U.S. Policy on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Presented at Colby College by Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. on September 30, 1994

We have witnessed over the past several years the tremendous changes that have swept the world. The former Soviet Union collapsed, bringing an end to the Cold War; Germany reunited; Iraq mounted an unsuccessful bid for regional hegemony; Israel and the Palestinians signed a peace agreement; apartheid collapsed in South Africa and the South African government agreed to share power; to mention only a few. The pace and nature of these changes could not have been predicted just a few years ago.

What is clear now, however, is that the old East-West competition no longer dominates the geostrategic landscape. Rather, regional rivalries and instability constitute the major threat to international security. With the ever present potential for the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, these regional rivalries have become significantly more dangerous. Combatting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means for delivering them is becoming a more and more important task for the foreign policy of the United States; recognizing this, the Clinton Administration is aggressively developing and pursuing policies address this critical issue.

Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Securing the indefinite extension of the 1968 Treaty on the

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) is a key element of the Administration's nonproliferation policy. Less than one year from today, the more than 160 parties to the NPT will meet in New York to decide whether the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. For many states, including the United States, this conference will be the most important event in the life of the NPT and will determine not only the Treaty's future, but also the future of the entire international nonproliferation and arms control regime. This is the one opportunity the parties will have to extend the NPT indefinitely and make it a permanent part of the international security framework, the one and only opportunity to extend the NPT and give it the same duration that all other international arms control treaties and conventions enjoy.

The threat of nuclear proliferation is not new. In the early 1960s there were predictions that there could be 20, 25, or 30 declared nuclear weapon states by the mid-1970s if the international community took no action to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. following the achievement at Tlatelolco in 1967, where Latin American and Caribbean countries negotiated an agreement to free their region from the threat of nuclear proliferation, the broader international community undertook to negotiate a nuclear nonproliferation treaty with global reach, the NPT.

The NPT has served for nearly twenty-five years as the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Indeed, it has provided a firm and dependable foundation on which

all other measures of arms control and disarmament, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties and the Chemical Weapons Convention, have been and are being built..

The key provisions of the NPT are designed to:

- prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons

- provide assurance, through international safeguards, that the peaceful nuclear activities of states which have not already developed nuclear weapons will not be diverted to making such weapons

- promote, to the maximum extent consistent with the other purposes of the treaty, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy particularly in developing countries and

- express the determination of the parties that the treaty should lead to an end to the arms race, and to comprehensive arms control and nuclear disarmament measures

There are currently nearly 170 parties to the NPT, including all five declared nuclear weapon states -- US, UK, Russia, France, and China. More countries have joined the NPT than have joined any other arms control treaty in history; this reflects the widespread and consistent appeal of the goals and objectives of the NPT.

The NPT is essential to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. As I have already noted, the NPT is the only nuclear nonproliferation agreement that is global in scope, and as such, it serves as the principal international legal and political barrier to nuclear proliferation. The NPT reflects an international norm of nonproliferation that has helped to isolate

states outside the regime who have persisted in their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. It codifies a standard of acceptable international behavior against which the actions of even those states outside of regime are measured. And, it provides a basis upon which the international community can act when faced with direct challenges to the NPT and to the nonproliferation norm. The taboo that now exists against the acquisition of nuclear weapons is a direct result of the entry into force of the NPT.

The NPT also is essential to support the worldwide regime for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy under effective international safeguards. NPT parties are required to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA whose duration is tied to the duration of the NPT. By law, the U.S. may not engage in nuclear cooperation with any country that does not have such a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. This policy moreover, has been adopted by all major nuclear suppliers. Were the NPT to end, the basis for all of these agreements would also end, and the fundamental enabling force for peaceful nuclear cooperation with other NPT parties would be destroyed.

The NPT provides a framework in which to address regional proliferation problems and promotes regional stability. Regions where the risk of proliferation is greatest are those where key states have been unwilling to forswear the nuclear weapon option in a binding and verifiable manner. This danger is mitigated however, by the NPT and the strength of its membership.

In the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and South Asia there would be little or no prospect for avoiding nuclear arms

races without the NPT. Without the NPT, states would be free of any legal restraints on their nuclear activities, and mutual suspicion and fear of a nuclear confrontation in the difficult transition period faced by the world today. In Africa, South Africa's adherence to the NPT helped to open a security dialogue with other African states and to pave the way for the negotiation of an African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty. Here, as in Latin America under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the NPT and the regional nuclear weapon free zone treaties complement and reinforce each other to the benefit of all.

The NPT is the only multilateral arms control agreement that obligates all states to pursue measures of disarmament. For the nuclear weapon states, this provision is clearly aimed at their nuclear weapons arsenals. The NPT provides both a framework and a foundation for those arms control measures and contributes to a stable international environment that facilitates progress towards this end.

The Clinton Administration is committed to the one outcome that will safeguard the NPT regime -- indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. ACDA, as the lead agency, has been at work for more than two years preparing for the Conference. Because the stakes are so high, we consider NPT extension to be ACDA's biggest single responsibility over the next year.

In charging me with the lead responsibility in the Administration for securing indefinite extension of the NPT, ACDA Director John Holum stated that "there is no single item on the arms control agenda to which I attach greater importance than the

NPT extension Conference. Between now and April 1995, the United States must leave no stone unturned in its efforts to ensure a successful outcome at the Conference."

Affirming Support for the IAEA

For over 30 years the IAEA has served vital U.S. security and nonproliferation interests through its program of international safeguards, which provide assurances that nuclear materials are not diverted from civilian to military purposes. It plays a central role in international efforts to make the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy available to countries worldwide. The IAEA has also helped make nuclear facilities safer worldwide through its nuclear safety program.

The IAEA's international nuclear safeguards system was developed to help provide assurance to all states that nuclear activities placed under safeguards are directed toward peaceful purposes, to dissuade potential proliferators from using safeguarded nuclear materials for other than peaceful purposes, and to detect diversion of these materials from peaceful uses. IAEA safeguards form a comprehensive system of accounting and reporting procedures, on-site inspection, and nuclear material measurements and surveillance. The system is based on a network of 188 separate international agreements between the IAEA and participating states, based on NPT membership and/or conditions of supply of peaceful nuclear technology and materials.

The United States is one of the IAEA's strongest supporters and provides approximately 25 percent of its annual budget. The

United States is also a significant contributor to its technical programs, which are supported by voluntary contributions of the membership. The U.S. is committed to ensuring adequate resources for safeguards and recognizes that significant resources will be required.

Export Controls

At the center of our nonproliferation export control efforts stands a number of multilateral arrangements that the U.S. helped to create - The Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Nuclear Suppliers group. These groups of suppliers share a common objective of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. This Administration has worked vigorously to ensure that these arrangements are effective, that their control lists are comprehensive, their controls appropriately targeted, and then common standards applied, and practices are harmonized. We accomplish this through rigorous implementation of our own obligations under these multilateral arrangements as well as through information sharing, and intensive diplomacy with other suppliers.

To be effective export controls have to be enforceable: Last year, the Administration endorsed sanctions legislation sponsored by Senator Glenn. this legislation would impose sanctions, for the first time, on foreign <u>firms</u> engaging in prohibited nuclear trade. and with respect to foreign countries, it would both expand the range of conduct that can trigger sanctions and

considerably expand the range of sanctions available.

I'd like to underscore the Administration's continuing commitment to export controls as a key element of nonproliferation policy. there has been a measured relaxation of controls on dual-use items like computers, based on their widespread availability. This does not weaken our nonproliferation commitment, but rather, recognizes the reality that ineffectual controls only dilute our efforts.

The Administration's new draft Export Administration Act both reflects post-Cold War realities and properly balances our competitive interests with our nonproliferation goals. One need not believe that U.S. industry experienced vast burdens as a result of past nonproliferation export controls to understand that the best export controls are those that are accepted and implemented multilaterally. At the same time, the Administration has acted wisely in preserving our ability to apply unilateral controls when we need to do so.

Fissile Material Cut-off

In his September 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton proposed a multilateral treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives or outside of international safeguards. A non-discriminatory, global, and effectively verifiable fissile material production ban would strengthen substantially the nonproliferation regime by restraining the unsafeguarded nuclear programs of certain non-NPT states for the first time. The United States will undertake a

comprehensive approach to the growing accumulation of fissile material, both from dismantled nuclear weapons and from civil nuclear programs. Under this approach, the United States will

-seek to ban any addition to stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium outside of IAEA safeguards, and to ensure that existing stockpiles are subject to the highest standards of safety, security and accountability

-propose a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of HEU or plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes or outside international safeguards

-encourage more restrictive regional arrangements to constrain fissile material production in regions of instability and high proliferation risk

-submit U.S. fissile material no longer needed for our deterrent to inspection by the IAEA

-explore means to limit the stockpiling of plutonium from civil nuclear programs, and seek to minimize the civil use of HEU

-initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for plutonium disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations.

Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Efforts

The U.S. commitment to eliminating chemical and biological weapons is no less intense than its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. The signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in January of 1993 represented a major arms control

milestone, breaking old political deadlocks and charting new procedural ground. The Administration has called on all nations -- including our own -- to ratify the CWC quickly so that it may enter into force as soon as possible.

Development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons is prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972. To help strengthen the Convention, the United States has decided to promote new measures increasing the transparency of activities and facilities that could be used for biological weapons purposes.

Preventing the Spread of Missiles and Missile Technology

The introduction of advanced missile capabilities into the inventories of a growing number of states is transforming the geostrategic landscape into more dangerous terrain. It is creating new threats at longer distances where no threats had existed before. It fosters the specter of civilian populations far from any military confrontation held hostage to nuclear, chemical, or biological attack. It is introducing a new issue of contention and controversy in the already troubled relationships of many states.

In April 1987, the United States and its six major trading partners (Canada, the former West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom) created the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to restrict the proliferation of missiles and related technology. Today there are twenty-five members of the

MTCR.

The MTCR, the only multilateral missile nonproliferation regime, is neither an international agreement nor a treaty. It is a voluntary arrangement among countries which share a common interest in arresting missile proliferation. The regime consists of common export policy guidelines applied to a common list of controlled items which each MTCR member implements in accordance with its national legislation. The purpose of the regime is to limit the spread of missiles and unmanned air vehicles/delivery systems capable of carrying a 500 kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers. In January 1993, MTCR Partners announced that the Guidelines had been extended to cover delivery systems intended to carry all types of weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological as well as nuclear).

As part of our new nonproliferation initiative, the United States is committed to promoting the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as a global nonproliferation norm and to seeking to use the MTCR as a mechanism for taking joint action to combat missile proliferation.

We must come to grips with the growing threat from more widely available missile capabilities. U.S. friends and U.S. forces are at risk from ballistic missile capabilities in volatile areas like the Gulf and the Korean peninsula. That is a development in no one's interest. We must deal with the problem from both the supply and demand sides.

Regional Nonproliferation Initiatives

Nonproliferation is receiving greater priority in our diplomacy, and will be taken into account in our relations with countries around the world. The United States makes special efforts to address the proliferation threat in regions of tension such as the Korean peninsula, the Middle East and South Asia, including efforts to address the underlying motivations for weapons acquisition and to promote regional confidence-building steps.

In Korea, our goal remains a non-nuclear peninsula. We will make every effort to secure North Korea's full compliance with its nonproliferation commitments and effective implementation of the North-South denuclearization agreement.

In parallel with our effort to obtain a secure, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East, we will promote dialogue and confidence-building steps to create the basis for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. In the Persian Gulf, we will work with other suppliers to contain Iran's nuclear, missile, and CBW ambitions, while preventing resumption of Iraq's activities in these areas. In South Asia, we will encourage India and Pakistan to proceed with multilateral discussions of nonproliferation and security issues, with the goal of capping and eventually rolling back their nuclear and missile capabilities.

In developing our overall approach to Latin America and South Africa, we will take account of the significant nonproliferation progress made in these regions in recent years. We will intensify efforts to ensure that the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China do not contribute to the spread of weapons of mass

destruction and the means for delivering them.

Strategic Arms Reductions

Article VI of the Non-Prolfieration Treaty commits the Parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." World events have brought these objectives closer than might have been thought imaginable a decade ago. Remarkable agreements involving the United States and the former Soviet Union have both contributed to and codified the end of the Cold War. We have eliminated two thousand warheads from an entire class of weapons under the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. We are committed under START and START II to removing another 17,000 weapons and retiring their means of delivery -- steps that would wipe out <u>two decades</u> of the arms race. Voluntary reciprocal steps have taken down additional weapons from tactical systems like short range missiles and artillery. The United States alone is dismantling around 2,000 nuclear weapons a year -- a rate limited not by political will but by physical capacity to do more.

One key measure is the 1992 Lisbon Protocol, under which Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan became parties to START along with Russia, and agreed to eliminate the Soviet nuclear arms located on their territories, and join the NPT as non-nuclear states. Belarus and Kazakhstan have acceded to the NPT and we are hopeful that Ukraine will do so this fall, thus permiting START's

entry into force, paveing the way for START II ratification, and opening the door to consideration of further reductions.

To promote the safeguarding and the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction contained in the arsenal of the former Soviet Union, the United States offered to provide technical assistance and specialized equipment to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine -- the four former Soviet republics with nuclear weapons on their territory. Since the program's inception, the United States has focused on three major goals: safe and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of stockpiles of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; enhancing the ability of governments to control and manage dangerous fissile materials and guard against their proliferation; and facilitating a stable transition from militarized economies to civilian-dominated economies. The latter two objectives are closely linked in that, in different ways, they help limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and the technical expertise to create weapons of mass destruction. The program's success has laid the foundation for a safer international environment, and, through this demonstration of U.S. support, has strengthened developing democracies among the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

Conclusion

Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is a critical global concern today, and as

such it is afforded critical importance in Administration policy. As we consolidate the arms control gains made possible by the end of the Cold War, we must remain responsive and innovative in our approach to safeguarding global security. Aggressive efforts, like those that I have described today, are necessary if the United States is going to continue to play a leadership role in finding solutions to this global problem.

DRAFTER: D/NPT-Doug Shaw x76761

Cleared:.
NP/NPT-SBurk
SEA/SN-LRusten
PI-MMurphy