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Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary General, Distinguished Delegates. Thank you for the opportunity to address this important seminar on the role of nuclear weapon free zones in the international nonproliferation regime. This is a timely topic and the presentations we have heard and the discussions we have had, thus far, reflect the depth and breadth of support for the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones in numerous regions throughout the world.

This seminar has also clearly revealed the deeply rooted desire of those represented here today to see the cause of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament advanced by the successful conclusion of measures to further reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk that nuclear weapons will spread or worse, be used. This is a goal that my government shares with all represented here today. It is why the United States is committed to do everything possible to contribute to achievement of that goal.

The topic I was asked to address today is "The Treaty of Tlatelolco, the NPT and the CTBT: Towards Zero Option in Nuclear Weapons?" What do these agreements have in common and what do they say about the prospects for achieving our shared goal of ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons?

It is obvious, of course, that all three agreements are designed to serve the twin, and mutually reinforcing goals of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Collectively they prevent the development, improvement and further spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosives. All three agreements are the end result of long-ago initiatives of a single state or group of states. From the beginning of the nuclear age, countries recognized the need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons while ensuring that the benefits of the peaceful atom were available to all. A succession of initiatives, most notably by Ireland, culminated in a United Nations General Assembly resolution in 1961 which called upon all States "to use their best endeavors to secure the conclusion of an international agreement" under which the nuclear weapon states would pledge not to transfer their nuclear weapons or to assist non-nuclear weapon states to acquire them, and non-nuclear weapon states would pledge "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons." This resolution was the genesis of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. Today, nearly forty years after the "Irish Resolution," and more than 25 years after the NPT's entry into force, 185 parties have joined that Treaty - five short of universal membership.

The initiative for the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was a Brazilian-draft United National General Assembly resolution in 1962 calling for the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in Latin America. This resolution was supported by Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador but was not put to a vote that year. On April 29, 1963, at the initiative of the President of Mexico, the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico announced their proposal for a multilateral agreement among Latin American countries "not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or nuclear

launching devices..." This declaration received the support of the United Nations General Assembly in November of that year, with the United States voting in the affirmative. Negotiations on the Treaty of Tlatelolco were concluded in 1967 and the Treaty was opened for signature. Today, thirty years later, the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been ratified and is in force for nearly every state in the region and its Additional Protocols are in force for all eligible states.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is the newest addition to the international security architecture but it is far from a new idea. Indeed, early efforts to achieve a nuclear test ban culminated in the negotiation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (LTBT). And the preamble of the LTBT affirmed the determination of its parties to seek an end to all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. Now, more than thirty years after the international community formally endorsed the goal of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing, it has finally been achieved. Today, 140 states have signed the CTBT, including all five of the declared nuclear weapon states.

The NPT, Treaty of Tlatelolco and CTBT are all tangible, incremental steps toward nuclear disarmament. Their achievement became possible at a given moment, as a matter of security. Each agreement provided clearer insights into future possibilities and created new security realities. Each measure contributed to the achievement of the next.

The conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 gave successful impetus to efforts to include in the NPT, under negotiation at that time, what is now Article VII which provides that "Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in

order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories." Tlatelolco promoted regionally the nonproliferation objective promoted globally by the NPT. The model for nuclear weapon free zones established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco has now been embraced in whole or in part by states in the South Pacific, Africa and Southeast Asia who have negotiated nuclear- weapon- free zone treaties for their respective areas.

The NPT established a legally-binding framework for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons worldwide and for pursuing good faith negotiations to halt the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament. It reflects an international norm of nonproliferation that has transformed the acquisition of nuclear weapons from an act of national pride to one contrary to international law. The NPT also serves as a necessary support to the worldwide regime for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy under effective international safeguards. Broad international support for efforts to strengthen compliance with this aspect of the Treaty has led to the important negotiations in Vienna on Programme 93 plus 2 to strengthen the IAEA's system of safeguards in NPT states. And the NPT has served as a foundation upon which other vitally needed measures of nuclear disarmament have been built. By promoting stability and discouraging further nuclear weapon proliferation, the NPT has fostered an international environment conducive to other arms control measures. We must continue to do all we can to strengthen this agreement and the system of safeguards that all of us rely on to monitor compliance with its provisions.

Most recently the decision by the parties to the NPT to extend that Treaty indefinitely and without conditions generated a level of confidence about the international community's

commitment to nuclear nonproliferation that contributed to the successful conclusion of the CTBT. The significance of the CTBT for our larger nuclear disarmament objectives cannot be overstated. United States' officials have characterized it as the "longest sought, hardest fought" goal of nuclear disarmament. Those who have spent careers in the business of arms control and disarmament, as I have, appreciate this point deeply.

Fundamental doctrines do not change overnight. But by committing to end all nuclear explosive testing, the nuclear weapon states are signaling the end of one era and the beginning of another. We must now turn our attention to securing the entry into force of the CTBT. This will ensure that the resources of the International Monitoring System and all the deterrent and detection possibilities of on-site inspection will be available to help verify that no state is continuing to improve its nuclear arsenals through nuclear explosive testing, or acquiring a nuclear arsenal through such means.

The CTBT is also a concrete example of how and why disarmament proceeds. We can all recall the suspicions of some that if the NPT were made permanent, the nuclear weapon states would lose interest in the test ban. That concern was mistaken on two counts -- first, because it cast the NPT as a favor to the nuclear weapon states, rather than a security instrument for all. And second, it assumed that uncertainty about the NPT's future would elicit more disarmament. In fact, **confidence** about the NPT has fostered further disarmament, and the nuclear weapon states' efforts to conclude a test ban intensified, rather than diminished, after the NPT was extended.

The next measure on our nuclear disarmament agenda is the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. The 1995 NPT Conference recognized, in its decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, the need for "immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations" for a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons. A multilateral, effectively verifiable cutoff treaty will complement the CTBT's qualitative cap on nuclear weapons by capping the quantity of fissile material available for such weapons throughout the world. It will ensure that the essential ingredient for nuclear weapons is no longer produced outside of international safeguards. It will cut off the lifeblood for arms races, new and old. A Fissile Material Cutoff Agreement would also represent a major step toward the goal of ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons, as well as preventing their further proliferation worldwide. It would be another major step in the continuum of actions that has been underway for some years now to make progress toward the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. For this reason, the United States strongly urges the member states of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. This treaty must become an urgent priority of the international community.

In addition to these global measures and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, other regional arms control and nonproliferation efforts have made mighty contributions to an international environment conducive to further steps in the process of nuclear disarmament. The United States and other nuclear weapon states have supported, through signature of the relevant Protocols, the South Pacific and African nuclear weapon free zones. We are continuing to consult with the members of ASEAN with a view to bringing the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Treaty into conformity with our long-standing criteria for supporting such zones. Nuclear weapon free zones are a valuable complement to the global NPT. They reinforce the NPT through their affirmation of the vital role of IAEA safeguards in monitoring compliance with these agreements. They also demonstrate that nuclear nonproliferation is not something non-nuclear weapon states "do" for the nuclear weapon states. Rather, they demonstrate that nuclear nonproliferation is a security measure that regional states seek for themselves. And they go beyond the NPT by prohibiting the deployment of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon states in the territories of regional parties.

Finally, we must continue to make progress in shrinking existing nuclear arsenals. For the foreseeable future, bilateral negotiations offer the best prospects for success, which I would define as durable, verifiable agreements that continue the process of irreversible arms reductions.

In recent years there has been dramatic progress in nuclear arms reductions and we are determined to see the elimination of nuclear weapons continue. The elimination of strategic offensive arms by the U.S. and Russia under START I is more than two years ahead of schedule. The United States and Russia are also eliminating nuclear warheads at a significant rate each year. And these are real arms reductions; nuclear warheads are being taken apart and their delivery systems are being destroyed; some being literally cut into pieces.

By the end of the START II reduction period, the United States' strategic nuclear arsenal will have been reduced by two-thirds of its Cold War levels. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed that once the START II Treaty is ratified, the United States and Russia would proceed to

deactivate all strategic delivery systems to be reduced under START II by removing their warheads or by taking other steps to remove them from alert status. Moreover, President Clinton told the UN General Assembly last September that "When Russia ratifies START II, President Yeltsin and I are ready to discuss the possibilities of further cuts, as well as limiting and monitoring nuclear warheads and materials. This will help make deep reductions irreversible."

The United States also has continued to reduce its non-strategic nuclear force warheads. Since 1988, non-strategic nuclear force warheads have been reduced by 90 percent. These warheads are no longer routinely deployed at sea, and the United States is committed to a process of eliminating the capability to deploy these weapons on U.S. surface ships, including on carrier-based aircraft. In accordance with commitments made first in 1992, the United States has now withdrawn from Europe all land-based tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons are now being dismantled.

These are significant steps that will make us all more secure. Each step imparts momentum to the next. We need only to catalogue the many multilateral and bilateral agreements that have been negotiated to reduce the nuclear threat to understand the process of nuclear disarmament is proceeding step-by-step.

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, we are all united in our shared commitment to further reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament is everyone's business and there is ample room for careful thought and constructive opinion about how

disarmament should be pursued. The reports last year by the Canberra Commission, the Stimson Center, and Atlantic Council, and statements by the former head of the Strategic Air Command, General Lee Butler, and other military leaders are recent examples of this discussion. But not one of these proponents of nuclear disarmament has asserted that this will be easy or can be accomplished on a fixed or arbitrary timetable. Progress on any disarmament measure depends first of all on security. Nuclear disarmament cannot occur on demand or in a vacuum, but must be approached in tandem with broader improvement in the international security environment. Should we be impatient? Perhaps. But we cannot let this impatience lead us to be careless or to take steps that will not hold up under the wear and tear of a world where new challenges to our individual and collective security emerge daily.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco, the NPT and the CTBT, and all the other agreements that have been concluded or await our attention, have one very important characteristic in common -- their direct and immediate contribution to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. All of these agreements are making nuclear disarmament happen, because they are building the security environment in which it can happen. Just as we must continue to pursue further nuclear disarmament measures, we must support existing agreements through our adherence to and full compliance with them. There is little doubt that each step we take up the security ladder will enable us to see better and farther, and to do more.