

**Talking Points on  
the Future of Nonproliferation Regimes**  
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Intro:

- Strong international norms exist against the use or spread of all forms of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological and chemical. These norms are embodied and bolstered by treaties created to specifically address each form: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
  
- These norms and their associated legal embodiments have proven relatively successful in the past in limiting the spread or actually eliminating weapons of mass destruction.
  
- The future will involve efforts to strengthen all three norms and their treaty regimes to make it even more difficult for rogue states to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

BWC

- The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) entered into force in 1975, and has 139 parties who have pledged never under any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or

other peaceful purposes. For many years after, biological weapons were not a source of great concern for many, since relatively few states were capable of producing them.

- However, the technology for making biological weapons is becoming more widespread.

Combined with the fact that some biological weapons approach the lethality of low-level nuclear weapons, this has led to efforts to strengthen the BWC.

- Unlike other regimes, the BWC contains no provisions for on-site inspection activity, a source of increasing criticism in recent years. In an effort to strengthen the BWC, many of the parties currently are actively participating in an effort to draft a legally binding protocol that will enhance openness and transparency and thereby improve compliance. This instrument will set forth measures that provides for off-site and on-site activities and should strengthen compliance by making certain national information declarations mandatory. Our objective is to complete this work by 1998, well before the Fifth Review Conference in 2001.

### CWC

- The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993 bans the stockpile, transfer, and production of chemical weapons, mandates the elimination of stockpiles now in existence, and requires parties to submit to intrusive on-site inspections.

- Due to its comprehensive verification regime, this treaty, which was drafted in consultation with representatives from our chemical industry, is a landmark in the struggle against the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

- The Convention will make it tougher for rogue states to acquire chemical weapons and will reduce the threat to our citizens at home as well as our troops in the field.
- With more than the 65 states necessary to trigger the 180-day countdown toward entry-into-force now having ratified the CWC, the Convention will enter into force at the end of this month.
- As I'm sure many of you know, certain individuals on Capitol Hill in Washington are not fond of this treaty, and as a result, the United States has not yet ratified the CWC.
- The CWC was specifically designed to punish those countries who choose to flout the international norm against chemical weapons, thus providing additional incentives to join the regime. They will be subject to restrictions on their chemical trade -- restrictions which will also apply to the United States chemical industry if the United States does not become a part of the CWC regime.
- U.S. credibility in the fight to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction would be eroded were the United States to fail to join the CWC regime. In the words of retired General Norman Schwarzkopf, "by not ratifying the treaty, we align ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea, and I'd just as soon not be associated with those thugs...".

- One of the most oft-heard criticisms of the CWC in Washington is that rogue states have no intention of signing the treaty, and that therefore, the United States should not, either. Since the U.S. has already decided to destroy its own chemical weapons, the rationale that we should refrain from ratifying the CWC because a few nations may continue to pursue them is illogical. The CWC will make it harder for those countries to acquire the ingredients they need for chemical weapons.

#### Australia Group

- In addition to the BWC and CWC, an informal forum of 30 states, including the United States, exists which has as its goal to discourage and impede chemical and biological weapon proliferation. Chaired by Australia and thus dubbed the “Australia Group,” these states seek to accomplish this goal by harmonizing national export controls on precursor chemicals, pathogens, and dual-use production equipment, sharing information on proliferation developments, and seeking other ways to curb the use of chemical and biological weapons.

- The effects of the Australia Group support and complement the BWC and CWC, and the United States expects the Australia Group to remain a key element of U.S. nonproliferation policy and an important means to combat the use and spread of chemical weapons.

#### NPT

- Before 1970, the acquisition of nuclear weapons had been a point of national pride. The NPT, by establishing a norm of international behavior, converted this former act of national pride into a

violation of international law.

- The NPT has been the most successful arms control agreement in history. It has 185 parties with only a small number of nations currently outside this “Club of Civilization.” It has added immeasurably to the security of the United States and of the entire world.

- This fact is what led the states parties to agree to extend the NPT indefinitely at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference in New York. The indefinite extension of the NPT was a watershed event. It ensured a strong and dependable basis for future efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- What are these future efforts? For starters, the first PrepCom meeting leading to the 2000 NPT Review Conference will be held later this month. This is the first PrepCom under the post-1995 NPT Conference regime and it will be an important step toward the “strengthened treaty review process” called for at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The meeting will address exactly how the “strengthened treaty review process” should be implemented. The PrepCom will make both the substantive and procedural preparations for the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

- Certainly, one important means of strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), opened for signature last year. The CTBT is a bulwark against the spread and further development of nuclear weapon capabilities and reinforces and complements the international norm of nonproliferation embodied in the NPT. It will constrain any

nation from improving its existing arsenal and prevents the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons. It also keeps new states from becoming nuclear powers by preventing them from testing in order to learn how to build nuclear weapons more efficiently, or to make more advanced weapons.

- Now that the CTBT has been opened for signature and 142 countries have signed the treaty, we must begin work to secure ratification by the required parties to bring the treaty into force. The goal of the Clinton Administration is to work towards achieving entry-into-force of the CTBT at the earliest possible date: September 1998. A strong international consensus against nuclear explosive testing already exists, but each signature and ratification serves to further codify this international norm and make it stronger.

- Another complement to the NPT are the several nuclear-weapon-free-zones now in existence. Each one adds emphasis to the important regional aspect of the control of weapons of mass destruction.

- Since the NPT was extended in May 1995, the United States has signed onto two new nuclear-weapon-free-zone agreements: the Treaty of Raratonga -- the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, and the Treaty of Pelindaba -- the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free- Zone Treaty.

- In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco -- the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty -- is nearing full implementation. Nearly all Latin American countries are parties and the five nuclear

weapon states and relevant extraterritorial states are party to its protocols.

- In addition to the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, and Pelindaba Treaties, the United States has been working closely with the ASEAN countries during the drafting of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and its associated Protocols so that the five nuclear weapons states can eventually sign the Protocol to the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which was opened for signature on December 15, 1995 in Bangkok. The United States supports in principle the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia and will continue to work with the ASEAN states and our P-5 partners to resolve the few concerns that remain.

- Continued progress toward nuclear disarmament between the U.S. and Russia also strengthens the NPT and the norm of nonproliferation. The announcement last month at the Helsinki Summit by President Clinton and President Yeltsin that the U.S. and Russia are ready to negotiate a START III Treaty that would reduce strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000 - 2,500 on each side is a striking example of this progress. When such levels are reached, the two nations will have reduced their strategic nuclear arsenals by 80 percent below their Cold War peak, a reduction which the world would never have thought possible only a few years ago.

- As we look ahead to further strengthen the NPT regime, verification must be enhanced. Such efforts are underway at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna pursuant to the "93+2" program. By adding new technologies and access, such as environmental monitoring, we can make sure that nuclear weapons programs aren't being concealed from inspectors.

- Last but not least, it is obviously desirable to have as many countries as possible become parties to the NPT, and in this regard, we have been very successful. One hundred and eighty-five countries have stated their intention under the NPT never to acquire nuclear weapons, leaving only five countries outside the NPT regime: Brazil, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan.

- All of the measures I've just mentioned -- achievement of a CTBT, the expansion of NWFZs, enhanced verification measures and strides toward NPT universality -- were specifically mentioned in a document on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament" agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The implementation of so many of these "Principles and Objectives" clearly illustrates that the NPT regime is growing stronger and that the United States is committed to fighting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

### Conclusion

- Strong regimes for controlling the spread or use of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological and chemical -- form the basis for further efforts to enhance peace and stability through arms control. Progress between the U.S. and Russia in reducing the overarmament of the Cold War in recent years has been possible in large part due to the strong international norms and treaty regimes concerning weapons of mass destruction proliferation. As the nuclear stockpiles of the U.S. and Russia continue to grow smaller, it will become even more important for each of these regimes to remain vigorous and effective.

- Looking to the future, the experiences of the BWC, CWC and NPT suggest that just as the Cold



War is part of the past, so is narrow bloc politics in multilateral arms control negotiations. The reflexive antagonism between East and West and North and South has been overtaken by history. Nations are concerned with the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction and find it in their own best interest to reach agreements on how to limit their spread or eliminate them. Ongoing efforts to strengthen these regimes demonstrate that there is support for them all over the world and that, when appealed to directly, all states are prepared to make their own decisions about their own security.