

“The Future of Nonproliferation Regimes”

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Strong international norms exist against the use or spread of all forms of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological and chemical. These norms are embodied and bolstered by treaties created to specifically address each form: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These norms and their associated legal embodiments have proven relatively successful in the past in limiting the spread or actually eliminating weapons of mass destruction. The future will involve efforts to strengthen all three norms and their treaty regimes to make it more difficult for rogue states to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

BWC

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) entered into force in 1975, and has 139 parties who have pledged never under any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. For many years after, biological weapons were not a source of great concern for many, since relatively few states were capable of producing them and what was available was not effective.

However, the technology for making biological weapons is becoming more widespread. Combined with the fact that some biological weapons now approach the lethality of low-level

nuclear weapons, this has led to efforts to strengthen the BWC.

Unlike other regimes, the BWC contains no provisions for on-site inspection activity, a source of increasing criticism in recent years. In order to strengthen the BWC, many of the parties currently are actively participating in an effort to draft a legally binding protocol that will enhance openness and transparency and thereby improve compliance. This instrument will set forth measures that provides for off-site and on-site activities and should strengthen compliance by making certain national information declarations mandatory. Our objective is to complete this work by 1998, well before the Fifth Review Conference in 2001.

CWC

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) will ban the stockpile, transfer, and production of chemical weapons, eliminate stockpiles now in existence, and require parties to submit to intrusive on-site inspections. Due to its comprehensive verification regime, this treaty, which was drafted in consultation with representatives from our chemical industry, is a landmark in the struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Convention will make it tougher for rogue states to acquire chemical weapons and will reduce the threat to our citizens at home as well as our troops in the field.

With more than the 65 states necessary to trigger the 180-day countdown toward entry-into-force now having ratified the CWC, the Convention will enter into force at the end of this month. As I'm sure many of you know, certain individuals on Capitol Hill in Washington are not fond of this treaty, and as a result, the United States has not yet ratified the CWC. Despite their opposition, President Clinton has vowed that the U.S. "will join the ranks of nations determined to prevent the spread of chemical weapons," and he and President Yeltsin stressed

their intention at the Helsinki Summit to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification of the CWC in each of their countries. I hope that the Senate will act favorably to allow the United States to ratify this important treaty.

NPT

Of course, the oldest and most extensive of the nonproliferation regimes is that created to control the spread of nuclear weapons. Before 1970, the acquisition of nuclear weapons had been a point of national pride. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), by establishing a norm of international behavior, converted this former act of national pride into a violation of international law.

The NPT has been the most successful arms control agreement in history. It has 185 parties with only a small number of nations currently outside this "Club of Civilization." It has added immeasurably to the security of the United States and of the entire world.

This fact is what led the states parties to agree to extend the NPT indefinitely at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference in New York. The indefinite extension of the NPT was a watershed event. It ensured a strong and dependable basis for future efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. *Strengthened review - principles & objectives*

What are these future efforts? For starters, the first PrepCom meeting leading to the 2000 NPT Review Conference *has just been completed* ~~will be held later this month~~. This is the first PrepCom under the post-1995 NPT Conference regime and it ~~will be~~ *was* an important step toward the "strengthened treaty review process" called for at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The meeting ~~will~~ *ad* address exactly how the "strengthened treaty review process" should be implemented. The PrepCom ~~will~~ *ad* make both the substantive and procedural preparations for the 2000 NPT Review

Conference. *The principal, substantive proposal was South Africa's call for an international treaty providing legally binding, negative security assurances.*
As we look ahead to further strengthen the NPT regime, verification must be enhanced.

Such efforts are underway at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna pursuant to the "93+2" program. By adding new technologies and access, such as environmental monitoring, we can add to our confidence that nuclear weapons programs are not being concealed from inspectors.

Last but not least, it is obviously desirable to have as many countries as possible become parties to the NPT, and in this regard, we have been very successful. One hundred and eighty-five countries have become Parties to the NPT, leaving only five countries outside the NPT regime: Brazil, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan.

CTBT

Certainly, one important means of strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), opened for signature last year. The CTBT is a bulwark against the spread and further development of nuclear weapon capabilities and reinforces and complements the international norm of nonproliferation embodied in the NPT. It will constrain any nation from improving its existing arsenal and prevents the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons. It also keeps new states from becoming nuclear powers by preventing them from testing in order to learn how to build nuclear weapons more efficiently, or to make more advanced weapons.

All five of the declared nuclear weapon states have now stopped testing and for the first time in history, all five of the declared nuclear weapon states have accepted not only the principle of a test ban, but every word of a specific text. In addition to the support and commitment of the

nuclear weapon states, the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear weapon states also support the CTBT and its goal of ending nuclear explosive testing. The fact that these states over-rode the objections of those who wanted to link the CTBT to a plan for time-bound nuclear disarmament illustrate that they viewed the CTBT as a valuable achievement in its own right. States do not sign treaties lightly, and the fact that the CTBT bears the signature of each of these states serves as a strong reminder, pending entry into force, that a political barrier against nuclear explosive testing has been built and that henceforth, the international community will view it as out of bounds for any state to engage in nuclear explosive testing.

However, this strong international norm against nuclear explosive testing does not mean that we can rest easy. Formal entry into force remains a crucial goal, and when that is accomplished, energetic and effective verification of the CTBT's strictures is essential. A state violating a treaty commitment is even more a pariah than one violating a powerful international norm. The entry into force of this historic treaty will buttress the regime of nuclear nonproliferation that already exists and will add teeth to the norm of non-testing.

Now that the CTBT has been opened for signature and 142 countries have signed the treaty, we must begin work to secure ratification by the required parties to bring the treaty into force. The goal of the Clinton Administration is to work towards achieving entry-into-force of the CTBT at the earliest possible date: September 1998. A strong international consensus against nuclear explosive testing already exists, but each signature and ratification serves to further codify this international norm and make it stronger.

NWFZ

Another complement to the NPT are the several nuclear-weapon-free-zones now in

existence. Each one adds emphasis to the important regional aspect of the control of weapons of mass destruction. Since the NPT was extended in May 1995, the United States has signed onto two new nuclear-weapon-free-zone agreements: the Treaty of Rarotonga -- the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, and the Treaty of Pelindaba -- the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty. In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco -- the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty -- is nearing full implementation. Nearly all Latin American countries are parties and the five nuclear weapon states and relevant extraterritorial states are party to its protocols.

In addition to the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, and Pelindaba Treaties, the United States has been working closely with the ASEAN countries during the drafting of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and its associated Protocol so that the five nuclear weapons states can eventually sign the Protocol to the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which was opened for signature on December 15, 1995 in Bangkok. The United States supports in principle the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia and will continue to work with the ASEAN states and our P-5 partners to resolve the few concerns that remain.

START

Continued progress toward nuclear disarmament between the U.S. and Russia also strengthen the NPT and the norm of nonproliferation. The announcement last month at the Helsinki Summit by President Clinton and President Yeltsin that the U.S. and Russia are ready to negotiate a START III Treaty that would reduce strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000 - 2,500 on each side is a striking example of this progress. When such levels are reached, the two nations

will have reduced their strategic nuclear arsenals by 80 percent below their Cold War peak, a reduction which the world would never have thought possible only a few years ago.

The Presidents agreed that, once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, which will include the following basic components:

- reductions in deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000 - 2,500 by December 31, 2007;
- for the first time, the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads will be on the table; and
- efforts will be made to ensure that the current START Treaties are made unlimited in duration, to make clear that their arms control benefits are irreversible.

President Clinton and President Yeltsin also agreed to extend the START II deadline to December 31, 2007, subject to the approval of the Russian Duma and U.S. Senate. To ensure that both sides still achieve definite security benefits from START II at the earliest possible time, the Presidents agreed on the deactivation by December 31, 2003, of all the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to be eliminated under START II, by removing their warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps. Finally, at Helsinki the Presidents also agreed that their experts will explore possible arms control measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, and will consider issues related to transparency in nuclear materials. These discussions will take place separate from, but in the context of, the START III negotiations.

All of the measures I've just mentioned --enhanced verification measures and strides toward NPT universality, achievement of a CTBT, the expansion of NWFZs, and continued reductions in nuclear weapons -- were specifically mentioned in a document on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament" agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The implementation of so many of these "Principles and Objectives" clearly illustrates that the NPT regime is growing stronger and that the United States is committed to fighting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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Conclusion

Strong regimes for controlling the spread or use of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological and chemical -- form the basis for further efforts to enhance peace and

stability through arms control. Progress between the U.S. and Russia in reducing the overarmament of the Cold War in recent years has been possible in large part due to the strong international norms and treaty regimes concerning weapons of mass destruction proliferation. As the nuclear stockpiles of the U.S. and Russia continue to grow smaller, it will become even more important for each of these regimes to remain vigorous and effective.

Looking to the future, the experiences of the BWC, CWC and NPT suggest that just as the Cold War is part of the past, so is narrow bloc politics in multilateral arms control negotiations. The reflexive antagonism between East and West and North and South has been overtaken by history. Nations are concerned with the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction and find it in their own best interest to reach agreements on how to limit their spread or eliminate them. Ongoing efforts to strengthen these regimes demonstrate that there is support for them all over the world and that, when appealed to directly, all states are prepared to make their own decisions about their own security.