MR. CHIARELLO: Good afternoon, and welcome to the Foreign Press Center. This is an on-the-record briefing. My name is Vincent Chiarella.

Our guest today, Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., special representative of the president for arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, is here to discuss an update on the Non-Proliferation Treaty extension. Ambassador Graham served as counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as well as its acting director -- one of many official positions he has held in dealing with non-proliferation and arms control. A native of Louisville, Kentucky, he is a graduate of Princeton University and holds a degree from the Harvard Law School.

After his opening remarks, we will begin the question-and-answer period. I ask that you identify yourself and your organization and that you speak directly into the microphone.

Ambassador Graham.

MR. GRAHAM: Thank you very much, and I'm happy to be here.

In April of 1995, a conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, or NPT, will be held in New York to extend that treaty beyond its initial 25 years. The United States strongly supports the indefinite extension of the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and a necessary foundation for post-Cold War arms reductions.

With 167 parties and counting, the NPT enjoys the widest adherence of any arms control agreement in history. As the only nuclear non-proliferation agreement of global reach, the treaty has codified an international standard of behavior against which actions of even states outside the regime are measured. The NPT has had remarkable success in promoting its three major goals -- to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to foster an end to the arms race and promote general disarmament.

By the time the NPT was negotiated, five countries had openly tested nuclear weapons -- the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China and France.
Estimates at the time suggested that this number might have grown as high as 30 by the late 1970s, and who knows how high by now if this emerging trend were left unchecked. Many argued and in fact still do that the impetus for widespread nuclear proliferation is an unstoppable force. If that is so, then it met an immovable object in the NPT.

Although a small and diminishing number of threshold states have muddied the waters, the nearly 25 years the NPT has been in force have been free of a single addition to this list of declared nuclear powers. It is difficult to prove that the NPT dissuaded even one state from building a nuclear arsenal, but in light of the marked change in global attitudes toward proliferation, it is indefensible to contend that it did not.

In 1970, the declaration of a nuclear arsenal stopped being a point of national pride. The NPT made it a violation of international law. The NPT provides essential support for peaceful uses of nuclear energy under effective international safeguards. NPT parties conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, to verify to suppliers, recipients and the rest of the world that these technologies and materials are not being used for nuclear-weapon purposes. By law, the United States may not engage in significant nuclear cooperation with any country that does not have such a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In 1993, the world's major nuclear suppliers agreed to require full-scope IAEA safeguards, those mandated to non-nuclear-weapons states under the NPT, as a condition of significant new nuclear supply. This policy ensures that states outside the NPT or other comparable agreements that have not safeguarded their nuclear programs will not benefit from nuclear cooperation and trade on terms as favorable as those accorded to NPT parties.
The end of the NPT would mean the destruction of the basis for peaceful nuclear cooperation and the fruits of that cooperation enjoyed around the world today. The NPT serves as a foundation upon which other vitally needed measures of arms control and disarmament are being built. The significant progress in arms control ongoing today is dependent on the international security environment shaped by the NPT.

The end to the arms race envisioned by the NPT had been codified by remarkable agreements involving the United States and the former Soviet Union. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty eliminated 2,000 warheads and an entire class of nuclear weapons. The United States has committed under START I and START II to removing another 17,000 weapons and retiring their means of delivery. Reciprocal unilateral steps have taken down additional weapons from tactical systems like short-range missiles and artillery.

The United States alone is dismantling around 2,000 nuclear weapons a year, a rate limited not by political will, but by technical capacity to do more. President Clinton has proposed a fissile material cutoff treaty which would cap the amount of separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium available for nuclear explosives.

Achieving a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, or CTBT, at the earliest possible date is also an imperative for the Clinton administration. We want to ensure that the first half century of nuclear explosions is the last. The NPT is the bedrock on which our nuclear arms control and non-proliferation efforts are being built. If it crumbles, even if cracks are detected, a great deal of the nuclear security architecture painstakingly constructed by the international community may begin to collapse.

At the review and extension conference of the NPT in April-May 1995, states parties to the treaty will decide whether it will continue in force indefinitely or be extended for a fixed period or periods. It has been suggested that a limited or conditional extension could be used to, quote, "keep the pressure on," closed quote, the nuclear powers to force them to continue to aggressively pursue specific measures related to disarmament, like further strategic reductions, or a CTBT. This view is misguided.
It is the NPT which commits and legally binds the nuclear powers to the task of disarmament, and by strengthening the treaty through indefinite extension, this commitment will be likewise strengthened. Weakening the treaty through lesser measures takes building blocks out of the hands of disarmament negotiators. Nineteen-ninety-five is our only chance to consolidate the progress fostered by the NPT once and for all. It is our one chance to ensure that the benefits of the treaty will be available to future generations. We must not gamble with the permanence of this critical agreement.

Some would cite the case of North Korea as evidence that the NPT is weak, but this belies a basic misunderstanding of the key role that the NPT plays in preventing nuclear proliferation. It was North Korea’s refusal to fulfill its NPT obligations which allowed the international community to focus its attention on the problem. It is the NPT that establishes the global norm that nuclear proliferation is bad behavior. The NPT both highlighted the problem and provided a basis for action. No matter how much we do not like the news the NPT brought in this case, we cannot afford to shoot the messenger. We may need its services again.

Replaying the nuclear developments on the Korean peninsula of the last two years without the NPT does not allow for as positive a result as has been achieved. The framework agreement between the United States and North Korea commits North Korea to full compliance with and continued adherence to the NPT. This option would not have been available without the NPT in place.
It is impossible to predict exactly what the world would be like without the NPT, but there are numerous compelling reasons to believe it would be considerably more dangerous. The global norm against proliferation and the stigma attached to nuclear weapons currently codified in international law by 167 countries would disappear. The commitment for good faith negotiations among the nuclear weapon states toward disarmament would be gone and pressures to maintain and build large arsenals would reappear. The basis for denuclearization in the former Soviet Union would be significantly eroded. The threshold states would no longer have any incentive to restrain their nuclear weapons programs from the kind of full-blown and acknowledged arms racing risked by the superpowers during the Cold War at still untold cost in terms of national treasure, environmental damage, and constant danger of unimaginable destruction.

The NPT is an indispensable part of the super structure that undergirds our international security environment. Global peace and prosperity can be built upon it, but only if it remains in place. The world is not yet the way we ideally want it to be. There is much work to be done. That is why the Clinton administration supports and vigorously promotes the indefinite extension of the NPT. The loss or even the weakening of the NPT could set back years of unprecedented, irreplaceable progress toward a safer world for our children.

MR. CHIARELLO: Okay, we'll begin the question-and-answer period now. Please, again, I ask one, that you wait for the microphone, identify yourself and your organization, and please, for transcript purposes, speak directly into the microphone.

Q Parashuram, Press Trust of India. Could you explain a bit more fully why nuclear weapons are good for the five and not for the rest? Secondly, you mentioned the stigma of nuclear weapons, and yet the five want to carry the stigma, and for 23 years they have not agreed to abolish nuclear weapons, and even today U.S. spokesmen talk about the complete necessity for the U.S. having nuclear weapons capability — (inaudible) — (in the Third World ?) and the U.S. having it indefinitely. What is the incentive for the U.S. to agree to complete abolition of nuclear weapons?

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MR. GRAHAM: I think that your question, sir, flows from a misconception of the nature of the NPT. The NPT does not guarantee that five states can have nuclear weapons. The NPT is a balance of obligations between those states that did not have nuclear weapons in 1968 and agree not to acquire them and those five states that did possess nuclear weapons in 1968 and agreed to eliminate them through disarmament negotiations. All five nuclear weapons states are committed under the NPT to the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons through disarmament negotiations, through an end to the nuclear arms race and disarmament negotiations. That is the essential bargain of the NPT. If the NPT is only extended for only a short period of time or even a mid-range period of time, that commitment of nuclear weapons states will inevitably be weakened. The only way to ensure that eventually we will reach a nuclear -- a verifiable nuclear-free world is to make the NPT a permanent treaty, like all other arms control treaties.

Mr. Ambassador, India, Pakistan and Israel have not signed the NPT. Now is there any U.S. administration policy to reduce pressure on the three countries to sign the NPT by a step-by-step approach. And especially because they have agreed to, India and Pakistan have agreed to CTBT and fissile material production control.

MR. GRAHAM: Well, of course, the United States recognizes that countries join the NPT when they decide that it is in their security interests to do so. A country cannot be compelled to act contrary to its security interests. But having said that, the Clinton administration by no means intends to stop urging India, Pakistan and Israel to become NPT parties or to lessen its interests in those three states as well as a few others that are still outside the regime to become NPT parties. The United States government has always been committed to universality of membership in the NPT and that has not changed, nor will it.
The United States government has always been committed to the universality of membership in the NPT, and that has not changed, nor will it.

MR. CHIARELLO: Please identify yourself, please, and your organization.

MR. GRAHAM: Well, I would differ with you slightly. To the best of my knowledge, it is only China that is urging a no-first-use policy. The developing countries, and there are many of them, who are NPT parties are interested in upgraded, updated, harmonized and improved positive and negative security assurances which are similar to the concept that you mention as no-first-use but which are different.

Positive security assurances have the five permanent members of the United Nations and nuclear weapons states under the NPT pledged to come to the assistance of any country that is threatened or attacked by nuclear weapons. That's positive security assurances.

Negative security assurances involves a pledge by those states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT. Those are positive and negative security assurances. There is an ongoing negotiation among the five now to provide -- which has as its objective the providing of new, updated, harmonized and improved positive and negative security assurances to the non-nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT by the time of the review and extension conference next year.

Okay, Mr. Ambassador, there is some tension between Israel and Egypt at the time due to the high profile that the Egyptian government is giving to that question.
Since the United States is a close ally of both parties, how do you see this new tension between the two cosigners of the Camp David Accord on this specific point of Israel signing or not and Egypt signing or not on the chemical issue? Thank you.

MR. GRAHAM: Well, that's a very complicated but yet very important issue, and we recognize its importance to Egypt and to other countries. I would first respond by saying that the United States is committed to the objective of universality of membership in the NPT, including Israel as well as any other country that still remains outside the NPT. And I would say further that the prospects for Israel joining NPT become enhanced by the strength of the NPT regime and its durability. So the United States would argue that if the treaty is made permanent, the chances are better for Israel eventually joining NPT than if it is only extended for a certain number of years because, with good reason, Israel could then argue, well, why should they join if the treaty is going to expire in a few years anyway.

We think that the NPT is very important to the security of Egypt. We understand their regional concerns, and we are trying to work with them to reach a solution to their concerns that will permit them to support making the NPT permanent and which will look to the future, as well, in the direction of universality of membership and a solution to the significant regional issues about which they are concerned.

Q I am Siddiqi from Dawn, Karachi, Pakistan. As you know, because of Pakistan's nuclear program, all American aid to Pakistan remains cut off. Now we know that Israel has an arsenal, but why is it that American aid, in fact, grant -- $3 billion -- continues uninterrupted. So why is Israel an exception to America's non-proliferation concerns?

MR. GRAHAM: Well, Israel is not an exception to U.S. non-proliferation policy. We want Israel to join NPT.
We do not by law cooperate with Israel in the nuclear technology field, and nothing would make us happier than for Israel to join NPT. They are not an exception in any way.

George Graham with the Financial Times. You concentrated on the extension of the NPT. Are there any other changes that the United States is seeking in the text?

MR. GRAHAM: We are not seeking any other changes in the text of the NPT. I might add that it's very difficult to amend the NPT because of the procedures for amendment that are contained within the treaty itself. Also there are many parliaments involved which would have to pass on an amendment, 167 now. That is not to say that we don't think improvements are desirable or can be made. We would look to make improvements outside of the text, such as strengthening the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct investigations on site or off site on the territory of parties.

There's an ongoing program called the '93-plus-two program which looks toward enhancing the capability of the IAEA to detect violations of the NPT or problems with respect to NPT compliance. It's called the '93-plus-two program because it began in '93 and was to run for two years. A report on that program will be submitted to the board of governors of the IAEA in March of 1995. It will contain a number of proposals and recommendations to strengthening -- looking toward strengthening the authority of the IAEA. For example, environmental monitoring. The sampling of water from rivers, from the mouths of rivers where they come to the ocean to detect whether there's any undeclared nuclear activity ongoing in the area drained by that river. That's considered a very promising technology and one that we think will enhance the IAEA's capability to monitor the provisions of the IAEA.
A number of countries have expressed an interest in having a debate and perhaps the development of some kind of statement or declaration or understanding on the question of verification and compliance generally. Given that we've had two serious cases in recent years — Iraq and North Korea — what can we do to strengthen the verification of the and the compliance procedures of the treaty. So, improvement is possible, but the United States is looking outside the text of the NPT in order to accomplish those things.

I'm N.C. Menon from the Hindustan Times in India. Ambassador Graham, how do you see the prospect of missile proliferation in South Asia, with India manufacturing and developing its own missiles and Pakistan apparently getting missiles and technology from China?

MR. GRAHAM: Well, we regard that as a very serious development. Both — as you say — both countries seem to be developing ballistic missile capability that could as a delivery vehicle for weapons of destruction, and we can state from our own experience that it's not a very comfortable situation to have a confrontation with another country where both countries possess the capability to destroy or seriously damage each other within a matter of minutes with weapons systems that once launched are not recallable. It tends to greatly increase the tension between the two countries, make war more possible, and more difficult to avoid and keeps the armed forces on both sides on a hair-trigger. Because these missile systems travel very fast, and as I said, once launched they are not recallable and they are highly accurate. And when combined with weapons of mass destruction they are immensely dangerous.

So, the United States is very concerned about the prospect of a ballistic missile proliferation in South Asia. We want to do everything we can to prevent that from occurring, or to moderate it, should it occur in any case.

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Obviously we can only do what the two parties want us to do, but we certainly want to do everything we can, because it is potentially very dangerous.

MR. CHIARELLO: Oh -- (inaudible).

Q Thank you. Saki Ouchi from Yomiuri Shimbun from Japan. Now that the START I has entered into force and when the START II is ratified, the U.S. and Russia is talking about negotiating START III. What do you think will be an ideal target number to reduce the warheads in START III?

MR. GRAHAM: Well, that's a difficult prediction to make at this time. We want to concentrate first on getting START II into force. START I is now in force, as you say. That took a long time, 12 years from the beginning of the negotiations. START II, we want to get that in force as fast as we can. Hearings have been held in our Senate. There may have to be additional hearings.

Last year there were -- it was suggested by some that there could be difficulties with respect to the Duma in Moscow passing START II. We hope that now that START I is in force, Ukraine is a party to the NPT, that the Duma will look more favorably on approving START II and approving START II in the near future.

Remember, those two agreements taken together project reductions out to the year 2005. They will result in a two-thirds reduction in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, strategic weapons, and when you add that, when one adds that to the 90 percent reduction in tactical nuclear weapons which is under way pursuant to the Bush-Gorbachev understanding of the fall of 1991, there is already a tremendous amount of nuclear disarmament under way, more than the facilities of either country can handle in an expeditious way, as I indicated in my opening statement. The United States is dismantling 2,000 nuclear weapons a year. We could do more if we could, but one does want to rush taking apart a nuclear weapon, you want to be sure of what you're doing, otherwise you could have negative results.

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With respect to START III, it is something we want to pursue. I have no idea how fast it will happen or what the levels will be. I would just note that the original Russian proposal for START II was 2500 as opposed to 3500. There could be other figures. But we do want to pursue START III, and I think once we get START II locked in and operating, then we will proceed expeditiously to work something out that will be called START III. Its exact form, I can't say what it will be, but we do want to proceed ahead on that but first get START II in place.

Koji Igarashi from Asahi Shimbun, Japanese paper. On most Korean nuclear issues it seems you gave very positive assessments on the framework agreement, but nobody knows whether North Korea has developed a nuclear bomb or not until special inspection will be carried, say, by five or six years time. Doesn't it kind of harm the credibility of NPT?

MR. GRAHAM: Well, that is a very important question and a very serious question. I mean, throughout our negotiations with North Korea we had in mind the strength and the viability of the NPT, and also the precedent that this agreement was establishing. I would not be forthcoming if I didn't say that these are real concerns because not only were we worried about North Korea's program, we were worried about the continued strength and viability of the NPT. It was a very difficult negotiation. One has to keep in mind what the alternatives were to no agreement. They were, to put it mildly, quite serious. We think that on balance, we got the best deal that we could, but I would not represent the world to be ideal.

I would note that North Korea has agreed to remain an NPT party, and that verb is important, "remain." They have agreed to fully comply with all IAEA inspection requests, and they have agreed eventually to allow the special inspections, something they said they would never do. They have also agreed not to reprocess the spent fuel that they took from the reactor this past spring and which could be made in -- once reprocessed, could be used to make up to five nuclear weapons. And they've also agreed to completely terminate their existing nuclear program once the light-water reactor systems are on the way.

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Q KOJI IGARASHI FROM ASAHI SHIMBUN, JAPANESE PAPER. ON MOST KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUES IT SEEMS YOU GAVE VERY POSITIVE ASSESSMENTS ON THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, BUT NOBODY KNOWS WHETHER NORTH KOREA HAS DEVELOPED A NUCLEAR BOMB OR NOT UNTIL SPECIAL INSPECTION WILL BE CARRIED, SAY, BY FIVE OR SIX YEARS TIME. DOESN'T IT KIND OF HARM THE CREDIBILITY OF NPT?

MR. GRAHAM: WELL, THAT IS A VERY IMPORTANT QUESTION AND A VERY SERIOUS QUESTION. I MEAN, THROUGHOUT OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA WE HAD IN MIND THE STRENGTH AND THE VIABILITY OF THE NPT, AND ALSO THE PRECEDENT THAT THIS AGREEMENT WAS ESTABLISHING. I WOULD NOT BE FORTHCOMING IF I DIDN'T SAY THAT THESE ARE REAL CONCERNS BECAUSE NOT ONLY WERE WE WORRIED ABOUT NORTH KOREA'S PROGRAM, WE WERE WORRIED ABOUT THE CONTINUED STRENGTH AND VIABILITY OF THE NPT. IT WAS A VERY DIFFICULT NEGOTIATION. ONE HAS TO KEEP IN MIND WHAT THE ALTERNATIVES WERE TO NO AGREEMENT. THEY WERE, TO PUT IT MILDLY, QUITE SERIOUS. WE THINK THAT ON BALANCE, WE GOT THE BEST DEAL THAT WE COULD, BUT I WOULD NOT REPRESENT THE WORLD TO BE IDEAL.

I WOULD NOTE THAT NORTH KOREA HAS AGREED TO REMAIN AN NPT PARTY, AND THAT VERB IS IMPORTANT, "REMAIN." THEY HAVE AGREED TO FULLY COMPLY WITH ALL IAEA INSPECTION REQUESTS, AND THEY HAVE AGREED EVENTUALLY TO ALLOW THE SPECIAL INSPECTIONS, SOMETHING THEY SAID THEY WOULD NEVER DO. THEY HAVE ALSO AGREED NOT TO REPROCESS THE SPENT FUEL THAT THEY TOOK FROM THE REACTOR THIS PAST SPRING AND WHICH COULD BE MADE IN -- ONCE REPROCESSED, COULD BE USED TO MAKE UP TO FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AND THEY'VE ALSO AGREED TO COMPLETELY TERMINATE THEIR EXISTING NUCLEAR PROGRAM ONCE THE LIGHT-WATER REACTOR SYSTEMS ARE ON THE WAY.
In addition, the key components of the light-water reactor systems will be withheld until the special inspections take place, so we're not operating on faith. There is a definite quid pro quo within the agreement. They will not get these key components until the special inspections take place. So they will take place. There is a time certain within which the IAEA will know all that it can know.

We are concerned about the past; the future is -- was, before the agreement -- the future was infinitely more dangerous than the past because it was without limit, but the past is important, too, and the strength of the NPT is important as well. We believe that this agreement will maintain the viability of the NPT and that we eventually will get these special inspections, and we're not providing the systems that North Korea wants until we get the inspections.

True, they are some five years in the future, but we will get them. Eventually the past will be resolved, and the future can have been already resolved by this agreement.

Q On a purely practical level -- matter, Ambassador Graham, does the newly constituted Senate, convening in early January, does that present any form of problem and/or difficulty for your organization?

MR. GRAHAM: You mean with respect to the North Korean agreement?

Q Well, with respect to all the agreements, really. Do you foresee any changes taking place regarding the present -- the administration's presentation of the extension of the agreement to the Republican-controlled Senate?

MR. GRAHAM: I don't think there will be any difference between a Republican-controlled Senate and a Democratic-controlled Senate with respect to extension of the NPT. Non-proliferation is a subject that there is close to unanimity on in the United States Senate; indeed, the United States Congress. There may be differences about certain aspects of export controls and that sort of thing, but the objective of stopping nuclear proliferation, the objective of a viable and strong nuclear non-proliferation regime is shared by all members of the Senate, all members of the Congress.

Q My name is Moli (sp), News India Times. My question is sort of regarding -- Ambassador, what is your assessment on the nuclear weapons inventory in China? If it is so intimidating and in terms of the security perceptions were -- as noted -- as in the minds of India and other countries in the neighborhood, like Pakistan, what is the incentive for India and Pakistan to join NPT?
Is it enhancing some kind of their security?

MR. GRAHAM: Well, I'm speaking personally now, so I want you to understand that that is the case. But—and speculatively also. But it's difficult for me to see how the unsafeguarded nuclear program in India helps India vis-a-vis China. And I would say the same—well, the Pakistan, Indian programs are of course linked. But it's difficult for me to see what is gained by India in pursuing the unsafeguarded program that they do. It's not going to change the Chinese program. The Chinese program has been in existence for 30 years or more. Wouldn't it be more in India's long-term interests to be within the security umbrella of the NPT, receive security guarantees from China, as well as the other four nuclear weapon states, and look toward eventual nuclear disarmament through negotiations as provided for in the NPT rather than to try to somehow compensate for China's program with an unsafeguarded nuclear program of its own which likely would have little effect on China.

It's difficult to see how such a program as it currently exists in India helps India. Rather, to be part of the world community as expressed in NPT membership, I would think would be more in India's security interests. Now, I'm looking at it from my perspective, I'm not an Indian citizen, so I can only look at it from my perspective. But take the case of Ukraine; I mean, arguably Ukraine is much more secure now that they're an NPT party than before, vis-a-vis Russia or anyone else.
I would think that would be true in South Asia as well.

Q: (Name inaudible.) You mentioned, among other things, a security umbrella. Do you have in mind the kind of nuclear umbrella for the non- -- for the signatory participants of NPT like the kind you have given the Japanese or the Europeans, or -- because only a guarantee that appears to work as a treaty that is ratified by the Senate by a two-thirds majority, otherwise assurance of the U.S. are absolutely no value, what the president says or what you say or what anyone says. Do you think the United States would be willing to give that kind of security guarantee by treaty to signatory states ratified by two-thirds majority of the Senate?

MR. GRAHAM: Do you think that India would join the NPT if they got --

Q: I would like to know whether you can give that kind of guarantee.

And also you mentioned that the NPT is a moderator of the arms race. On the other hand, since the NPT was signed, the United States has improved its weapons, the Chinese have built more weapons, also the -- you are concentrating only on Indian and Pakistan missiles, but there's a range of countries in the entire region which has got missiles, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, North Korea -- Iraq probably not now.

MR. GRAHAM: Well, let me make myself clear. I'm not saying that -- I'm not engaged in criticizing other countries or saying they're right or wrong on a moral basis from doing this or that or following this or that policy. Rather, I'm trying to look at what it seems to me is in their security interests as well as, of course, the United States security interests, the world's security interests, as affected by their policies.

I think that an arms race in ballistic missiles would be a disaster for South Asia, and the fact that Saudi Arabia has a few long-range ballistic missiles -- I'm not even sure how many, I know that there was a question of the CSS-1 and how many of those they have and whether they've in fact been delivered, I'm not even sure. But I don't think the Saudi Arabian capability is very great.

Iran's missiles are essentially either very old technology or short-range, as I understand it.
But, be that as it may, even if Saudi Arabia acquired many ballistic missiles it certainly -- I don't think -- would be desirable for ballistic missile proliferation to take place in South Asia. These are very, very dangerous weapons and the United States lived for 45 years under the threat of immediate annihilation by long range ballistic missiles, and we had one serious crisis -- the Cuban missile crisis -- and we managed to get through those 45 years without a disaster.

But one mistake, one error in early warning, one error in planning can bring complete disaster to both countries once they reach a certain level of capability with these weapons systems. With respect to security guarantees, what I was talking about was the negative security assurance applicable to all NPT parties. And I indicated in my answer to one of the other questions that this is being worked on, it's final form has not yet been finalized, but we are looking toward updating and harmonizing this assurance among the five nuclear weapon states parties of the NPT, who would pledge to the non-nuclear weapons states not to use nuclear weapons against them.

Additionally, they would also pledge that if any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT is threatened or attacked by nuclear weapons they would come to their assistance through the Security Council mechanism.

Now, that's a little bit different from what you were talking about. We regard it as a very, very important commitment of the United States and of the other four. But certainly this is a subject that is appropriate for NPT parties to discuss. It's a subject that is appropriate to associate with extension of the treaty, it's a subject that goes back to the very beginning of the NPT, in that it was discussed around the time of the completion of the negotiations of the NPT, and it is a subject that the United States takes very, very seriously.

From Financial Times again. In the last couple of days both Senator Helms and Senator McConnell have suggested the abolition of ACDA.

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Would you care to make a case for the utility of the agency and why it should continue to exist as a separate agency?

MR. GRAHAM: Well, I believe that the existence of an independent Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is very important as a very important part of the national security structure of the United States government. The theory, when ACDA was founded in the Kennedy administration in 1961, was that arms control is a subject that cuts across national security and defense policy, which is the prerogative of the Pentagon and other agencies to some extent, and also cuts across interests that we have in relations with other countries, that it's best to have arms control policy formulated by an agency that does not have as its primary responsibility the improvement and maintenance of relations with other countries because arms control solutions may run counter to those interests on some occasions, and likewise, to have arms control policy formulated by an agency whose prime responsibility is not the development of weapons systems and defense programs, because arms control can run counter to those interests as well, and that when the debate takes place at the top level of the government as to what policy should be pursued in relation to a specific arms control proposal or concept that could affect our relations with another country or countries and could affect our — one or more of our defense programs, it's best to have the ultimate decisionmaker the president and his National Security Council have available to them the objective and independent voice for the arms control solution to a particular national security problem. That doesn't mean it should always prevail, but the theory was that it's best for the decisionmaker to hear this side of the argument and not have it submerged within an agency whose primary responsibility is relations with other countries or submerged within an agency whose primary responsibility is the military defense of the United States.

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That was the theory that the Kennedy administration had when ACDA was founded, when it founded ACDA. It was expressed by Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. I think those arguments are still valid today.

MR. CHIARELLO: Last question, please.

Q  Suzal from the Turkish daily, Sabah. Sir, lately the Moscow -- the Russian government, they are pushing hard to change the conventional arms and force agreement in Europe, especially on this subject is the Turkish government -- they have a very big concern and they contact with the White House, I believe, it’s the president of Turkey and the prime minister of Turkey. What is the U.S. government position on the desire for -- the Russian desire?

MR. GRAHAM: Sir, could you ask your question again? I’m not sure I got all of it.

Q  The Russians, they want to change the conventional arms and force agreement in Europe.

MR. GRAHAM: Oh, CFE. And what is our position on that?

Q  Yes.

MR. GRAHAM: Well, this is not a new issue. This has been on the table now for about a year. And the issue is should there remain zones of deployment within Russia and within Ukraine which restrict their deployment of equipment limited by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty to certain areas and certain numbers. Only Russia and Ukraine have the remnants of those zone limits which were put in the treaty when there still was a USSR.

The U.S. position is that we oppose any change in the treaty at present to accommodate the Russian position, but certainly we want to continue the discussion with Russia and with Ukraine of this subject. We believe that there are means by which they can solve most of the problems that they have expressed to us that are not restricted by the treaty or for which there are exceptions under the treaty, such as the use of armored combat vehicles by internal security forces, and we don’t think that a compelling case to amend the treaty or suspend certain of its provisions has been made. However, we do want to continue the discussion.

MORE
We're not saying we won't talk about it. We certainly will. And we would also note that there is going to be a review conference of the CFE treaty in 1996 at which all of these issues will certainly be on the table.

MR. CHIARELLO: Professor Graham, thank you for coming.

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

MR. GRAHAM: Thank you.