it, could be revised appropriately. More difficult issues are limitations on land-based battle-management radars and space-based tracking sensors because information from these sources can be used to upgrade the capabilities of theater missile defenses. The solution will rest in part in a specific number of fixed land-based ABM

radars unlimited by geography, and space-based tracking and engagement sensors for strategic but not theater defense purposes. With a combination of the "three Cs"-- explicit constraints, expanded confidence-building measures and greater technological cooperation--agreement should be achievable.

The second stage would include development of an extensive and intrusive transparency and inspection regime on warheads, fissile material and ballistic missiles that could start as early as next year. This regime would have value in itself and could be opened to include the other Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear powers as a preliminary to involving them in actual reduction discussions in the third stage. This would help to lay the groundwork for limits on tactical nuclear weapons, including sea-launched cruise missiles, at as low a level as possible--perhaps 500 weapons for each party. Such a limit could pave the way for a gradual move to a single, combined level for each party, say 1,000 for all nuclear weapons, including reserves. We understand these steps could only be taken if both sides remain comfortable with the deterrent value of their retaliatory forces in the face of whatever missile defense deployments are permitted by an amended ABM Treaty. Moreover, Russia will agree to limits on tactical nuclear forces only if Western and Chinese policies are not perceived as degrading its security situation.

The third stage, to begin early in the next century, would involve five-power negotiations aimed at reaching residual levels of nuclear weapons in the low hundreds for the U.S. and Russia and even lower levels for China, France and the U.K. (taking into account the programs of India, Pakistan and Israel). If successful, this five-power process would represent the most dramatic and important development regarding implementation of Article VI of the NPT and would enormously strengthen the NPT regime. Reducing drastically the number of nuclear weapons in the world is the only path toward security and stability in the next century.

*Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., was a special representative of President Clinton for arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament from 1994-97. He is president of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS). John B. Rhinelander, legal adviser to the U.S. SALT I delegation that negotiated the ABM Treaty, is a vice chairman of LAWS. Minister-Counselor Alexander S. Yereskovsky, a former senior Soviet/Russian diplomat, is a post-doctoral fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and an associate at the International Center in Washington.*