# Modern Arms Control Diplomacy: A Historical Perspective

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I am grateful to Nabil Fahmy to be here today and honored to speak before the Diplomatic Institute. Although the different international security concerns of our two nations have occasionally put us on opposite sides of issues, I have always valued the perspective of the Egyptian diplomatic corps and their commitment to professionalism.

The arms control process holds significant lessons and implications for the future as we move forward into both a new century and a dramatically new international environment. For the purpose of my discussion with you here today, I would like to describe the history of arms control as consisting of four different phases: the first being the entire sweep of time until the First World War, the second consisting of the period between WWI and WWII, the third being the Cold War and nuclear arms race that began at the end of the Second World War and the fourth, a new age that began with the end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the superpower rivalry, which, while still in its infancy, is an era that has already given us several significant successes for arms control.

War has been the scourge of humankind since the beginning of time. As soon as humans began living together in large groups they began making war on their neighbors, primarily to seize their goods or their land. Attempts at long term peace between neighboring groups, tribes,

and nations were made from time to time with very limited success. For several millennia, the implements of war did not appreciably change and victory went to the largest or best trained armies.

This condition slowly began to change as technology transformed the character of warfare. During the Middle Ages, the advent of the English longbow and the crossbow and, of course, the invention of gunpowder by the Chinese demonstrated the impact and the importance of new technology on waging war. At this time began the first attempts to limit the technology and implements of war to enhance the cause of peaceful settlement and to reduce the likelihood of war. This is what we today refer to as arms control.

Military technology gradually improved over the centuries and war became more and more destructive. The rifle, the machine gun, poison gas, and aerial bombardment, among other such developments, steadily followed one another, with each new innovation seemingly worse than those before. Attempts at arms control were few and far between and for the most part unsuccessful. One of the earliest arms control agreements, the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 between the United States and Great Britain, had as its objective the limitation of armament on the Great Lakes. This agreement was honored more in the breach than the observance. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, among other things, prohibited the use of poison gas in war, but failed to prevent its widespread use in World War I. The extent to which centuries of destructive invention had amplified man's ability to kill his fellow man was realized in World War I. These new technologies and the advent of total war resulted in the deaths of an unprecedented number of people. This ghastly fact lent impetus to diplomatic attempts to end war for all time and ushered in a new era of arms control policies.

The Versailles Treaty of 1919, which ended the so called "War to End All Wars," included extensive provisions limiting the number of troops and types of weapons that a defeated Germany would be allowed. The Washington Naval Convention of 1922 attempted to prevent a naval arms race between the great powers by establishing a limit upon the number and tonnage allowed to each of them. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 created numerous "rules" for the conduct of war and, important from an arms control perspective, prohibited the first use in war of poison gas and biological weapons. Almost all of these agreements in the end were failures. Through clever acts of deception by the German military and the inattention of the Allies, Germany was able to retain the rudiments of its war-making capability, allowing it to engage in tremendous military expansion seemingly overnight under the leadership of Adolf Hitler. The Washington Naval Convention did not forestall a build-up of naval armaments in the 20's and 30's. Only the Geneva Convention, a forerunner of the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, was adhered to in any significant manner, and even it did not prevent the use of such weapons by Italy against Ethiopia in 1936. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the League of Nations which attempted to outlaw war and establish a system of collective security during this period, have been described by many historians as failing because they placed too much emphasis on ideals and not enough attention upon military and political realities. This same accusation has been made against the arms control treaties of this period as well. This trend led to World War II, the most destructive of all wars in which approximately 60 million people died.

Everything changed on July 16, 1945, in Almagordo, New Mexico, with the successful testing of the first atomic bomb. This new weapon was so powerful that even the scientists

responsible for creating it had some misgivings about unleashing it upon the world. The technology of war had now advanced to the point where humanity had created a weapon of such power that it had in hand the ability to cause its own destruction. This date marked a new era for arms control, one based on the essential necessity to control and limit nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction, if humanity was to be preserved. This new phase of arms control was different from past ones in one important respect: there was widespread recognition that agreements would have to be negotiated with an eye focused upon realistic considerations -- given the horrible power of atomic weapons, there was no margin for error. The price of failure was graphically displayed at the end of World War II by the horror of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the massive conventional bombings of Tokyo, Dresden, Hamburg, London, and Coventry. Treaties that tried to accomplish too much and failed as a result would no longer be only an embarrassment for diplomats, a cause for concern on the part of generals or contributors to destructive wars; they could lead to a war that would potentially be fatal for every man, woman and child on the face of the earth.

However, this new thinking in arms control did not happen overnight. The first attempts at controlling nuclear weapons failed for the same reasons previous agreements had failed -- they were unrealistic. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report recommended complete international control of atomic energy in all its aspects, after which atomic bombs would be banned or destroyed. The proposal of the Baruch Plan in 1946 to create an international authority to control nuclear weapons proved to be ill-fated with the onset of the Cold War. The Soviet Union, determined to have its own atomic bomb, rejected the offer and the nuclear arms race ensued.

The United States acquired nuclear weapons in 1945 and the Soviet Union followed suit

in 1949, followed by the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960 and China in 1964. This increase in the number of nuclear weapon states took place against the background of predictions during the Kennedy Administration of 25-30 nuclear weapon states -- meaning states with nuclear weapons integrated into their military arsenals -- by the late 1970s. If such a trend had continued unchecked that number could probably be doubled for 1995.

The principal reason that this did not happen was the result of a successful arms control negotiation in the 1960s -- the negotiation and conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. I would note that an Egyptian diplomat, Ambassador Mohammad Shaker, was a most important figure in the negotiation of this landmark treaty.

The NPT has been the most successful arms control agreement in history. It is nearing universality with 181 parties. Only a handful of non-parties remain, with several more expected to join in the next year or so, leaving only a few outside. The U.S. objective is to reduce this number as much as possible during the preparatory process for the next NPT Review Conference in the year 2000. The NPT has added immeasurably to the security of the United States and of the entire world. Before 1970, the acquisition of nuclear weapons had been a point of national pride. The NPT made it tantamount to a violation of international law. If the trend predicted during the 1960's had not been checked by the NPT, we would be living today in a world of unending nightmares. From day to day the question would arise whether civilization or perhaps humanity itself would survive. As frightening as it was to live under the nuclear umbrellas of two superpowers during the Cold War, imagine how much worse it would be if dozens or scores of nations possessed nuclear weapons and every border conflict, civil war or international

incident brought with it the potential threat of nuclear war.

But this did not happen. The NPT was successful in retarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, it is important to keep in mind that the NPT was directed not only against horizontal proliferation, but against vertical proliferation as well. The world community, already weary of living under the constant threat of nuclear extermination, decided in negotiating the NPT in the 1960s -- enough! we will draw a line where we are, it will be agreed that no additional nation will acquire nuclear weapons; and the five states that have them (in 1968) will agree to engage in disarmament negotiations in good faith. Or expressed in different terms, the ultimate objective of the NPT is a nuclear weapon-free world. This seems a rather idealistic goal at first glance, doomed to a place on the scrap-heap with the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Baruch Plan, but because it sought to reach this goal through realistic and practical means, the NPT has been an unprecedented success in the history of arms control and nuclear weapons are being eliminated at a significant rate.

In terms of preventing horizontal nuclear weapon proliferation the NPT has largely done what it was intended to do. It established an international norm against nuclear weapon proliferation. The number of declared nuclear weapon states is still the same as it was in 1968 -- five. 176 countries now have stated their intention under the NPT never to acquire nuclear weapons.

With respect to controlling and reversing vertical proliferation, only limited progress was possible during the Cold War, but it was the focus of much effort, nevertheless. The agreements that were reached during that period tended to be narrow in scope, but over the years built upon one another in an incremental manner. This approach took many years to bear fruit, but we

continue to enjoy the benefits even today. These early, limited successes built a foundation on which we have made rapid progress since the end of the Cold War.

The pursuit of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is the oldest arms control objective of the nuclear age. The quest began in the late 1950s, the first step being the informal testing moratorium which commenced in 1958 and collapsed in 1961. An impasse in the test ban negotiations in 1962 over the issue of on-site verification for underground tests led to the by-passing of this issue in 1963 and the conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty which prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons or carrying out explosions for peaceful purposes anywhere but underground. A refinement was agreed to by the United States and the former Soviet Union in 1974 and in 1976 through two treaties which together limit underground nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons, or roughly 10 times the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb. A complete abolition of nuclear testing was difficult to achieve during the Cold War. Since the superpowers relied upon nuclear deterrence to keep the peace, many within the U.S. and Soviet Union viewed it as essential to continue to conduct nuclear tests in order to ensure the reliability of the stockpile of nuclear weapons, to improve existing types of nuclear weapons, and to develop new kinds of weapons to be associated with new types of delivery systems.

As the Cold War progressed, U.S. thinking about nuclear disarmament moved away from an emphasis on reducing or eliminating weapons testing and toward a more practical emphasis on how to make the U.S. - Soviet nuclear arms race more predictable and stable. In 1969, the United States and the former Soviet Union began the strategic arms limitation process which led to the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement (SALT I) as well as to the SALT II Treaty.

SALT I was the first attempt through bilateral negotiations to limit the delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons. The objective of the SALT I negotiations was to place initial limits on the strategic nuclear offensive and defensive systems of the two superpowers. SALT I was signed by the two parties in 1972 and negotiations for SALT II began soon after.

As attempts to place limits on strategic offensive weapons were being conducted, an agreement to limit defenses against such weapons was also reached in 1972. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty had as its objective to eliminate the deployment of a large-scale ABM strategic defense. By codifying each side's vulnerability to the offensive weapons of the other, the ABM Treaty sought to forestall a greater arms race and to provide a foundation upon which further offensive arms control talks could be built. The Treaty remains in effect to this day and we continue to work with Russia and the other Soviet successor states to ensure its viability.

SALT II attempted to complete the limitations on strategic offensive systems begun in SALT I. While the Treaty was signed in 1979, it was never ratified. New negotiations on strategic arms were begun in 1982 under the new title of START, or Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

Arms control talks between the superpowers languished for the most part through the late 70's and early 80's, but were revived at the Reykjavik Summit in 1986 between President Reagan and Soviet President Gorbachev, when the Soviet Union agreed to the principle of intrusive on-site inspection in the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). This Treaty was a true breakthrough in nuclear arms control agreements. In addition to the revolutionary nature of its verification regime, the INF Treaty was the first that eliminated an entire class of weapons -- in this case, missiles with ranges of 500 - 5,500 km.

The Reagan Administration saw an opening to begin attempts to actually reduce, rather than just limit strategic nuclear weapons, a goal that had been impractical at best during the height of the U.S. - Soviet competition. The INF Treaty was a first step in this direction.

In September 1991, President Bush made a bold unilateral initiative on tactical nuclear weapons, offering to destroy all U.S. nuclear artillery shells, significantly reduce theater arsenals, and to end the 24-hour runway alert status for nuclear bombers. President Gorbachev responded eight days later with a similar initiative, promising to also destroy nuclear artillery shells, take Soviet bombers off alert, confine mobile missiles to their garrisons, and to cancel several new weapons programs. Both countries also had previously committed themselves to deep cuts in their strategic nuclear arsenals thus, facilitating conclusion of the START I Treaty on July 31, 1991, which mandated reductions in the total number of warheads to 6,000 on each side (roughly a 50 percent cut). The demise of the Soviet Union greatly complicated the entry of the START I Treaty into force. It suddenly became necessary for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to accept their obligations as successor states to the former Soviet Union for START I. Toward this end, the Lisbon Protocol was signed in May 1992, committing Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to accede to START I and the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states in the shortest possible time; associated letters from the Presidents of these three states further commit them to eliminate all nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms located on their territories within the seven year START I reduction period. The U.S. Senate provided its advice and consent to START I in October 1992 and when the Ukrainian parliament voted to accede to the NPT on November 16, 1994, the way was cleared for START I's entry into force on December 5, 1994.

Another important arms control agreement between the superpowers was reached in

1990. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was designed to verifiably regulate the levels of certain types of conventional military equipment, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, attack helicopters, artillery, and fixed-wing combat aircraft held by NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the Atlantic to the Urals zone of application. It was designed to promote stability by reducing disparities and the probability of large scale offensive action. CFE limits are particularly effective in discouraging offensive action because they focus on just the types of combined arms that would be most useful for *blitzkrieg* type attacks.

Obviously, Europe has changed dramatically with the fall of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. These changes have complicated the Treaty's application, but it continues to have important successes, with thousands of treaty-limited items destroyed and regular on-site inspections taking place throughout the zone of application. The elemental conditions under which the agreement was reached have changed, but the CFE, and its implementing body, the Joint Consultative Group, continue to provide an effective framework for stabilizing levels of conventional arms in Europe. The CFE Review Conference in May will be an important opportunity to work to ensure that the Treaty will remain the basic document affecting European security.

In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 90's we entered into a new age in which huge steps forward in controlling and eliminating weapons of mass destruction could be made. The end of the confrontation between the superpowers meant that each side no longer had to rely on an arsenal of thousands of weapons to deter the other from attacking. With each side able to talk seriously about reductions in their stockpiles, a door was opened for agreements that had previously been unthinkable.

The first step through this door were taken in the form of the "Joint Understanding on Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms," signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in June 1992, which obligated both sides to deeper cuts in their strategic nuclear forces, below even START I levels. This agreement formed the basis of the START II Treaty, signed in January 1993, and will, when ratified and implemented, dramatically reduce the number of nuclear warheads remaining after START I. The START I and START II Treaties taken together represent approximately a two-thirds cut in the deployed strategic offensive arms of the parties. START II also eliminates heavy Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and bans Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicles, contributing to stability by focusing on weapons that lend themselves to first-strike use. The U.S. Senate recently gave its advice and consent to ratify START II, and we hope for similar action from the Duma in the near future.

Pursuant to these agreements the United States has already eliminated approximately 60 percent of its nuclear weapon stockpile with approximately 80 percent to be eliminated by the end of the decade. Under the 1991 Bush-Gorbachev understanding, 95 percent of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are no longer deployed. Russia has undertaken similar measures. Not to be overlooked is the U.S. - Russian Detargeting Agreement because of which, U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons are no longer targeted against each other's territory. Some dismiss the Detargeting Agreement as symbolic rather than substantive, but it is an important sign that the Cold War and the nuclear arms race are truly over. We must now look ahead to the next phase of this process and the eventual involvement in it of all five nuclear weapon states.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is yet another important post-Cold War arms control agreement. The CWC, opened for signature in 1993, prohibits all development,

production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons and requires destruction of all existing stocks of such weapons within 10 years of the treaty's entry into force. One hundred and thirty countries were original signatories to the CWC, and the number of states that have ratified the treaty continues to grow.

1995 was a year which saw the foundation of security and arms control agreements finally become a permanent international fixture with the decision to extend indefinitely the NPT. Decisions were also taken regarding a commitment to certain non-proliferation principles and objectives as well as the establishment of a strengthened NPT review. The principles and objectives decision outlines 20 different measures that address all aspects of the Treaty. Among the measures called for are vigorous pursuit of the nuclear disarmament process that I have referred to above, as well as an undertaking to support nuclear weapon free zones, to achieve universality of membership in the NPT, and to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) by the end of this year.

Achieving indefinite extension of the NPT was an important policy objective for many parties. The United States is extremely concerned by any further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The threat of a nuclear war aside, the possibility that a terrorist bombing could involve a nuclear device makes proliferation a serious danger for all states. During the 1995 NPT Conference, some parties, many of them from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), expressed concern over their perception of a lack of progress by the nuclear weapon states in fulfillment of their Article VI disarmament obligations. There was also concern expressed over the lack of universality of membership in the NPT. These parties wanted to see the completion of the arms control agenda which existed at the time of NPT signature in 1968 and which related to the basic

NPT bargain, most importantly a CTBT. Therefore, these states believe it important to maintain leverage over the nuclear weapon states to ensure progress toward a CTBT and other disarmament measures and were as a result reluctant to agree to indefinite NPT extension -- even though they supported the NPT regime itself. More vigorous efforts in the direction of universality were desired as well. The result was the package of decisions agreed to by the 1995 NPT Conference: a permanent NPT and separate decisions establishing a framework to insure a full implementation of the Treaty.

The NPT is, after the UN Charter itself (which has 185 adherents as opposed to now 181 NPT parties), the central document of world peace and security, which is why I have spoken about it at some length today. The unmistakable import of the 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Statement describing nuclear weapon proliferation as a threat to international security and the Security Council consideration of the cases of Iraq and North Korea is that proliferation is a threat to all states. Let us hope that by the NPT Review Conference in the year 2000 universality of membership in the NPT will have been achieved or at least be clearly in sight, to the enhancement of everyone's security.

The expansion of nuclear weapon free zones is an important trend which strengthens the world-wide NPT regime. It adds emphasis to the important regional aspect of the control of weapons of mass destruction. The Treaty of Tlatelolco -- the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty -- is nearing full implementation. All Latin American countries are parties and the five nuclear weapon states and relevant extraterritorial states are party to its protocols. The decision at the 1995 NPT Conference encouraged the same degree of support for additional Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, for example, the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga -- the South

Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty -- and the recently concluded Treaty of Pelindaba -- the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. When the United States, France and the United Kingdom sign the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga in the first half of this year, all the nuclear weapon states will have signed its Protocols. The Treaty of Pelindaba will be opened for signature here in Cairo next month. The United States hopes for a similar result for this most important Treaty. In addition, I would note, the United States has been working closely with the ASEAN countries, led by Indonesia, to solve problems that remain with the text so that the five nuclear weapons states can sign the Protocol to the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which was signed on December 15, 1995 in Bangkok.

I have already mentioned the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the strategic arms limitations treaties of the 70's. In spite of those agreements, the nuclear arms race continued unabated for many years. The five nuclear weapons states by the early 1990s had conducted almost 2000 nuclear weapon tests, the United States more than half of the total. However, whereas a credible argument could be made for the need for nuclear weapon tests during the Cold War and the associated superpower thermonuclear confrontation, the rationale for continued testing was substantially diminished by the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War world, continued nuclear weapon testing by the nuclear weapon states reduces rather than enhances security in that it encourages proliferation and undermines efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. This fact is what led President Clinton to support in 1993 the continuation of the current nuclear testing moratorium and the prompt negotiation of a CTBT. President Clinton gave further impetus to this effort by his statement on August 11 of last year that the United States supports a "zero yield" CTBT which would prohibit even very small nuclear explosions.

We now have a new commitment by all of the NPT parties -- most importantly by all the nuclear weapon states -- to conclude the CTBT negotiating process "no later than" 1996. The United States' strong commitment to this goal was underscored by President Clinton's pledge, read to the opening of the 1996 CD Session in Geneva, of the ". . . full and energetic support of the United States to conclude promptly a treaty so long sought and so long denied."

Unfortunately, some have argued that the completion of a CTBT should be linked to a commitment on behalf of the nuclear weapon states to agree to a time-bound framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Such a proposal harkens back to the WWI era and its impatient and impractical efforts at arms control which attempted to accomplish monumental goals with the stroke of a pen. The past 50 years have shown us that arms control works best when pursued through incremental, step-by-step measures in a realistic and practical fashion. As U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum pointed out in a recent speech to the CD in Geneva, "holding one important goal hostage for another is a sure way to fail at both." It is crucial that we not fail at completing a CTBT because of inappropriate linkage to other initiatives.

In this regard, I was pleased to read a press report shortly after my trip to Egypt in January in which Nabil Fahmy was quoted as saying that while Egypt supports having a timetable for nuclear disarmament it is not saying there could not be a CTBT without one.

Looking to the future, the evolution of the NPT extension process and other recent arms control agreements suggest that just as the Cold War is part of the past, so too should be narrow bloc politics in multilateral arms control negotiations. The reflexive antagonism between East and West and North and South has been overtaken by history. The new arena of multilateral

diplomacy is characterized by independent states voting their interests both individually and as a part of regional groupings. Regional politics more than bloc politics likely will be the most important focus of diplomacy in the multilateral arena in the future.

I have mentioned that many of the arms control agreements in the past failed because they tried to accomplish goals that were unrealistic. I would like to point out that this does <u>not</u> mean there is no place for idealism in diplomacy. What we are all striving for is an ideal world that is peaceful and secure for all. It is important to set ourselves lofty goals. We must realize, however, that to achieve these worthy goals, be they regional security efforts, the elimination of nuclear weapons, or even world peace, it is often necessary to work toward them one achievable step at a time. Three world wars, two hot and one cold, have shown us the price of impatience and wishful thinking.

The pursuit of peace and stability throughout history has always been difficult. The limitation and reduction of armaments through treaty negotiation has been a long, slow, uphill climb with many blind alleys but with a few real achievements. Now that the world is nearing perhaps the end of the first stage of this climb with the deep and irreversible reductions of nuclear weapon stockpiles, the indefinite extension of the NPT, and the imminence of a CTBT, we must not relax our efforts. We must continue to press forward. The path will be tortuous with many obstacles to overcome, but the stakes are high and the reward for all of us will be great.