Testimony before the Bundestag Subcommittee on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
by
Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.
President, Lawyers Alliance for World Security
September 29, 1999

Madame Chair and distinguished members of the Subcommittee,

It is my honor to appear before you today and I thank you for the opportunity to offer my view on what I believe is a defining issue for NATO and international security as we enter the 21st century. Germany has made a major contribution to Alliance security by supporting a review of Alliance nuclear policy and suggesting that consideration be given to revising NATO nuclear policy to provide that NATO will not introduce nuclear weapons into future conflicts. In Paragraph 32 of the Summit Communiqué such a review is mandated. Our discussions in various capitals indicate that Germany has much support in this throughout the alliance. Also, Washington is internally divided over this issue and the ultimate outcome will be strongly influenced by European views.

The threats to Alliance security have changed since the end of the Cold War and so should our policy with respect to nuclear weapons. NATO is the strongest military alliance in the world. The principal threat to Alliance security is no longer the Warsaw Pact but rather the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is our main defense against this threat.
However, NATO’s current nuclear doctrine reserving the option of the first use of nuclear weapons is potentially inconsistent with the negative security assurances which were an essential part of the indefinite extension of the NPT and are now central to its ongoing viability. The assurances consist of commitments under which the five nuclear weapons states (including the United States, United Kingdom and France) promised in 1995 never to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, some 181 countries—most of the world—unless attacked by such a state in alliance with a nuclear weapon state. There is no exception for chemical or biological weapons. A revision of Alliance nuclear doctrine and the adoption of a no first use policy by NATO would bring NATO policy into line with these most important NPT-related commitments and thus would be a significant contribution to strengthening the NPT regime. Further, it is imperative for the long-term success of our non-proliferation efforts that the political value of nuclear weapons be reduced by means of limiting the role of nuclear weapons to that of core deterrence. In today’s world, the only function of nuclear weapons should be core deterrence, that is deterring the use of other nuclear weapons.

Change, particularly to a doctrine which has been considered successful for 50 years, is of course a sensitive issue. However, almost a decade after the end of the Cold War, and in light of the growing threat to NATO member states of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the time has come for a serious review of Alliance nuclear doctrine.

The Canberra Commission Report, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences Report and more recently the Tokyo Forum Report have approved a policy of no first use as an important contribution to non-proliferation efforts. Specifically, the Tokyo Forum Report states that, “until they are abolished, the Tokyo Forum believes that the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons” and that “the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has just put in place a mechanism to review its first use options, and in-depth discussion and further efforts will be needed to bring to fruition an effective no first use commitment. The Tokyo Forum commends such efforts.”

For your records, I am submitting a longer paper which sets forth in greater detail my views on this important issue. Thank you again for this opportunity.