



## **PLENARY SESSION FIVE:**

### **MAKING THE NPT WORK: CHECKING PROLIFERATION AND ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

**BY**

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weapons were built, perhaps 30,000 for the U.S. and as many as 70,000 - 80,000 for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. combined. The Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, has claimed that the Soviet Union had built 45,000 nuclear weapons and had made enough fissile material for 90,000 weapons. The sheer number and destructive power of these arsenals was staggering, but so too were the economic costs involved. Many of the details of the nuclear weapons programs of the superpowers remain secret, but some observers estimate that the U.S. spent more than four trillion dollars on its nuclear arsenal. The Soviet Union, whose economy could bear the burden even less than the United States, probably spent as much or more.

For more than 40 years, the world lived divided into two armed camps with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, many on hair-trigger alert status, ready to launch at a moment's notice. Frequently we heard about megadeaths, megatons, nuclear winter, and the like. An all-out thermonuclear war between the superpowers might well have destroyed civilization. We were lucky this did not happen, because it was a possibility. The most dangerous situation, the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, came close to catastrophe, closer than we knew at the time. given what we have since learned about Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Although the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and their allies surged ahead with inexorable momentum, the world community took a stand in 1968 to prevent more states from acquiring nuclear weapons and worsening the problem. Towards this end, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was created. It was agreed that no additional nation would acquire nuclear weapons and the states that had them would agree to engage in disarmament negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, as well as a treaty on general

and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The NPT is a “common sense” agreement; this is not a weakness, but rather the core of its enduring value. It encourages states to act in their own self-interest by not building nuclear weapons, and it forms the security environment in which states can be sure that their neighbors are not building nuclear weapons. It is important to keep in mind that the NPT is directed not only against horizontal proliferation, but against vertical proliferation as well. The NPT is the only legally binding commitment the nuclear weapons states have ever made to negotiate towards a nuclear free world and it provides the only context ever offered the world community in which such negotiations could even be contemplated. The NPT regime serves as the foundation upon which the considerable arms control progress made in recent years with the former Soviet Union has been accomplished. It established the conditions which make such progress possible. In terms of preventing horizontal nuclear weapon proliferation, the NPT has largely done what it was intended to do by establishing an international norm against nuclear weapon proliferation. Before the NPT, predictions were made that there would be 25 or 30 avowed nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons fully integrated into their arsenals by the end of the 1970s, and who knows how many by this time. We might have faced a world with 50 or 60 nuclear armed states creating almost unimaginable insecurity with a daily question as to whether civilization would survive. The principal reason this is not the case is the NPT. While a few states have chosen to leave the nuclear option open, this dire prediction has not come to pass.

Although the NPT was successful in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries, the arms race between the superpowers continued unabated. During this period of nuclear confrontation, a credible argument could be made that nuclear weapon testing should be

continued in spite of a desire by many non-nuclear countries to have a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). For nuclear weapons to deter war, the deterrent had to be credible, and this credibility was achieved through extensive testing.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, greater progress in arms control and arms reduction suddenly became possible. The START I and START II Treaties taken together represent approximately a two-thirds cut in the deployed strategic offensive arms of the parties. Initiatives made by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev removed strategic bombers from alert status, destroyed nuclear artillery shells, reduced theater arsenals and canceled several new strategic weapons programs. And because of the Detargeting Agreement between the two countries, U.S. and Russian weapons were no longer targeted against each other's territory. Pursuant to all of these agreements, the United States has eliminated approximately 60 percent of its nuclear weapon stockpile, with approximately 80 percent to be eliminated by the end of this decade, and no longer deploys 95 percent of its tactical nuclear weapons. The U.S. continues to reduce its nuclear arsenal at a rate of up to 2,000 weapons per year and has thus far dismantled more than 9,000 nuclear weapons. Russia has taken similar measures, though at a lesser rate of dismantlement.

In 1995, the NPT parties decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely. They also adopted a set of "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament" and a framework for a strengthened review process. These decisions give us the goals for our future efforts and guiding principles by which we can judge our success. The "Principles and Objectives" set forth the commitments of the parties and the agenda for the future. Pursuant to the "Principles and Objectives," NPT parties agreed on the importance of strengthened and cost

effective IAEA safeguards. They also endorsed the value of increased cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including in particular the safe and efficient utilization of nuclear energy. They agreed on the importance of continuing nuclear weapon reductions, with the ultimate objective being zero nuclear weapons. NPT parties agreed to pursue the establishment of more nuclear weapon free-zones and have agreed on the importance of nuclear weapon state support for such zones through their implementing protocols. And they also agreed on the desirability of universal adherence to the NPT, the need for a convention on the cut-off of fissile material production for weapons purposes, and on the early attainment of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) "no later than 1996."

Even though the NPT has been permanently extended and massive reductions in the arsenals of the nuclear weapon states are occurring, the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, has evolved into unquestionably the greatest threat to world security. In some ways, the world is a more dangerous place than it was at the height of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. If a thermonuclear war between the superpowers had taken place the result would have been devastating for the entire world, but for most of the Cold War period there was a low probability of this happening. Today, however, although the risk of a major nuclear war is virtually non-existent, and the NPT has been made permanent, the threat of use of a nuclear weapon or weapons is much greater. For example, the next World Trade Center-type bombing in New York City could involve a nuclear weapon. The relative stability of the bipolar world order is gone and in the unstable world order that now exists, the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to unstable countries, terrorist groups, or criminal conspiracies presents a great danger to all countries everywhere.

One way to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons is through the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones. The expansion of nuclear weapon-free zones is an important trend which strengthens the world-wide NPT regime and the U.S. has supported the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones as long as they meet our long-standing criteria. They add emphasis to the important regional aspect of the control of weapons of mass destruction, providing a bottom-up, "grass roots" approach to nonproliferation that can prove extremely effective. The value of nuclear weapon-free zones to global and regional peace was recognized at the NPT Review and Extension Conference last year when the development of nuclear weapon-free zones was encouraged in the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament."

Over the last year since the indefinite extension of the NPT, considerable progress has been made with respect to nuclear weapon-free zones and there is reason to hope the next year will be equally productive. The Treaty of Tlatelolco -- the Treaty for the Denuclearization of Latin America and the Caribbean -- is nearing full implementation. All Latin American and Caribbean countries are parties, with the exception of Cuba, which has signed but not yet ratified, and the five nuclear weapon states and relevant extraterritorial states are party to its protocols. The decision at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference encouraged the same degree of support for additional Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, for example, by signature of the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga -- the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty -- and the Treaty of Pelindaba -- the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The United States, France and the United Kingdom signed the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga on March 25; all five nuclear weapon states are now signatories to its Protocols. The Treaty of Pelindaba was opened for signature in Cairo on April 11 and the United States, France, the United Kingdom and China

signed the Treaty Protocols. All of the nuclear weapon states except Russia are now signatories of these Protocols.

The U.S. decision to sign the Rarotonga and Pelindaba Treaty Protocols clearly demonstrates our commitment to the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament." Finally, we note the signature in Bangkok by ten Southeast Asian nations of the Southeast Asia nuclear weapon free zone treaty. The United States places great value on its relationships with ASEAN and its member states and recognizes the contributions they have made to regional peace and economic prosperity, and supports efforts by regional groupings, including ASEAN, to strengthen and reinforce the international nonproliferation regime, including this treaty's reaffirmation of the importance of the NPT. We have stated on several occasions that the United States is prepared to consider positively a SEANWFZ treaty, provided it conforms to our aforementioned long-standing criteria for supporting such zones. We have explained to the ASEAN states that the latest text of the treaty and protocol still raises significant problems for the U.S. and does not meet all of our fundamental concerns. We hope that these concerns will be adequately addressed, as they must be before the U.S. will be in a position to sign any Protocol.

Another important prerequisite for the elimination of nuclear weapons is a CTBT. The Cold War rationale for continued nuclear weapon testing has largely disappeared and a CTBT, one of the longest-sought arms control goals of the nuclear age, is almost in hand. A test ban treaty is a bulwark against the spread and further development of nuclear weapons capabilities. By fending off such developments, the CTBT will help to make nuclear war less likely and sustain today's trend toward a world ultimately free of nuclear weapons.



We are now on the verge of concluding a CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament. Last year, the UNGA called for a CTBT to be opened for signature by the outset of the 51st UNGA in mid-September. The CD is striving mightily to meet this target by concluding the negotiations by the end of the current negotiating session on June 28.

A CTBT will be a profound and permanent new constraint upon nuclear weapons capability, especially on the nuclear weapon states. Since almost all of the other nations of the world have committed through the NPT or nuclear weapon-free zones never to acquire nuclear weapons, the prohibition on testing will affect only the nuclear weapon states or countries outside the NPT that keep the nuclear option open. The CTBT is an important step towards nuclear disarmament. It will prevent the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons, ensuring that the arms race is over once and for all. It will also help prevent new states from becoming nuclear powers by preventing them from testing in order to learn how to build nuclear weapons. Both of these results are essential prerequisites to further progress toward nuclear disarmament. President Clinton noted in his message to the CD that: "A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is vital to constrain both the spread and further development of nuclear weapons. And it will help fulfill our mutual pledges to renounce the nuclear arms race and move toward our ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear arms." A CTBT is in the best interest of the U.S. because it will prevent a new arms race and keep other states from building nuclear arsenals, and it is in the interest of every other nation in the world for these same reasons. Much like the NPT, the CTBT is a "common sense" agreement.

Now is the time to achieve the long-sought goal of a CTBT. Everything is in position. We have the commitment of the vast majority of states, including all the nuclear weapon states, to

conclude the Treaty. However, the commitment is to conclude the Treaty in 1996, and the international community has been working toward this goal with an intensity that some believe will not be sustainable.

On May 28, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, the Dutch Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on the CTBT, laid before us a Treaty text that by no means satisfies everyone, but is a clean replacement for the so-called "rolling text" that delegations have been using as the basis for negotiations for over two years. The "rolling text" contains over 1200 pairs of brackets of disputed language and time simply does not allow us to continue to use this document.

Chairman Ramaker's text is a singular accomplishment that the U.S. Government hopes all the delegations in Geneva can seriously consider. It provides a way forward in the negotiations and it is our fervent hope that the distinguished diplomats in Geneva, and more importantly, their governments around the world, will now focus on what is possible to achieve together in the draft CTBT text and set aside what in some cases are completely individual, if not isolated, concerns. If so, the international community will have significantly strengthened the NPT regime and it will have taken a major step toward attaining our ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. Whether or not the current Geneva negotiations can achieve these lofty aspirations in time to make the Treaty available for signature in September, 1996, just prior to the convening of the 51st General Assembly, will depend a great deal on the political will of the Parties in Geneva to act quickly and decisively in the very few weeks remaining in the CD's second session which concludes on June 28. It is the U.S. Government's intention to meet this timetable.

A CTBT will be an inherently important step both for disarmament and for nonproliferation. If a CTBT is not completed, the international community will have lost not only an important

opportunity finally to codify in an international treaty the end of nuclear weapon testing, but also an opportunity to strengthen further the international nonproliferation and disarmament regime. And, just as a successful effort will further strengthen this global regime, the failure to achieve a CTBT could negatively impact the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. The NPT, as the cornerstone of that international regime, will surely be affected. This is because achievement of a CTBT has long been viewed by NPT parties as an essential step toward fulfilling the Article VI goals of the NPT, and in this way is viewed as a "litmus test" of the nuclear weapon states' commitment to nonproliferation and disarmament. As such, the CTBT can further reinforce the viability of the NPT; it can strengthen the effort to make adherence to the NPT universal; and it can lead the way to completion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the near future. Failure to complete the CTBT this year, however, would be a huge disappointment and would set us back across the board in arms control. It is crucial that in the next few weeks, the nations of the world redouble their efforts to reach agreement on a CTBT. Failure to do so will destroy what is possibly the only chance the world will ever have to achieve this valuable treaty. It is my fervent hope, and my personal opinion, that the international community will not allow this tragic outcome to occur. The stakes are too high, and the rewards are too great.

With the Cold War and bipolar nuclear confrontation now receding, we can begin, as Vice President Gore stated last year at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains our ultimate goal." To protect ourselves we must begin steps in this direction. Much has already been done in the United States and Russia, but far more remains to be done. A CTBT will be an important step towards disarmament and a fissile material cut-off treaty, next on the agenda, will be another.

But we still have a long way to go. The ultimate goal of a nuclear-free world must establish a regime that is both verifiable and enforceable. No one knows how to do this yet and it will take many years. The simple act of destroying all of these weapons will take decades. This is the task of the next generation, to move the world in the direction of the NPT objective -- a verifiable and enforceable nuclear free world.

This work has already begun. The Canberra Commission, established by the Prime Minister of Australia, is taking a first look at how the world will actually go about ridding itself of nuclear weapons and will issue its report at the end of August. This is a striking illustration of how far we have come, from a world where it was once pondered if we could survive a nuclear war to one where the actual process of nuclear disarmament is now being seriously examined.

The Latin phrase *Carpe Diem*, or "seize the day," is a famous one. It is meant to encourage one to live for the moment, to not be afraid to take chances. We must now follow this advice and "seize the day" to continue strengthening the NPT and to work toward the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

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