"Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Weapons"
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CWC

Although the subject of my talk with you today is reducing the threat of nuclear weapons, I would like to begin with a few words about the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC will ban the stockpile, transfer, and production of chemical weapons, eliminate stockpiles now in existence, and require parties to submit to intrusive on-site inspections. Due to its comprehensive verification regime, this treaty, which was drafted in consultation with representatives from our chemical industry, is a landmark in the struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Convention will make it tougher for rogue states to acquire chemical weapons and will reduce the threat to our citizens at home as well as our troops in the field.

With more than the 65 states necessary to trigger the 180-day countdown toward entry-into-force now having ratified the CWC, the Convention will enter into force at the end of this month. As I'm sure many of you know, certain individuals on Capitol Hill in Washington are not fond of this treaty, and as a result, the United States has not yet ratified the CWC. Despite their opposition, President Clinton has vowed that the U.S. "will join the ranks of nations determined to prevent the spread of chemical weapons," and he and President Yeltsin stressed their intention at the Helsinki Summit to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification of the CWC in each of their countries. I hope that soon there will be favorable Senate action on Thursday that will permit the United States to ratify this important treaty.

[One of the most oft-heard criticisms of the CWC in Washington is that rogue states have

no intention of signing the treaty, and that therefore, the United States should not, either. This is a most unconvincing argument. The United States is already committed under laws passed by Congress in 1985 and 1992 to destroying its chemical weapons. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili testified, "Desert Storm proved that retaliation in kind is not required to deter the use of chemical weapons . . . Our ability to deter the use of chemical weapons in a post-Cold War world will be predicated upon a robust chemical weapons-defense protection program and the ability to rapidly bring to bear superior and overwhelming force in retaliation against a chemical attack...". Since the U.S. has already decided to destroy its own chemical weapons, the rationale that we should refrain from ratifying the CWC because a few nations may continue to pursue them is illogical. The CWC will make it harder for those countries to acquire the ingredients they need for chemical weapons.

The Convention will also require those states who become party to it to adopt domestic legislation making the manufacture or possession of chemical weapons illegal. Currently, many states lack such laws. It is worth pointing out that within weeks of the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, Japan quickly ratified the CWC and approved accompanying domestic legislation. The Administration's proposed CWC implementing legislation, which must accompany ratification of the Convention, will significantly improve U.S. ability to investigate and prosecute those who try to produce chemical weapons.

As a nation whose interests are truly global in nature and whose troops serve all over the world, we stand to gain the most from making outlaws out of those states who refuse to follow the international norm against chemical weapons. The CWC, by enhancing international security and stability, will complement our efforts to fight nuclear proliferation. If we fail to ratify this

treaty, we miss out on a chance to help banish poison gas and make our own military forces and citizens much more secure.

NPT

I would now like to turn to our main topic of discussion, namely reductions in nuclear weapons. Before 1970, the acquisition of nuclear weapons had been a point of national pride. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), by establishing a norm of international behavior, converted this former act of national pride into a violation of international law.

The NPT has been the most successful arms control agreement in history. It has 185 parties with only a small number of nations currently outside this "Club of Civilization." It has added immeasurably to the security of the United States and of the entire world.

This fact is what led the states parties to agree to extend the NPT indefinitely at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference in New York. The indefinite extension of the NPT was a watershed event. It ensured a strong and dependable basis for future efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In making the NPT a permanent Treaty, all the Parties agreed to a strengthened review process and a "Statement on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation" which together reflect the collective interest and commitment of NPT Parties in implementing the Treaty and creating a process to further strengthen the Treaty regime. Among these "Principles and Objectives" were calls for enhanced verification measures, strides toward NPT universality, achievement of a CTBT, the expansion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and continued reductions in nuclear weapons. Although it is the Treaty itself which is the source of each Parties' obligations, in order to maintain a strong and effective NPT regime, progress toward these goals are essential. Fortunately, we are making such progress.

Efforts to enhance the effectiveness of verification are underway at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna pursuant to the "93+2" program. By adding new technologies and access, such as environmental monitoring, we can add to our confidence that nuclear weapons programs are not being concealed from inspectors.

In regard to NPT universality, we have been very successful. One hundred and eighty-five countries have become Parties to the NPT, leaving only five countries outside the NPT regime: Brazil, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan. Brazil is a party to the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and Cuba is a signatory, so in effect, only three countries are not part of the NPT system.

CTBT

The CTBT was opened for signature last year. It is a bulwark against the spread and further development of nuclear weapon capabilities and reinforces and complements the international norm of nonproliferation embodied in the NPT. It will constrain any nation from improving its existing arsenal and prevents the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons. It also keeps new states from becoming nuclear powers by preventing them from testing in order to learn how to build nuclear weapons more efficiently, or to make more advanced weapons.

Now that the CTBT has been opened for signature and 142 countries have signed the treaty, we must begin work to secure ratification by the required parties to bring the treaty into force. The goal of the Clinton Administration is to work towards achieving entry-into-force of the CTBT at the earliest possible date: September 1998. A strong international consensus against nuclear explosive testing already exists, but each signature and ratification serves to further codify this international norm and make it stronger.

START

Continued progress toward nuclear disarmament between the U.S. and Russia also strengthens the NPT and the norm of nonproliferation, and recent progress in this area illustrates the importance with which the governments of each country view further reductions.

The START I Treaty, which mandated reductions in the total number of deployed strategic warheads to 6,000 on each side (roughly a one-third cut), entered into force on December 5, 1994. The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to the START II Treaty in January 1996. Unfortunately, over a year later, we are still waiting for the Russian Duma to follow suit. Building on the disarmament progress made under START I, START II will leave each side with 3,500 deployed strategic warheads. START II also eliminates heavy ICBMs and bans multiple warheads on ICBMs, contributing to stability by focusing on weapons that lend themselves to first-strike use.

At the March 21, 1997 Summit in Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reached an understanding on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms that will substantially reduce the roles and risk of nuclear weapons as we move forward into the next century.

The Presidents agreed that, once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, which will include, among other things, the following basic components:

- reductions in deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000 - 2,500 by December 31, 2007;
- measures relating to transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads; and
- efforts to ensure that the current START treaties are made unlimited in duration, to make clear that their arms control benefits are irreversible.

The measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads, and any other jointly agreed technical or organization measures, will promote the irreversibility of deep reductions, including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads. The United States looks forward to developing with Russia measures to implement this new, forward-looking area of arms control. The United States has been thinking about this issue for some time, and we are continuing internal deliberations to define the requirements for a warhead elimination regime.

No previous arms control agreement has required the parties to actually dismantle nuclear warheads. Instead, previous arms control agreements placed limits on delivery systems and launchers. Using launchers and delivery systems as the units of account made good sense because a warhead would have limited value without them, and thus these previous agreements enhance the security and provide other benefits to both sides.

Adding warhead elimination to limits on launchers and delivery vehicles in START III will have two important benefits. First, we believe that a limitation on warheads will have a synergistic effect of making destruction of launchers, delivery systems, and warheads irreversible because warhead elimination will help provide assurance that a side does not have the capability to reconstitute its forces rapidly by uploading additional warheads on existing delivery systems. The incentive to comply with the agreement will thus be enhanced. Warhead elimination will also help mitigate the "loose nukes" problem by removing fully assembled and transportable nuclear warheads from facilities that may not be safe and secure.

Given the improved political and security environment since the end of the Cold War, we believe that the time is right to make warhead destruction a component of post-START II strategic

arms control. By committing to destroy warheads in a formal agreement, beyond those the sides have said they are eliminating unilaterally, the United States and Russia will demonstrate further commitment to their NPT Article VI obligations.

In response to Russian concerns about the high costs of implementing START II by January 1, 2003, the Presidents also reached an understanding that this deadline will be extended to December 31, 2007. This will allow us to, in President Clinton's words, "implement START II in a way that is economically feasible for Russia, but does not in any way compromise the security of the American people". This change must be submitted to the Russian Duma and U.S. Senate for their approval. To ensure that both sides still achieve definite security benefits from START II at the earliest possible time, the Presidents agreed on the deactivation by December 31, 2003, of all the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to be eliminated under START II, by removing their warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps.

The Presidents also agreed that their experts will explore possible arms control measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, and will consider issues related to transparency in nuclear materials. These discussions will take place separate from, but in the context, of the START III negotiations. This agreement reaffirmed their statement of May 10, 1995, in which the two Presidents agreed that:

- fissile material removed from nuclear weapons being eliminated and excess to national security requirements will not be used to manufacture new nuclear weapons;
- no newly produced fissile material will be used in nuclear weapons; and
- fissile materials from or within civil nuclear programs will not be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.

In the may 1995 Joint Summit Statement the Presidents also agreed to negotiate agreements to increase transparency and irreversibility by:

- exchanging on a regular basis detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and security;

- working out a cooperative arrangement for reciprocal monitoring at storage facilities for fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons; and

- working out other cooperative measures, as necessary, to enhance confidence in the reciprocal declarations on fissile material stockpiles.

We hope that the reaffirmation of the May 1995 Summit Statement at Helsinki last month will help break the impasse in safeguards, transparency and irreversibility negotiations that has existed since late 1995.

Finally, the two Presidents also reached agreement on how to preserve the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the cornerstone of strategic stability that permits us to go forward not only with START I and START II reductions, but potentially down to the 2,000 - 2,500 level envisioned by the agreement on START III.

Prior to the Helsinki Summit, the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine concluded, but have not yet signed, an Agreed Statement that theater missile defense (TMD) system interceptors of a velocity not exceeding 3.0 kilometers/second are deemed Treaty compliant if, during the testing of such TMD systems, the ballistic target-missile does not exceed either a maximum velocity of 5.0 km/sec or a maximum range of 3500 kilometers. (These criteria would ensure that, if this Agreed Statement enters into force, 5 of the 6 core TMD systems currently under development would be deemed ABM Treaty compliant.)

The Joint Statement signed at Helsinki provides the basis for the conclusion of three years of negotiations to demarcate between strategic ABM systems, which are covered by the Treaty, and theater missile defense, which are not. The Joint Statement reaffirms the Presidents' commitment to the ABM Treaty and the necessity of effective theater missile defenses. Specifically, the elements for the agreement on higher-velocity TMD systems reached at Helsinki are:

- during testing, the velocity of the target ballistic missiles will not exceed 5 km/sec; and
- the range of the target ballistic missiles will not exceed 3500 kilometers;
- the sides will not develop, test, or deploy space-based TMD interceptor missiles or components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles;
- the sides will exchange detailed information annually on TMD plans and programs.

To further help build transparency and confidence, the U.S. and Russia also announced in the Helsinki Joint Statement that neither country has plans:

- for TMD systems with interceptors exceeding a velocity of 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air- based TMD systems; or with interceptors exceeding a velocity of 4.5 km/sec for sea-based TMD systems;
- to test TMD systems against target missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs);
- to test TMD systems against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles;
- to flight test TMD interceptor missiles in a higher-velocity TMD system against a ballistic

target missile before April 1999.

The Helsinki Joint Statement itself does not constitute a legally-binding agreement on higher-velocity TMD systems (such as the Navy's "Theater-Wide" or "Upper Tier" system), but must be codified in an agreement concluded by the participants in the ABM Treaty's Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) in Geneva. An agreement regarding higher-velocity TMD systems based on the Helsinki Joint Statement would not establish any velocity limitations on TMD interceptor missiles and would not impose any moratorium or other restrictions on field-testing or deployment of such systems. Other than applying the target criteria, the U.S. and Russia will each unilaterally determine the ABM Treaty compliance of its own respective higher-velocity programs. Such an agreement will establish no legal barrier to any U.S. tests that we unilaterally certify as compliant. (The Navy's "Upper Tier" system -- potentially with a velocity exceeding 3.0 km/sec -- has been certified ABM Treaty compliant by the United States.)

To sum up, START III will provide a 30-45 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons below START II and about an 80 percent reduction below Cold War levels, as well as containing new measures to further enhance security, strategic stability, and irreversibility. Implementation of START II and III thus will make a major contribution toward the ultimate goal of the United States and all NPT Parties to have a world free of nuclear weapons and the threat of war. This process cannot occur overnight, however. The United States continues to hold that progress on disarmament can only be accomplished on a step-by-step basis, carefully taking into account the legitimate security concerns of all states. By doing so, we move closer to what President Clinton has called "a century in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced, and ultimately eliminated."