



# ARMS CONTROL TEXT

---

January 12, 1995

**AMBASSADOR THOMAS GRAHAM, JR.  
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE  
PRESIDENT FOR ARMS CONTROL, NON-  
PROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT**

*"Non-Proliferation: Points of View  
of Latin America and the Caribbean"  
Address to a Seminar Sponsored by the  
Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear  
Weapons in Latin America and the  
Caribbean (OPANAL) in Cancun, Mexico  
(AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY)*

I want to talk today about my ideas on the role of nuclear and non-nuclear states in nuclear disarmament programs, and I want to present my ideas in the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT. I have chosen to do so for several reasons. First, the NPT is immensely important to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Second, the NPT itself helps to define specific responsibilities of the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. Third, it is one of the structures within which this general issue is debated.

Article VI of the NPT obligates all of the parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Article VI clearly places primary responsibility on the nuclear weapon states for negotiations on nuclear disarmament. By means of the balance of obligations incorporated in the NPT, the non-nuclear weapon states also have important Treaty responsibilities in this process. I will address those responsibilities later in my talk.

I think that it is important to make clear at the outset why there is a nuclear disarmament process. In brief, why would nuclear weapon states want to reduce their nuclear weapons?

Nuclear weapon states reduce their nuclear armaments principally because it is directly in their interest to do so. The significance of Article VI is not that it compels nuclear weapon states to reduce their armaments but that it explicitly acknowledges the interest of all NPT parties in nuclear arms reductions and makes the nuclear weapon states accountable to the other NPT parties for undertaking these negotiations. Accountability is exercised through NPT review conferences, which have been held every five years and which will continue as long as the NPT itself.

It is also important to realize that when international realities change, as they have so sharply just within the last four years, the changes are likely to affect the specific priorities of the arms control agenda. Regrettably, none of us is clairvoyant, and so it is unwise to attempt to predict with any degree of precision the future international reality and, consequently, the complete arms control agenda. Who can say what the specific priorities will be ten or fifteen years from now? Looking at the past, though, we can see clearly how changed circumstances have influenced the nuclear weapon states in their approach to nuclear arms control.

The United States and the Soviet Union began the long journey of strategic arms control negotiations

every five years if requested by a majority of the parties, and four review conferences have been held.

The Treaty will next be reviewed in only four months, and I have no doubt that Article VI will receive considerable attention, as it always has.

We should understand that concluded agreements are not the same thing as negotiations in good faith. As I mentioned earlier, circumstances affect what concrete accomplishments can be achieved. Negotiations undertaken in good faith do not always yield quick results. In fact, as I think my review has shown, results usually come with some difficulty. On the other hand, without such negotiations undertaken in good faith results are simply not possible. I believe that the unprecedented results over the past five years will support the conclusion that the nuclear weapon states have acted in conformity with Article VI.

Article VI, however, is only one element in the process of negotiating limitations and reductions of nuclear weapons. The NPT is related to nuclear arms control in a second way, a way that also defines the important role and responsibility of non-nuclear weapon states.

It is hard to believe that the major agreements we have concluded in the last 25 years would have been possible without the NPT. A strong nonproliferation regime is an essential condition for nuclear arms control. As nuclear weapon states negotiate reductions and other limitations of nuclear armaments it is important for them to know that the commitments they make are made in an environment not threatened by nuclear proliferation.

The commitment of the NPT non-nuclear weapon states to support the Treaty is crucial to the continuing process of arms control. The foundation of the global nuclear nonproliferation

regime is the NPT. Were that foundation to be shaken arms control negotiations would become much more difficult. The irony would then be that nuclear weapon states wanting to reduce their weapons would find themselves obstructed from doing so. This is not to say that attempts would cease, simply that the efforts would have to be greater, the length of time needed to conclude agreements longer, and, perhaps, the results more modest than would be the case with a robust and durable nonproliferation regime.

We have come a long way from our early nuclear arms control negotiations, and there is more to do -- a comprehensive test ban treaty, a fissile material production cutoff treaty, further reductions of nuclear weapons, continuing dismantlement of existing weapons under START I and then START II. Beyond the nuclear area, we look forward to eliminating chemical weapons and strengthening efforts to prevent production of biological weapons. The list of current agenda items could be extended, and, as I said earlier, there will be new items in the future.

In April the parties to the NPT will convene in New York to decide on the duration of the Treaty. The best way to guarantee that the momentum we now have going on negotiating nuclear arms control will continue is to extend the NPT indefinitely and unconditionally. This will ensure that the nonproliferation regime will remain strong and dependable, which is an essential condition for effective arms control. Indefinite and unconditional extension will have an additional benefit that directly affects all NPT parties: continued accountability and review.

\* \* \*