



OFFICIAL TEXT

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Thank you, Mr. Director. It is a great pleasure for me to be here today to address this distinguished audience.

We have all witnessed over the past several years the storm of change that has been sweeping through the world, thawing the Cold War and triggering a groundswell of regional changes. The former Soviet Union collapsed, Germany reunited, Iraq mounted an unsuccessful bid for regional hegemony, Israel and the Palestinians signed a peace agreement, Apartheid collapsed in South Africa and the South African government agreed to share power, to only mention a few. Change in the post-Cold War international system has occurred with remarkable rapidity and regularity as its foundation of ideology and bilateral antagonism gives way.

Arms control is not the private preserve of the superpowers, or of Europe and North America. States in other regions cannot approach arms control as mere spectators. No longer can regional powers and small states hide their military buildups in the shadow of the arsenals of the superpowers. Every state has the responsibility and the obligation to constrain its arms. Arms control is now everyone's business, and every state must be an active participant. As a result, arms control in the post-Cold War era has become far more complex, and this complexity offers both great possibilities and pitfalls as we approach the millennium.

The old East-West competition no longer dominates the geostrategic landscape, but its departure has exposed the long-hidden minefields of regional instability and violence. Iraq's flouting of UN Security Council resolutions and its efforts to rebuild its military capabilities, the collapse of Yugoslavia into a sinkhole of violence and brutality, and the continuing standoff over North Korea's nuclear program are but a few of the mines that have been uncovered. These mines have little or no ideological character, but they have a legacy of totalitarianism in common. They are made more unstable by political, military, ethnic, or religious tensions and threaten to explode in unexpected places and ways. They are made more volatile by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and the acquisition of sophisticated conventional military capabilities. Their detonation could shatter the fragile movement around the world toward democracy and freedom that has been the hallmark of the end of the Cold War. If they are to be cleared, joint action will be required in peacefully settling disputes and effectively managing competing interests.

Let me briefly review for you the progress we have made so far in defusing these mines.

REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL

The end of the Cold War and the increased emphasis on arms control and non-proliferation has led many states to negotiate and implement regional measures

designed to reduce tension, contain destabilizing arms races, and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Regional arms control activity has increased dramatically in the past several years with the introduction of regional dialogues in the Middle East, Latin America, South Asia, and the East Asia/Pacific region.

Regional arms control initiatives are beginning to complement new multilateral and non-proliferation efforts by providing a framework within which regions can establish and codify acceptable military balances and implement measures designed to promote military transparency and openness. Regional and international stability is enhanced in this way.

Regional arms control is multifaceted in nature, encompassing reduction and elimination of military inventories, confidence-building and risk reduction measures, and persuasion that arms control can enhance a nation's security. Taken together, the distinct regional efforts form a web of negotiations that provide models for newer dialogues. For example, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, established in 1967 and now signed by 30 states, was the first nuclear weapons free zone to prohibit states with civilian nuclear programs from possessing, manufacturing, or testing a nuclear explosive device. Other regions recognize the value of such zones: the South Pacific created one in 1985 and Southeast Asia, Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East are now considering them.

Unfortunately, interest in regional arms control and confidence-building is not shared by all. Some states must still be convinced that arms control can be a useful instrument in managing difficult relationships between and among states. Others have shirked their share of the collective responsibility to take practical and appropriate arms control steps, instead hiding behind the unsustainable argument that arms control is about controlling the arms of others.

Now let me turn to the specific developments in each newly created regional security forum.

LATIN AMERICA

Latin America is a region with a rich history of regional arms control dialogues. I have already noted the Latin American nuclear weapons free zone. Activities today encompass a broad range of measures designed to address instabilities in Central and South America.

In 1990, the Governments of Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala resumed their attempts to reduce their forces and weapons. This process began in 1983 under the auspices of the Contadora Group, and continued in 1992 under the direction and determination of the Central American States. They reaffirmed their desire to open the negotiations on security, verification, civilian control, and arms reduction as called for in the Esquipulas II agreements. At the initial Security

Commission meeting in San Jose on 31 July 1990, they agreed to a regular process to accomplish the agreements' stated goals: assuring the defensive nature of armed forces; maintaining a reasonable balance or a proportional and comprehensive equilibrium of weapons, equipment, and troops so that they do not threaten neighboring countries; and designing new security relations based on cooperation, communication and prevention. They also agreed to create the Central American Security Commission (CASC) to continue discussions in this area. This process in and of itself is an encouraging development, and it continues today.

In South America, the return to democracy in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in the past several years has led to the Foz do Iguazu Declaration on Nuclear Safeguards and the Mendoza Declaration on Prohibiting Chemical and Biological Weapons. Peru has also proposed regional efforts to ban weapons of mass destruction and to increase the transparency of military activities. At the 1992 Conference on Disarmament (CD), Chile proposed convening a Latin American security conference to discuss disarmament and confidence-building measures (CBM), a conference which it has offered to host.

The Organization of American States (OAS) has also emerged as an important regional organization focused on arms control and non-proliferation. On 23 May 1992, the OAS General Assembly adopted a joint U.S. and Brazilian resolution on security and development (AG/RES 1179) establishing a clear consensus on an arms control agenda for OAS member-states. The OAS also passed a resolution (AG/RES 1180) extending the existence of the OAS working group on security, which provides an ongoing forum to discuss arms control issues. The Special Committee on Hemispheric Security has been meeting on a regular basis since the passage of this mandate.

On 11 June 1993, the OAS General Assembly adopted four resolutions on arms control and security, one of which called for a governmental experts meeting on security mechanisms and CBMs. In response, the first OAS experts meeting on confidence-and security-building measures (CSBM) was convened in Washington in November 1993. This meeting laid the ground work for the hemispheric-wide OAS governmental experts' meeting on CSBMs scheduled to be held in Argentina in March 1994.

MIDDLE EAST

The Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) dialogue, has contributed to the establishment of regional arms control fora around the world. By fostering a healthy debate on the application of traditional forms of arms control to regional instabilities and drawing long-standing adversaries to the table, ACRS has highlighted the role that confidence-building measures and other arms control measures can play in regional security.

The ACRS working group is one of five multilateral groups formed just after the opening round of the Middle East peace process in Madrid in October 1991. Twelve

Arab states, Israel, and a Palestinian delegation have been joined by a number of extra-regional participants for plenary and intersessional meetings focusing on both conceptual and operational arms control measures suited to the Middle East.

Since May 1992, the U.S. and Russia, co-sponsors of the ACRS working group, have hosted four plenary sessions, two in Moscow and two in Washington, DC. Breakthroughs in the bilateral peace process in September 1993 have made region-specific measures and venues the focal point of the group's efforts. The fifth ACRS plenary meeting is scheduled for April 1994 in Qatar.

The mid-1993 intersessional discussions provided information on specific measures and maintained the continuity of the dialogue. Six discussions were held during the fall, sponsored by both regional and extra-regional states with backgrounds in the subject areas. For example, Egypt hosted a verification seminar with a visit to the Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, Turkey held a workshop on information exchanges on military forces and mechanisms to report unusual military activities, and the Netherlands introduced the CSCE Communications Network.

At the November 1993 Plenary in Moscow, the working group welcomed the offer of the CSCE to link up to its communications network based in The Hague. Establishing a communications link and data base between thirteen or more Middle Eastern participants will be a seminal accomplishment of the peace process. Work is now underway on a temporary network through the CSCE for passing arms control information in preparation for the establishment of a network based and operated in the Middle East, possibly in a newly created "Conflict Prevention Center." Detailed intersessional work is also scheduled on measures relating to maritime, information exchange, and other confidence-building measures.

EAST ASIA/PACIFIC

Let me now turn to the East Asia/Pacific region, where arms control efforts range from the application of traditional measures in the Korean peninsula to the creation of a new region-wide dialogue on the security issues facing the region.

Tentative work on reconciliation and reunification in the Korean peninsula was halted by North Korea's announcement in March 1993 that it intended to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Prior to this announcement, the governments of North and South Korea had begun to take concrete steps toward establishing a security dialogue. The December 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation charged a Joint Military Commission to discuss and implement steps to achieve confidence-building measures and arms reductions. Other specific steps included: mutual notification and control of major military exercises, peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of

mass destruction, and the establishment of a hot line between their militaries to prevent "accidental arms clashes and avoid their escalation."

We hope that once a settlement is reached with North Korea, the two countries will hold talks at the prime ministerial level to resume this dialogue.

Capitalizing on a long history of bilateral and trilateral security contacts, the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) -- Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Brunei -- established in July 1993 the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to discuss regional security issues. The first meeting of the ARF is scheduled for 1994. ARF membership includes the six ASEAN states, ASEAN's seven principal dialogue partners (the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the European Union), Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea.

SOUTH ASIA

Having fought wars in 1947, 1965, and 1971, India and Pakistan have begun taking concrete steps to improve their relationship and reduce regional tensions. They signed and ratified bilateral agreements on avoidance of airspace violations, notification of military exercises, and establishing a communications link, or "hot line" at the senior military level. Since 1990, they have held a series of bilateral talks at the Foreign Secretary level, the most recent of which was conducted earlier this month in Islamabad.

In 1991, they ratified an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities, and, in 1992 and 1993, they exchanged lists of facilities covered under the agreement. An Open Skies-type agreement for the verification and implementation of confidence-building measures has been discussed in non-governmental settings. In addition, both countries have announced unilateral bans on chemical weapons and have signed the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). They are also working on a biological weapons ban as well. India and China have also begun negotiating non-nuclear confidence-building measures and in September 1993 initiated a series of agreements on ensuring "peace and tranquility" on their mutual border.

In 1993, India and Pakistan agreed in principle to establish a multilateral dialogue on regional security and nonproliferation. Still in its formative stages, this dialogue, as envisioned, will likely consist of an umbrella group of countries with particular interests in South Asia. Working groups could address specific nonproliferation and arms control issues and how they could enhance regional security and reduce tensions. The participants could be determined by topic, with different mixes of countries participating in each working group as appropriate.

While resolution of areas of tension such as Kashmir continues to be slow in coming, the agreement to multilateral dialogue is a positive step in support of the bilateral Indo-Pakistan dialogue and toward the development of solutions to the instabilities that exist in the region.

After this presentation, I am traveling, at the invitation of the Government of Pakistan, to Islamabad with a team of experts from my agency for informal meetings on the aspects of the U.S. arms control experience that may be relevant to South Asia, such as confidence-building measures, and conventional force reductions. While there, we will present information on all aspects of arms control, including negotiation, implementation, compliance, and verification.

AFRICA

In Africa as well, there are a number of recent developments which are very encouraging. In addition to the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone which I have already mentioned, other initiatives are being considered on a bilateral and multilateral level to address regional and ethnic tensions.

In November of 1993, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) formally established a Conflict Resolution Mechanism within its Secretariat which is designed to promote peacekeeping and conflict resolution. The Mechanism will address conflicts on both the inter-state and intra-state level, through preventative measures as well as those designed to apply to the resolution of ongoing wars. At its meeting in Cairo, the OAU agreed to tax members annually in order to fund the Mechanism which has recently begun operating on an ongoing basis in Addis Ababa.

Many believe that this process resulted in large measure from a nongovernmental forum held in May 1991 which adopted a series of proposals intended to promote the establishment of a regional security dialogue within the OAU. The historic forum, attended by several current and former African heads of state, was the first of its kind to address the problem of security and stability in the region. Participants released the Kampala Document which set forth guidelines for the creation of a "Helsinki" process for the region.

In East Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya are taking steps to address regional tensions which, in the past, have led to the accumulation of large military forces on the country's borders. At the end of 1993, they agreed to undertake efforts to reduce tension in the region and among themselves. Similarly, in southern Africa, the front line states have conducted discussions on regional security and stability following the transition of South Africa to majority rule. It is hoped that these developments will lead to a series of consultations and agreements in the near term.

EUROPE

Europe has seen the longest-running and most-successful regional security dialogue. Efforts to address security in Europe have produced multilateral security mechanisms that serve as models for addressing regional security throughout the world.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with a current membership of 52 nations, has provided the overall architecture for a European security dialogue since its creation by the 1975 Helsinki Agreement.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is more than one year into its three-year reduction of major categories of conventional armaments. CFE parties have notified reduction of over 17,000 tanks, armored combat vehicles, pieces of artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters, a significant decrease by anyone's standards. These reductions will continue until 1995.

On balance, CFE implementation has gone remarkably well. The Treaty is very complex and its implementation has not been flawless, with some problems still to be worked out in Vienna by the Treaty's oversight body, the Joint Consultative Group.

Further efforts toward regional security in Europe are underway. The CSCE's Forum on Security Cooperation (FSC) has adopted measures on conventional arms transfers, defense planning, military contacts, and crisis CSBMs, and is continuing work on a code of conduct, new CSBMs, and other measures, looking forward to a December 1994 CSCE Budapest Follow-Up Meeting.

Before moving on, I would like to discuss for a moment the Open Skies Treaty, the most wide-ranging international effort to date to promote openness and transparency on military forces and their activities. The Treaty, signed by 25 states in Helsinki on 24 March 1992, establishes a confidence-building regime of reciprocal aerial observation flights over the entire territory of all its signatories, an enormous geographic sweep.

The Treaty's potential scope extends well beyond the borders of its initial signatories. All of the states of the former Soviet Union are considered initial participants and may join at any time. Other CSCE members are expected to apply for participation soon after entry into force. Six months after entry into force, the Treaty will be open to any interested state, subject to agreement by all original signatories. Open Skies will contribute to greater openness and transparency about military matters throughout Europe and North America.

MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION

By way of transition from regional arms control to multilateral arms control, let me talk for a moment about a regional problem which requires a multilateral solution, namely

the destabilizing impact of excessive conventional arms buildups. I discussed a moment ago one attempt to deal with this problem, the CFE Treaty.

Frequently, responsibility for such accumulations is placed on arms supplier states. While it is true that industrialized states have defense industrial overcapacity and excess military equipment, some of this has been demand-driven. Although arms supplier states bear some responsibility for destabilizing arms transfers, the arms buyers must also weigh the impact of arms acquisitions on the resources available for a country's socio-economic development and regional stability.

Arms transfers policies -- of both buyers and sellers -- must recognize that a balance must be maintained between the need to respond to legitimate defense needs and the international security interest in discouraging destabilizing weapons buildups, especially in regions of tension and conflict.

Another item on the arms control and confidence-building agenda -- one that is often closely tied to the arms transfer problem -- is transparency and openness. If regional understandings of what constitutes excessive military buildups continue to be elusive, an easier step to accomplish is greater openness and transparency on arms acquisitions.

Eighty-two contributions to the United Nations (UN) Register for Conventional Arms Transfers, established by the 1991 Transparency in Armaments (TIA) Resolution, is a good response -- but not good enough. The register can clearly be strengthened, and this year's governmental experts meeting should attempt to bolster it by increasing participation and improving the quality of returns.

The Conference on Disarmament, which I have mentioned several times, is the principal forum established by the international community for the consideration and, as appropriate, negotiation of multilateral arms control agreements. Created in 1979, the CD is the successor to several earlier bodies and the first disarmament conference in which the five acknowledged nuclear weapons states participate.

The CD created its first new ad-hoc committee in several years, the TIA Ad Hoc Committee. This committee is the only conventional arms item on the CD agenda. Unfortunately, only some countries were willing to discuss important questions that hit close to home, such as transparency in conventional arms transfers. Some CD members attempted to expand the TIA focus to include weapons of mass destruction to try to redirect the discussion away from conventional arms issues more directly bearing on their own security policies.

With the end of the Cold War, the global nonproliferation environment has changed dramatically. However, it is marked by both successes and signs of foreboding:

- International commitment to the cause of nonproliferation continues to grow steadily as evidenced by the adherence in recent years of South Africa, France, and China to the NPT and by the efforts of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force.
- While the breakup of the Soviet Union has not led to the emergence of new nuclear weapon states, the debate in Ukraine over START ratification and adherence to the NPT has raised questions about the future of former Soviet nuclear weapons still located there. Belarus has acceded to the NPT, and Kazakhstan has also taken steps to do so.
- Traditional suppliers have tightened export controls to curb arms proliferation, yet emerging suppliers threaten to undermine these efforts.
- NPT membership has grown to more than 160 states, including all five acknowledged nuclear weapons states, but non-compliant NPT members such as North Korea and Iraq challenge the Treaty's effectiveness.
- More than 150 nations have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, but some of those who have not signed -- and perhaps some who have -- are believed to be pursuing offensive chemical weapon capabilities.
- Despite the existence of a ban on offensive biological weapons for 20 years through the Biological Weapons Convention, we see evidence of countries continuing to pursue development of such weapons.

In responding to the scourge of proliferating weapons of mass destruction, we must first strengthen the international nonproliferation foundation, and then build upon it.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

With more than 160 parties, the NPT is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the primary legal and political barrier to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. It reflects the international consensus that the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitute a grave threat to global security and stability. For nearly twenty-five years, the NPT has provided security and economic benefits to its parties. Moreover, by successfully containing the spread of nuclear weapons, the NPT has facilitated the efforts of the United States and others to reduce their own nuclear arsenals.

The security benefits of the NPT are evident throughout the world. For example, South Africa's acknowledgement and abandonment of its nuclear weapons program in 1991 has enhanced the security of all African states and has made a concrete contribution to regional efforts to establish an African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. The NPT can make

a critical contribution as well in containing possible nuclear proliferation arising from the breakup of the former Soviet Union. Adherence to the NPT by all of the nuclear-capable states that have emerged will help reduce the risk of dangerous nuclear proliferation and will facilitate productive relationships with their neighbors and others. Full compliance with its NPT obligations by North Korea is also essential to reducing tensions in Asia. Even in regions such as South Asia and the Middle East, where countries are not NPT parties, the NPT has played a critical role in creating the nonproliferation norms the international community is increasingly demanding that others accept and in isolating those countries that refuse to do so.

The NPT has also fostered wide-ranging cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, particularly in the developing world. Many states have been able to take advantage of the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology because of their membership in the NPT.

Indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT in 1995 will ensure that the Treaty's contribution to global security will endure. An NPT of unlimited duration will provide the international community with a vital and dependable foundation on which further arms control and disarmament measures can be pursued. It will ensure reliable access to nuclear materials and technology for NPT parties. Due to the importance the United States attaches to the NPT, we will make every effort to secure its indefinite and unconditional extension.

As we seek to make the NPT a permanent part of the international security framework, however, we must also extend our efforts beyond it to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Rapid completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a high priority because it can strengthen our efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A policy of observation by all the nuclear powers of the continued moratorium on nuclear testing is a vital part of our effort, and it will facilitate progress toward achievement of a CTBT. We applaud the passage by consensus of the UN General Assembly resolution on CTBT and the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a CTB. We hope that the current session of the CD will make rapid progress in this area. We urge all member states to support the on-going negotiations in the CD so that we can realize the goal of a multilateral, effectively verifiable treaty to ban all nuclear weapons tests for all time. Such a ban will strengthen the norm of nonproliferation and constrain the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in nuclear weapons states and help limit nuclear capabilities in proliferant states.

A multilateral convention prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes would be another good step in curtailing the spread of nuclear weapons. We applaud the passage by the United Nations of the Resolution on the Cut-Off of Fissile Material for Nuclear Explosive Purposes. Other measures to pursue include:

- shrinking stockpiles of excess highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium and ensuring that they are subject to the highest standards of safety, security, and international accountability;
- eliminating the need for HEU in civil nuclear programs;
- encouraging more restrictive regional arrangements to constrain fissile material production in regions of instability and high proliferation risk.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) represented a major arms control milestone, breaking old political deadlocks and charting new procedural ground. As of January 1994, 154 states have signed the CWC, but adherence needs to be universal. Signing the convention is not an act of magnanimity but rather of self-interest. All signatories, including the United States, should ratify the CWC as quickly as possible, so that it can enter into force at the earliest possible date.

Looking forward to entry into force, the work of the CWC Preparatory Commission in The Hague, is encouraging. Theirs is not an easy task. They must ensure that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), created to oversee the CWC's implementation, is efficient and effective, not a bureaucracy where the bureaucrats' interests come first and those of the Treaty second. The technical detail is immense and working out administrative procedures can be grueling. However, this work is critical if the Convention is to function effectively, and we all must take an active role in ensuring that standards are not lowered in the name of expediency.

Since entry into force in 1975, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has been strengthened by several means, including widespread and increasing membership and through confidence-building measures. Creating a transparency regime that enhances the effectiveness of, and compliance with the Convention would further strengthen the BWC.

In addition to the CWC and the BWC, the 25-member Australia Group, which pursues informal multilateral measures to impede proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, should be encouraged in its work. This group has always supported universal and effective implementation of the CWC and the BWC, and will continue to work to achieve these goals through the promotion of harmonized multilateral export controls on chemical and biological weapons-related materials and equipment being sought for weapons programs. All countries should consider implementing the Australia Group export control lists.

MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION

The spread of advanced missile capabilities into the arsenals of a growing number of states is transforming the geostrategic landscape into more dangerous terrain by creating new threats at longer distances where no threats had existed before. It fosters the specter of civilian populations far from any military confrontation held hostage to nuclear, chemical, or biological attack. It is introducing a new tension into the already troubled relationships of many states. The guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) provide a useful launch pad for a global nonproliferation norm, and the MTCR should be used as a mechanism for taking joint action to combat missile proliferation.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I have spoken at some length today on the arms control and nonproliferation tasks before us, because it is important to recognize what has been done, and, more importantly, what must still be done. Although tangible developments at the regional level may seem at times to be slow in coming, it is important to remember that the U.S.-Soviet transition from voluntary declarations to detailed arms control agreements with intrusive verification regimes spanned the entire length of the Cold War. It was only after the two sides narrowly escaped nuclear conflict during the Cuban Missile Crisis that they were able to bring themselves to sign a communications or "hot line" agreement. Even the primarily voluntary nature of confidence-building measures contained in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act took several years to negotiate.

Given the instabilities afflicting these regions, establishing a regional dialogue is itself a confidence-building measure. The experience of the United States and the former Soviet Union amply demonstrates that mere existence of regular dialogue can reduce tension by providing a platform for communication among military and government participants -- even when political crisis prevents diplomatic contacts at senior levels.

Furthermore, established fora such as the OAS Special Committee on Hemispheric Security and ACRS are helping to shape regional security well into the future. Their sponsorship of meetings and conferences is creating a cadre of political and military arms control experts from each capital versed in the details of arms control negotiation and implementation. Such expertise will help ensure that measures are developed that best address unique regional instabilities and that these measures are effectively implemented over the long term.

We all should be encouraged by the progress that has been made to date to address regional instabilities. Such steps are an integral part of the international effort, carried out both at the UN and elsewhere, to adopt acceptable levels of conventional military forces and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction.

We still have a long way to go. Our job is to devise ways we can use arms control and confidence-building to realize the expectations and promote the relationships and behavior that foster a more stable and peaceful world. We will not reach our objectives if we cannot reverse the dangerous trend of proliferating weapons of mass destruction; if we do not establish and sustain strong international nonproliferation norms; and if we cannot contribute to the resolution of disputes in those regions of the world most prone to violence and conflict.

World changes, while potentially dangerous and certainly challenging, offer the hope of replacing antagonism with cooperation, creating a progressively more democratic global environment, preventing proliferation, and dampening regional conflicts. We will help to realize these hopes if we -- all of us -- continue to make effective use of the entire mix of arms control and confidence-building tools at our disposal.