"The Enduring Value of Arms Control"
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As soon as humans began living together in large groups they began making war on their neighbors, primarily to seize their goods or their land. Attempts at long term peace between neighboring groups, tribes, and nations were made from time to time with very limited success. For several millennia, the implements of war did not appreciably change and victory went to the largest or best trained armies.

This condition slowly began to change as advances in technology transformed the character of warfare. During the Middle Ages, the advent of the English longbow and the crossbow and, of course, the invention of gunpowder by the Chinese, demonstrated the impact and the importance of new technology on waging war. As technology made war increasingly more destructive, the first attempts were made to control technology and limit the implements of war in order to enhance the cause of peaceful settlement and to reduce the destructiveness of war. For example, the medieval papacy outlawed the crossbow in 1139 as "hateful to God and unfit for Christians" and the Church later attempted to proscribe the use of rifles. These early attempts were the forerunners of what we today refer to as arms control.

Military technology continued to improve over the centuries. The rifle, the machine gun, poison gas, and aerial bombardment, among other such developments, steadily followed one another, with each new innovation seemingly worse than those before. The extent to which centuries of destructive invention had amplified man's ability to kill his fellow man was realized in World War I. These new technologies combined with total war resulted in the deaths of an unprecedented number of people. This fact lent impetus to diplomatic attempts to end war for all

time and ushered in a new era of arms control policies.

The Versailles Treaty of 1919, which ended the so called "War to End All Wars," included extensive provisions limiting the number of troops and types of weapons that a defeated Germany would be allowed. The Washington Naval Convention of 1922 attempted to prevent a naval arms race among the great powers by establishing a limit upon the number and tonnage of ships allowed to each of them. The Geneva Convention of 1925 created numerous "rules" for the conduct of war and, important from an arms control perspective, in a Protocol prohibited, in effect, the first use in war of poison gas and biological weapons. With the exception of the Geneva Protocol, these agreements and other attempts like them were, in the end, failures. Through clever acts of deception by the German military and the inattention of the Allies, Germany was able to retain the rudiments of its war-making capability, allowing it to engage in a tremendous military expansion seemingly overnight under the leadership of Adolf Hitler. The Washington Naval Convention did not forestall a build-up of naval armaments in the 20's and 30's. Only the Geneva Protocol, a forerunner of the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, was adhered to in any significant manner, and even it did not prevent the use of such weapons by Italy against Ethiopia in 1936. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the League of Nations, which attempted to outlaw war and establish a system of collective security during this period, have been described by many historians as failing because they placed too much emphasis on ideals and not enough attention upon military and political realities. The failure of these treaties helped lead to World War II, the most destructive of all wars in which approximately 60 million people died.

The entire world changed on July 16, 1945, in Alamagordo, New Mexico, with the

successful testing of the first atomic bomb. This new weapon was so powerful that even the scientists responsible for creating it had some misgivings about unleashing it upon the world. The technology of war had now advanced to the point where humanity had created a weapon of such power that it had in hand the ability to cause its own destruction. This date marked a new era for arms control, one based on the essential necessity to control and limit nuclear weapons, if civilization was to be preserved. This new phase of arms control was different from the past in one important respect: there was widespread recognition that agreements would have to be negotiated with an eye focused upon realistic considerations -- given the power of atomic weapons, there was no margin for error.

However, this new thinking in arms control did not happen overnight. The first attempts at controlling nuclear weapons failed for the same reasons previous agreements had failed -- they were unrealistic. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report recommended complete international control of atomic energy in all its aspects, after which atomic bombs would be banned or destroyed. The proposal of the Baruch Plan in 1946 to create an international authority to control nuclear weapons proved to be ill-fated with the onset of the Cold War. The Soviet Union, determined to have its own atomic bomb, rejected the offer and the nuclear arms race ensued.

The United States acquired nuclear weapons in 1945 and the Soviet Union followed suit in 1949, followed by the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960 and China in 1964. This increase in the number of nuclear weapon states took place against the background of predictions during the Kennedy Administration of 25-30 nuclear weapon states -- meaning states with nuclear weapons integrated into their military arsenals -- by the late 1970s. If such a trend had continued unchecked that number could probably be doubled for 1997, with an almost unimaginable effect

upon U.S. and world security. The principal reason that this did not happen was the result of an arms control agreement -- the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which today forms one of the cornerstones of international peace and security. The number of declared nuclear weapon states is still the same as it was in 1968 -- five. There remain three states outside the NPT world system with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and compliance problems have occurred with two or three parties -- but 185 countries have become Parties to the NPT. There are now only five states that are not part of the NPT regime -- Brazil, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan. Brazil is a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, and Cuba is a signatory, so in effect, only three nations on earth have remained completely outside the NPT system.

Before the NPT entered into force in 1970, the acquisition of nuclear weapons had been a point of national pride. The NPT, by establishing a norm of international behavior, converted this former act of national pride into a violation of international law. The basic bargain of the NPT is that the non-nuclear weapon states agreed never to acquire nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapon states undertook to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations with the ultimate objective being the elimination of nuclear weapons. Thus, the ultimate goal of the NPT is nuclear disarmament -- a goal shared by the United States, and articulated by President Clinton in his September 1996 speech to the UN General Assembly, when he alluded to "a century in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced, and ultimately eliminated." At first glance this goal seems reminiscent of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Baruch Plan, but it is different in that it is based on realistic and practical means, enforceable obligations to retard the spread of nuclear weapons, and negotiations to extend over a long period of time, doing what is

practical when it is possible.

The fact that the NPT is a realistic and practical agreement which has added immeasurably to world security is what led the states Parties to agree to extend the NPT indefinitely at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference in New York. States recognized the valuable contribution the NPT makes to international stability. In choosing to extend the NPT permanently, they implicitly expressed their belief that arms control will be relevant not just 10 years from now, or for another 25 years, but forever. The indefinite extension of the NPT was a watershed event, ensuring a strong and dependable basis for future efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to make progress in nuclear disarmament negotiations. It is the best example of the enduring value of arms control. In making the NPT a permanent Treaty, all the Parties agreed to a strengthened review process and a "Statement on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation" which together reflect the collective interest and commitment of NPT Parties in implementing the Treaty and creating a process to further strengthen the Treaty regime. Perhaps the most prominent of the several "Principles and Objectives" enunciated in the Statement were a CTBT in 1996 and continued nuclear weapon reductions. Although it is the Treaty itself which is the source of each Parties' obligations, in order to maintain a strong and effective NPT regime, a CTBT and continued nuclear weapon reductions progress are essential.

However, with respect to this second half of the basic NPT bargain, to which I referred and which is addressed in the Principles and Objectives, that of controlling and reversing vertical proliferation, only limited progress was possible during the Cold War, but much has been possible since its end. Indeed, much has been accomplished since the 1995 Conference.

In 1969, the United States and the former Soviet Union began the strategic arms limitation

process which led to the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement (SALT I) as well as to the SALT II Treaty. SALT I was the first attempt through bilateral negotiations to limit the delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons. The objective of the SALT I negotiations was to place initial limits on the strategic nuclear offensive and defensive missile systems of the two superpowers. SALT I was signed by the two parties in 1972 and negotiations for SALT II began thereafter. SALT II attempted to complete the limitations on strategic offensive systems begun in SALT I. While the Treaty was signed in 1979, it was never ratified, although the two sides largely adhered to the Treaty's strictures on their own initiative.

As attempts to place limits on strategic offensive missiles were being conducted, an agreement to limit defenses against such weapons was also reached in 1972. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty had as its objective to prevent the deployment of a large-scale ABM strategic defense. By codifying each side's vulnerability to the offensive weapons of the other, the ABM Treaty sought to forestall a greater arms race and to provide a foundation upon which further offensive arms control talks could be built. The Treaty remains in effect to this day and we continue to work with Russia and other potential Soviet successor states to ensure its viability. An important agreement was reached at Helsinki last month wherein the United States and Russia agreed on a joint statement that provides the basis for the conclusion of negotiations to demarcate between strategic ABM systems, which are covered by the Treaty, and theater missile defenses, which are not.

New negotiations on strategic offensive arms were begun in 1982 under the new title of START, or Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, and as the Cold War ended, there was agreement to actually reduce the number of nuclear weapons as well as their delivery vehicles. The START I

Treaty was concluded on July 31, 1991, and it mandated reductions in the total number of deployed strategic warheads to 6,000 on each side (roughly a 50 percent cut). The demise of the Soviet Union greatly complicated the entry into force of the START I Treaty, since it suddenly became necessary to determine who would be the successors to the U.S.S.R. for the START I Treaty. Toward this end, the Lisbon Protocol was signed in May 1992, recognizing Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia and Ukraine as the USSR successors for START. Lisbon also committed Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states in the shortest possible time; associated letters from the Presidents of these three states further committed them to eliminate all nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms located on their territories within the seven year START I reduction period. This commitment was met by December 1996. The U.S. Senate provided its advice and consent to START I in October 1992 and when Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine had ratified START I and acceded to the NPT, the way was finally cleared for START I's entry into force on December 5, 1994.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, some people have asserted that arms control has outlived its usefulness, and that its institutions and practice are nothing more than Cold War relics. Now that the nuclear arms race and the associated thermonuclear confrontation have ended, they argue, why should we continue to bother with negotiating such agreements? History has made arms control irrelevant. I take strong exception to such views. History has not made arms control irrelevant. In fact, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has made it possible for huge steps forward to be taken in controlling and eliminating weapons of mass destruction. In this new era, arms control has taken on increased importance for the peace and stability of the entire world, but we must guard against the unbridled idealism that

characterized the period between World War I and World War II. Coupled with claims that arms control has outlived its usefulness are demands for time bound nuclear disarmament. As I have stated, arms control during the Cold War was a slow, tedious process, but it preserved stability and ultimately led us to where we stand today. This arms control process holds significant lessons and implications for the future as we move forward into both a new century and a dramatically new international environment. If we are to ever reach the goal of a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons, it will be accomplished not by grandiose declarations, but by capitalizing on and furthering the incremental progress made during the Cold War.

The United States and Russia have furthered this progress through the negotiation of disarmament treaties such as START II. After START II enters into force, as announced at the Helsinki Summit last month, the U.S. and Russia have pledged to commence negotiations on a START III Treaty. Building on the accomplishments of the first START agreement, the START II Treaty, signed in January 1993, will, when ratified and implemented, dramatically reduce the number of nuclear warheads remaining after START I. The START I and START II Treaties taken together represent approximately a two-thirds cut in the deployed strategic offensive arms of the parties. START II also eliminates heavy Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and bans multiple warheads on ICBMs, contributing to stability by focusing on weapons that lend themselves to first-strike use. Although the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratify START II last year, we are still waiting for the Duma to follow suit. President Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed at Helsinki to extend the START II deadline for eliminations to December 31, 2007, while agreeing that the systems to be eliminated will be deactivated by 2003. This extension agreement is subject to the approval of the Russian Duma and U.S. Senate.

Partly to facilitate Russian ratification of START II, last month in Helsinki, President Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed to a framework for START III. The goal of START III will be to establish by December 31, 2007, a ceiling of 2,000 - 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each party. This represents a 30 - 45 percent reduction in the number of such warheads permitted under START II, and more than a 65 percent reduction in the number permitted under START I. The two Presidents also agreed that START III will be the first strategic arms control agreement to include measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads, as well as promoting the irreversibility of deep reductions. The Presidents also agreed to the goal of making the current START Treaties unlimited in duration.

Just as START II and START III build on progress made during the Cold War, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), opened for signature last fall, completed steps taken decades earlier. A CTBT has been one of the oldest arms control objectives of the nuclear age. The quest began in the late 1950s, the first step being the informal testing moratorium which commenced in 1958 and collapsed in 1961. An impasse in the test ban negotiations in 1962 over the issue of on-site verification for underground tests led to the by-passing of this issue in 1963 and the conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons or carrying out explosions for peaceful purposes anywhere but underground. A refinement was agreed to by the United States and the former Soviet Union in 1974 and in 1976 through two treaties (the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the PNE Treaty) which together limit underground nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons, or roughly 10 times the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb. Although a convincing argument could be made for the need for nuclear weapon tests

during the Cold War and the associated superpower thermonuclear confrontation, the rationale for continued testing was substantially diminished by the end of the Cold War and the rise of weapons of mass destruction proliferation as overwhelmingly the greatest threat to the security of the United States, as well as the rest of the civilized world. Barring the unlikely event of a new Cold War, the threat to all of us -- and a very real threat it is -- is the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states, subnational groups, terrorist organizations, or criminal conspiracies. Because of this threat, the likelihood of actual use of a nuclear weapon or other weapon of mass destruction is, in my opinion, higher than it was during the Cold War. In this new international environment, continued nuclear weapon testing by the nuclear weapon states reduces rather than enhances security in that it encourages proliferation and undermines efforts to strengthen the NPT regime.

All five of the declared nuclear weapon states have now stopped testing and for the first time in history, all five of the declared nuclear weapon states have accepted not only the principle of a test ban, but every word of a specific text. In addition to the support and commitment of the nuclear weapon states, the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear weapon states also support the CTBT and its goal of ending nuclear explosive testing. The fact that these states over-rode the objections of those who wanted to link the CTBT to a plan for time-bound nuclear disarmament illustrates that they viewed the CTBT as a valuable achievement in its own right. States do not sign treaties lightly, and the fact that the CTBT bears the signature of 142 states serves as a strong reminder, pending entry into force, that a political barrier against nuclear explosive testing has been built and that henceforth, the international community will view it as out of bounds for any state to engage in nuclear explosive testing.

However, this strong international norm against nuclear explosive testing does not mean that we can rest easy. Formal entry into force remains a crucial goal, and when that is accomplished, energetic and effective verification of the CTBT's strictures is essential. A state violating a treaty commitment is even more of a pariah than one violating a powerful international norm. The entry into force of this historic treaty will buttress the regime of nuclear nonproliferation and will add teeth to the norm of non-testing. To those who say that arms control is no longer relevant, I would answer the day all states are legally bound to forego nuclear weapon testing is a day which will see the world become a much safer place.

Like the quest for a complete ban on nuclear testing, the prohibition of chemical weapons has been one of arms control's longest-sought goals, dating back to the Geneva Convention of 1925. In 1993, such a treaty was finally completed.

The CWC will ban the stockpile, transfer and production of chemical weapons, eliminate stockpiles now in existence, and require Parties to submit to intrusive on-site inspections. Due to its comprehensive verification regime, this treaty, which was drafted in consultation with representatives from the U.S. chemical industry, is a landmark in the struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Convention will make it more difficult for rogue states to acquire chemical weapons and will reduce the threat from these weapons to the citizens of all civilized states.

With more than the 65 states necessary to trigger the 180-day countdown toward entry into force now having ratified the CWC, the Convention will enter into force at the end of this month. I'm sure all of you are aware of the debate on Capitol Hill which has thus far prevented the United States from ratifying the CWC. The fervent debate in Washington over the CWC

proves that arms control still generates strong emotions and intense focus in Congress, which is ironically perhaps the greatest testimonial to arms control's continued relevance in the post-Cold War world. ~~I hope that soon there will be~~ expect that next Thursday's scheduled vote will result in favorable Senate action to permit the United States to ratify this important Treaty.

One need only look at the experiences of the last two years to see that arms control is more important than ever for international security and is being conducted with an eye toward realistic goals. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of our efforts to fight the spread of nuclear weapons, was indefinitely extended in 1995. The signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty last fall ended the era of nuclear testing, a goal that had been sought for more than forty years. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), opened for signature in 1993, will enter into force in 11 days, thus outlawing the use or possession of chemical weapons, a goal that had been sought for even longer than a ban on nuclear testing. And most recently, another significant step towards reducing the overarment of the Cold War was taken when Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on a framework for START III, that will, after START II enters into force, reduce the nuclear arsenals of the two nations by eighty percent of their Cold War high. Even this cursory description of recent events illustrates the continued relevance and enduring value of arms control in world affairs. Arms control is as important to international peace and stability today as any time in the past.

I have mentioned that many of the arms control agreements in the past failed because they tried to accomplish goals that were unrealistic. I would like to point out that this does not mean there is no place for idealism in diplomacy. What we are all striving for is an ideal world that is peaceful and secure for all. It is important to set ourselves lofty goals. We must realize,

however, that to achieve these worthy goals, be they regional security efforts, the elimination of nuclear weapons, or even world peace, it is often necessary to work toward them one achievable step at a time. In this century, two world wars and a tense 40-year nuclear standoff have shown us the price of impatience and wishful thinking.

Looking to the future, the evolution of the arms control process suggests that just as the Cold War is part of the past, so is narrow bloc politics in multilateral arms control negotiations. The reflexive antagonism between East and West and North and South has been overtaken by history. All nations are concerned with the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction and find it in their own best interest to reach agreements on how to limit their spread or eliminate them. Ongoing efforts to strengthen these regimes demonstrate that there is support for them all over the world and that, when appealed to directly, all states are prepared to make their own decisions about their own security.

The pursuit of peace and stability throughout history has always been difficult. The limitation and reduction of armaments through treaty negotiation has been a long, slow, uphill climb with many blind alleys but with a few real achievements. Now that the world is nearing perhaps the end of the first stage of this climb with the deep and irreversible reductions of nuclear weapon stockpiles, the indefinite extension of the NPT, and the achievement of a CTBT, we must not relax our efforts. We must continue to press forward. The path will be tortuous with many obstacles to overcome, but the stakes are high and the reward for all of us will be great.