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PUGWASH Bx 2 April 2025 webinar presentation by Hans Blix of his book ’A Farewell to Wars’ (Cambridge University Press 2013) As delivered

I am glad to have this opportunity to speak online with fellow members of Pugwash. I shall explain some of the ideas I have presented in my book ‘A Farewell to Wars’. It has the subtitle

‘The growing Restraints on the Interstate Use of Force’.

At a time when Russia’s war against Ukraine dominates the news, the title of the book has made some shake their heads

and cite the Swedish saying that ‘when the devil gets old, he becomes religious.’

Well, I am as indignant as others about the Russian brutality and aggression in Ukraine. I am also concerned about the erosion that the action brings to the legal order laid down in the UN Charter.

I disagree with those who casually say that ‘there have always been and always will be wars.’ The comment ignores

that the world has changed,

that its legal order has developed and

that war with nuclear weapons may threaten our existence.

I have wanted to assess how in this modern world incentives and restraints to the interstate use of force have changed.

( I am not talking about civil wars ).

My study, I am glad to report, finds that several long- term trends point to a world with

less of traditional warfare,

more of cooperation and

a switch to interstate competition by other means than the use of armed force.

One factor contributing to these trends has been what I would term the ‘public mind’, including global awareness of what the Russel- Einstein Manifesto calls ‘the perils of the development of weapons of mass destruction’ .

I shall return later to the role of the public mind .

I shall also explain why I don’t think Russia’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine will break the long-term trend away from traditional kinetic warfare..

I begin my study by noting that the geographic areas of the world in which interstate armed conflicts currently are going on are limited mainly to Ukraine and the Middle East.

North and South American states have long ago said farewell –to interstate war.

In Africa, colonialism was in some cases ended by ‘wars of national liberation’ and there are many armed internal conflicts but there are remarkably few interstate wars.

In Asia, apart from the major conflicts fought in Korea and Viet Nam, lesser wars have erupted involving India/Pakistan/China/Viet Nam/Cambodia. There was also a brief armed conflict between China and Russia.

In Europe, remarkably after millennia of war, the states have united in a union for peace and co-operation. Equally remarkable, the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in a peaceful liberation of European states and peaceful emancipation of many states in Central Asia.

The Russian war on Ukraine and the armed struggle between Armenia and Azerbaijan, have been exceptions to this peaceful devolution.

To this geographic overview I should add that we have now had 80 years without world war, while only 20 years passed between the First and Second World War. The League of Nations existed for only 20 years while the United Nations has now been in operation for 80 years. It remains the primary world forum and an instrument for peace — when the participating musicians are ready to use it.

The Russel-Einstein Manifesto was not written to register peaceful areas of world geography but to warn of the novel immense threats. It states that the primary tasks are

the ‘renunciation of war’ and

finding ‘peaceful means for the settlement of disputes’.

It notes that it is illusory to think that ‘war may be allowed to continue provided modern weapons are prohibited’. Yet, it says, to ‘abolish war is ‘difficult’ and it urges the renunciation of nuclear weapons as part of a general reduction of armaments’ — as a ‘first step’.

The demand for this first step that is easy for all to understand, has helped to forge and sustain a strong world opinion. It has helped to generate valuable agreements on arms control, and we should recognize that it has been vital to help maintain 80 years of non-use of nuclear weapons.

My book notes the importance that the ‘public mind’ has had, for instance, for the abolition of slavery, for decolonization, for human rights, for the prohibition of torture and the abolition of death penalty. It stresses the continued importance of public opinion for nuclear disarmament and for the fundamental demand that armed force shall not be used in interstate relations.

More specifically the book seeks to identify

incentives existing today to the interstate use of armed force.

disincentives , and

alternatives today to the use of armed force

I describe how traditional strivings for regional or global hegemony may generate incentives for the interstate use of armed force.

I also note that some new risks may create incentives to the use of interstate of force — terrorism, competition in space and a potential further spread of nuclear weapons.

I note on the other hand, that some incentives to the interstate use of armed force have disappeared or will not materialize:

— With the dismantling of colonialism there are no incentives for wars of liberation – unless we see the Palestinian struggle as such a war.

— With monarchies disappearing there are no incentives for wars of succession.

–Religions remain powerful forces, but no religious block of states will embark on world jihads,

–Increased coherence is predicted between Russia, China and ‘the South’ but it is unlikely to cause an armed ‘clash of civilizations’.

— The conquest of land is no longer seen as glorious and as creating incentives to war.

The occupation of the Crimea and threat against Taiwan have not been caused primarily by hunger for land, but by hurt pride.

The major part of my book seeks to identify disincentives that now exist to the resort to armed force between states.

The first disincentive is the possible cost in lives and property and the risk of defeat.

It is therefore understandable that military strength – deterrence -is the primary means that states employ to create disincentives to the use of force against themselves.

Before discussing military deterrence, I shall focus on two other factors designed or likely to be disincentives.

One factor is legal norms and institutions.

In our national communities –states- citizens are told by rather precise laws what they are prohibited to do. For instance, not to use force against their neighbours. For the most part the added threats of penalties for violations are not needed. The legal rules are respected without threats of sanctions as they reflect long existing social norms.

In the community of states, the situation is somewhat different. From time immemorial communities have felt no social norm demanding of them to refrain from using force against each other. War was legal.

It was not until the adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1920 that an agreed written prohibition of the interstate use of force came into being. It was confirmed and amplified in the UN Charter in 1945 -– and international criminal law has added personal responsibility . This is a tremendous evolution – and the ‘public mind’ has been an essential factor in bringing it about.

We know, of course, that the Security Council is not an effective mechanism for condemning violations and taking enforcement action. Yet, I submit, there is value already in the world community defined prohibition of the interstate threat or use of force. It is known by all and may together with condemnations of violations by General Assembly or Security Council, create reactions in the world community. Violations affect the reputation and standing of violators. The rule forms by itself a certain -admittedly insufficient –disincentive to violations.

Another factor is the accelerating interdependence of states. Globalization adds important disincentives to any interstate use of force. Great dividends are derived from more interstate trade, communication and division of labour. Ripping apart profitable cooperation and trade through the use of force or war is costly and painful.

I return now to military deterrence.

I believe with Darwinists that one reason why our species of man turned out to be the fittest to survive and thrive has been that among our genes were some that made us ready to use force to grab and defend resources and territory for surviving and living .

Smart for survival was and is also to refrain from the use of force when there is certainty or high risk of defeat–perhaps loss of life or freedom.

The conclusion – that we find self-evident—follows that a principal way to prevent attacks has always been to deter by showing superior – or at least significant – force.

It works at all levels of development. In the past, clans discouraged acts of violence against their members by threatening collective revenge.

Today, great powers publish nuclear posture reviews that warn which actions may trigger them to use their nuclear weapons. This may be an effective deterrent. However, between states that have a second-strike nuclear capacity nuclear deterrence is more complicated.

The Cuban crisis in 1962 made the US and the Soviet Union painfully aware that the use of nuclear weapons by either could trigger a second strike and a nuclear Armageddon. This awareness led President Kennedy and the Soviet leadership to negotiations that resulted in Soviet naval and nuclear withdrawal from Cuba. American commitment to withdraw missiles from Turkey allowed Chairman Khrushchev to retreat from his reckless adventure without completely losing face.

The mutual possession of second-strike nuclear capacity and the awareness that its use could lead to what is termed ‘mutually assured destruction’ was a key factor and led to diplomacy.

Ever since the Cuban affair the US has sought to create immunity against nuclear attacks, including the risk of a second strike. Billions of dollars have been and are still being spent on missile defense — ‘star wars’, now termed ‘a golden dome’.

Yet, these efforts have failed and the risk of mutually assured destruction (MAD) in a nuclear war remains. So does the conclusion that has been drawn that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought’ .

Yet, despite this oft repeated and welcome affirmation the risk remains that they can be used – – so long as any nuclear weapons remain.

In my view, this risk is leading to restraints in NWS to embark upon or allow themselves to be drawn into any conflicts that may through escalation or spread become nuclear. Uncertainty about how new methods of warfare like Cyber, Space, AI and autonomous weapons may impact probably strengthens this restraint.

The restraint, if real, is welcome and should naturally comprise the eschewing of all nuclear brinkmanship play and it should, logically be supplemented by a reduction of the stocks of nuclear weapons.

If I am right in believing that restraints arise on embarking on or joining traditional armed conflict due to concerns about risks of horizontal or vertical nuclear escalation, a significant question arises. Namely: how – if not by kinetic force – will the competition be pursued and the underlying conflict be solved? The good answer should naturally be: By diplomacy — But I think it is likely that hybrid war measures will be used or threatened to back the diplomacy

The signs, I humbly – some of you may say naively – suggest, already point to an ongoing switch to hybrid – non-kinetic – war, notably between the major blocks of states.

I am tempted to citing a quote I recently saw from George Orwell. In 1945 he wrote: “the atomic bomb is likely to put an end to large-scale wars at the cost of prolonging indefinitely a peace that is no peace.¨

Currently, we can follow the wrestling that is taking place on the economic and financial battle fields –economic sanctions and blockades. Even if not lethal these forms of contest may cause great pain.

There is, further, an increasing use of cyber to disturb important or indispensable industrial or social services. Supply of electricity or water may be sabotaged, air traffic disturbed, cables under the sea and pipelines for oil and gas can be damaged. We have seen operations to impact on elections, support of political parties, toppling of governments through coups. Will such measures – as I am inclined to think –be replacing or merely add to kinetic warfare ?

The influencing of public opinion is an increasingly important part of the competition between blocs. We see a kind of ‘beauty contest’ in which one side paints Western liberal, political and cultural patterns as decadent and perverse and the other side criticizes Russia’s and China’s political systems as inhumane, authoritarian, indifferent to the rule of law. Even such matters as which system has been superior in space exploits or poorest in combatting Covid 19 are invoked in the world competition about public opinion. The activities span from generally accepted open ways of influencing opinion to subversive, deniable actions, engineered insurrections and political murders.

They are conducted by other agents than men in uniforms. Some of the practices were pursued by both sides already during the Cold War. I would suggest that although the US and other Western countries have agencies like the CIA that are skilled in and practice subversion, the Russian model of deep state is exceptionally well adapted to hybrid warfare. It has been formed over a long time by large –partly underground –agencies like the Tjeka, later KGB and now FSB.

The development and pursuit of different forms of hybrid warfare will raise a need for supplementing the laws war by international rules on what is accepted as legitimate competition and what is stamped as impermissible intervention.

Such rules can emerge through state practice, judgments of the UN and of the International Court of Justice.

There seems to be broad agreement that the laws of war apply to cyber conflicts and the US has even indicated that nuclear weapons could be used in retaliation for cyber-attacks of a gravity comparable to that of a prohibited weapon of mass destruction.

I will now conclude. First by some comments on the Russian aggression I Ukraine. Then with some reflections on the role of diplomacy to forestall and prevent the interstate use of force.

Let me recall that during the Cold War the West established NATO as a part of a policy of containment of what it saw as an attempted Soviet Communist expansion in Europe. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, we have seen the play in reverse: Russia has sought to pursue a policy to contain Western NATO expansion. The NATO decision in Bucharest 2008 that Georgia and Ukraine were to become NATO members marked the failure of Russia’s efforts in the rooms of diplomacy. The decision contributed, I believe, to trigger the Russian armed intervention in Georgia.

And some years later Ukraine’s economic and political drift to the EU, but above all the prospect of Ukrainian integration into NATO and the possible stationing of NATO forces on Russia’s doorsteps generated the incentive to occupy the Crimea in 2014 and to invade Ukraine in 2022.

In my view, the invasion in Feb 2022 was not intended to be a full-scale war but a Crimea II –a smart ‘special military operation’ that would quickly topple a regime that was deemed unrepresentative and in power through a Western supported coup. The ‘operation’ failed as it was based on erroneous Intelligence and a lack of understanding that the majority of Ukrainians wanted independence and emancipation from Russia and from an increasingly unattractive economic and political system.

I see the Russian action as a disastrous ‘aberration’ and deviation from but not an end to the long-term evolution from interstate war.

Now about diplomacy:

I find it depressing that states spend billions on intricate military planning to deter possible adversaries from conceivable armed actions and so little effort on understanding other states, their interests and ambitions and on searching for non-violent approaches to differences. The human defense genes are easily triggered while demands for diplomacy, dialogue and détente are likely to be branded as meek.

To read the sometimes shifting intentions of foreign regimes may also be more difficult than conjecturing possible actions from the size, possession, character and location of their armed forces. It requires much knowledge, experience, intelligence and, in addition, empathy.

Sometimes– when armistices are reached after years of fighting –we hear it said that the ‘conflict had no armed solution’. We cannot help but wonder if that reflection could not have come earlier and led to a solution by diplomacy.

FRIENDS WITHOUT BENEFITS

David Bernell and Ambassador Thomas Graham (Retired)

January 2025

President Donald Trump campaigned on a promise of raising tariffs, and he seems ready to implement them. He stated soon after taking office that his administration will impose tariffs of 25 percent on goods from Canada and Mexico (and also 10 percent on goods from China). If implemented, these policies will be likely to please only the president and his staunch supporters and subordinates, who see tariffs as something that will bring prosperity and self-reliance. In reality, tariffs will mostly bring economic pain and political fallout. Consumers, companies that import or export goods to and from these countries, and the United States as a whole, along with its trading partners, will all suffer harmful consequences.

The economic hit will come in the form of higher prices not only of imported goods, but also their domestically produced equivalents, which can command a higher price due to diminished competition. Another impact will be the reduced availability of goods not produced in the United States (think avocados from Mexico). The Congressional Budget Office, as well as nonpartisan organizations such as the Peterson Institute for International Economics have done studies of the economic impacts that these tariffs would have: inflation, fewer jobs, and reduced GDP.

Trump states that tariffs are paid by foreign governments, but this is untrue. Canadian government agencies or companies do not pay the United States for the privilege of being able to sell their products here. Tariffs are paid to the U.S. government by companies that import goods, and they recover the costs by passing them along to customers. Consumers will therefore see price increases in places such as grocery stores (the US imports numerous agricultural products from Mexico and Canada), the gas pump (the largest supplier of foreign oil to the US is Canada, followed by Mexico), and car dealerships (automobile production is highly integrated across the both the northern and southern borders).

American tariffs will also harm our trading partners, putting people out of work and wreaking havoc on their economies as Americans reduce their purchases of Canadian and Mexican goods. These countries will also impose retaliatory tariffs, probably with some strategically placed on goods from states that voted for Trump: Florida citrus, steel from Pennsylvania, corn from the Midwest, Kentucky bourbon. American producers will see their sales to Canadian and Mexican customers drop considerably. The result will be a loss of income, jobs, and investment in industries all across the United States.

The economic consequences of Trump’s tariffs will be bad enough, but the bigger problem is likely to be the political fallout. The words and actions of the American president are harming relations with America’s allies and friends, who are the primary targets of Trump’s hostility and threats. (Trump has spoken quite well of Putin for many years, and once said that he “fell in love” with Kim Jung Il. Trump also doesn’t threaten to take any of their territory like he does a NATO ally.)

Trump has been making such threats for a while. During the campaign he not only promised numerous tariffs, he also derided America’s allies, stating that he would be fine with Putin doing “whatever the hell he wanted” to NATO countries if they didn’t “pay their bills” (Trump has repeatedly mischaracterized the commitment by NATO members to spend at least two percent of their GDP on defense as being delinquent on paying their bills to the U.S. if they haven’t met the target).

After the election, Trump began to speak about using the American military to forcibly take Greenland from Denmark (a NATO ally), and the Panama Canal Zone. He even suggested using “economic force” to make Canada part of the U.S. Energized MAGA supporters took this talk even further, going on social media to post maps showing a “greater” United States that includes these places. This bluster seemed to come out of nowhere, and has served primarily to antagonize countries that have had friendly relations with the United States.

Once Trump was back in the White House, he ramped things up even further. Speaking on video to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, he threatened tariffs on EU countries, saying that these nations treat the United States “very unfairly, very badly.” He also singled out Canada, saying “We have a tremendous deficit with Canada. We’re not going to have that anymore.” He then went on to taunt the country, saying “You can always become a state. And then, if you are a state, we won’t have a deficit. We won’t have to tariff you.”

On day seven of the new administration, conflict erupted with Colombia over deportations. When the President of Colombia refused to allow two U.S. military planes to land in his country, Trump said that the United States would immediately impose a 25 percent tariff on all Colombian imports and raise them to 50 percent the following week. In addition, he threatened banking and financial sanctions, along with a travel ban on Colombian government officials. The Colombian president hit back, saying that he would impose tariffs of 25 percent on U.S. imports. The two countries quickly settled their differences, but the Trump Administration said that it would leave the tariffs and sanctions “in reserve” to ensure that Colombia lives up to its commitments.

American foreign policy is being turned upside down by the Trump Administration. The United States is turning its hostility toward its historic friends and allies, countries that it has closely aligned with for decades. These connections have helped to keep the United States and its friends secure and prosperous. They have been grounded in institutions such as NATO, the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement, the World Trade Organization, and a host of other agreements and mutually cooperative actions.

Trampling on friendships and alliances, issuing repeated threats – these actions will have consequences. The clash with Colombia provides a warning to others and an example of what the future may hold. It has also taught the White House a lesson: react to any disagreement immediately and forcefully, issue threats, impose tariffs, and make opposition to American actions very costly. Doing this will cause others to back down quickly and get Trump what he wants while demonstrating his own power. The longer-term damage to the United States and its interests, however, are also likely to be very costly, making Americans worse off economically and isolating the United States from those who have been its best friends and trading partners.

The American people cannot expect other countries to tolerate Donald Trump and a U.S. government that continually throws its weight around, seeking to punish them for some harm (real or imagined) they have done us. Friends without any benefits will soon become no friends at all. In a world where Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are increasingly aligned and share antipathy for the United States and the global order, and where war and upheaval rage in Ukraine and the Middle East, Donald Trump works toward driving America’s friends and allies away, while the Pentagon under Pete Hegseth focuses on gender issues and pursues the agenda of Fox News. The results may not be to our liking.

_____________

Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. is former acting director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under President Clinton, and served as General Counsel of ACDA during the presidencies of Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. He is the author of several books on nuclear arms control, U.S. foreign policy, and American politics.

David Bernell is an Associate Professor in the School of Public Policy at Oregon State University. He is the author of Constructing US Foreign Policy: The Curious Case of Cuba, and The Energy Security Dilemma: US Policy and Practice. He also served in the Clinton Administration with the US Office of Management and Budget, and the US Department of the Interior.

You can find their work on Substack at Defending Democracy.

Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. and David Bernell

January 12, 2024

Since Russia’s unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 22, 2022, the war has inflicted a high level of casualties on both sides, featured periodic nuclear weapon threats by Russia, and resulted in atrocities that include war crimes and other violations of international law by Russia’s armed forces. The invasion at first looked like a potential success for Russian President Vladimir Putin, but the valiant Ukrainian army drove hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers into an area along the eastern border that represents roughly 20 percent of the territory of Ukraine. The fighting has now bogged down in a stalemate. Naturally the world would like to see this war, with its massive suffering and horrifying Russian actions, come to an end.

This is a war that Ukraine, the United States and NATO cannot afford to lose to the dictator in the Kremlin. The Ukrainians are doing NATO’s job, and they are doing it at little expense to the alliance, weakening Russia and keeping it at bay as it seeks to harm the West, undermine democratic elections in the United States and beyond, and bring Putin’s sympathizers to power on both sides of the Atlantic. If Ukraine loses, the United States and its allies will find themselves in a very different place in the world, one they would not like. It would be a world at greater risk of conflict between NATO and Russia, with the Baltic states and perhaps Poland likely to be next on the Putin hit list. Such an outcome is not inevitable, but it is increasingly possible given the reckless Republican party policy of blocking the American pipeline of arms to Ukraine.

The history of Russian connection to and domination of Ukraine might suggest that Ukraine’s independence and ties to the West are not essential to the security of the United States and its allies. This may have been true in the past, as Russia’s well-documented domination and persecution of Ukraine go back centuries. In the last century alone, Ukraine was forcibly brought into the Soviet Union in the 1920s. Though the relationship became formalized by means of a separate Ukrainian Republic in the Soviet Union, and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was even later granted its own separate recognition and membership in the United Nations after World War II, the domination and persecution never stopped. During the 1930s, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had carried out an enforced famine on the Ukrainian Republic by confiscating its grain crop each year to sell for foreign exchange. An estimated 3.9 million Ukrainians died of hunger in 1930-32 as a result. Ukrainian citizens, young and old, including children, died daily of hunger in the streets of Ukrainian cities while pleading for bread. Later, from 1936-38, Ukrainians made up a particularly prominent share of the nearly 700,000 people killed in Stalin’s campaign of political repression known as the Great Terror, or the Great Purge. During World War II, the principal Ukrainian resistance organization, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, fought against both the Nazis and the Soviets at different times, as Ukrainian nationalists believed that the Soviets were at least as bad as the Nazis, and maybe worse. After the war, Ukrainian resistance and nationalism were suppressed, placing Ukraine firmly under Soviet domination until 1991.

Ukraine became independent after the end of the Cold War, but the country continued to find itself a target of Russia. Upon its demise, the Soviet Union left 5,000 nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory, which Ukrainians wanted to keep to protect themselves from Russian invasion. Under great pressure from the United States and other Western powers who did not want to allow an additional nuclear weapons state under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Ukraine agreed to deliver these weapons to Russia pursuant to an international agreement known as the Budapest Memorandum. In exchange, the United States, the U.K., and Russia were to guarantee Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the time, the United States pledged that it would consider the Budapest Memorandum as carrying the force of a treaty.

Yet Russia continually interfered in Ukraine after the Cold War. It repeatedly sought to ensure the election of the Kremlin’s favored presidential candidates, force Ukraine away from greater political and economic connection to the European Union, and bring Ukraine back under Russian influence and control with political threats and the cutoff of natural gas supplies. And then, when Putin’s Russia went even further and carried out its invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014, and soon after fomented, led, and supplied an armed rebellion in the Donbas region of Ukraine, the United States and the U.K. essentially ignored their pledges under the Budapest Memorandum. They did so again when Russia began its all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Most significantly, the United States did not observe its “treaty-like” obligations. 

There can be no doubt about Ukraine’s determination to stay out of Russia’s grasp this time. To the great surprise of most countries, Ukraine, with the help of huge Western arms shipments, principally from the United States, was able to blunt Russia’s invasion and even drive it back out of some of the territory it seized in 2022. But the West also held back more than necessary, daunted by Putin’s repeated threats to use nuclear weapons, however incredible those claims should have been. So Russia still occupies much of Ukrainian territory along the Russian border. The situation at this time appears unlikely to change, and has been characterized as a stalemate, with little territory changing hands over the past year. Putin has no interest in ending the war, and considering Ukraine’s recent and historical experience with Russia, it would be most unlikely that Ukraine would ever reach a peace agreement with Russia under any terms other than Ukraine’s total victory because that is the only way it can ensure its future security.

As a result, the most likely outcomes at this time appear to be these: a Russian victory; a long, financially costly, gruesome stalemate; or victory by Ukraine (and NATO).

A Russian victory is ever more likely to be the ultimate result if the Republican Party in the United States is successful in blocking American military aid to Ukraine. Though it is unclear whether additional countries in NATO would adopt this policy, it is highly unlikely that the level of U.S. armaments could be replaced. This would make an eventual Russian victory, if not inevitable, then very much expected, despite the incredible bravery, patriotism, and military capability that the Ukrainians have demonstrated.

This would undoubtedly open the door for Putin to come closer to achieving his objective of weakening NATO, or even bringing about its demise, with the Baltic states and Poland as his next potential targets. To say this would be bad for America and its allies vastly understates the impact. It would be a short- and long-term catastrophe, placing Europe in the shadow of an aggressive and ascendant Russia, and establishing the United States as an unreliable friend and ally. It would (or should) also establish the Republican Party as modern-day quislings.

A second possibility is that the United States and NATO might overcome domestic resistance and continue to supply Ukraine with arms shipments. This might be enough to save Ukraine from defeat, but the last two years of conflict have indicated that it is not enough for Ukraine to win, unless the Biden administration finally commits to Ukraine’s victory, not just its survival. Short of that, the result would probably, almost certainly, be a long, highly expensive and demoralizing stalemate between Russia and Ukraine. This would be bad for Russia, but Putin has such intense control over his country and its citizens at this point that he could probably live with the situation as he watched Ukraine slowly deteriorate, while the United States and NATO continued to deplete their resources and lose faith in their own ability to do anything more than prolong a horrific war. This situation would also most certainly benefit China, whose economic power and political strength would allow it greater global influence, while keeping Russia propped up.

Lastly, there is the possibility of a Ukrainian victory, with a settlement that restores the status quo before Putin’s military hostility toward Ukraine began in 2014. This would be the only fair and honorable outcome for Ukraine, the only outcome that would ensure its security, and the most satisfactory end for the United States, NATO, and a more reliable world order that would restore the rule of law at least to some significant degree.

Of course, the conditions required to achieve this end will be difficult to meet. The first is that there has to be far greater U.S. and NATO military support for Ukraine, with a major influx of even more weapons, training, intelligence, and logistical support. Further, it might even require some level of more direct involvement, including American “boots on the ground,” well beyond the handful of special forces already sent to Ukraine. This would make the war belong to the United States and NATO as much as it does to Ukraine.

The second condition, even with a defeated Russia, would have to be assurance that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would never happen again. In the wake of the failure of the Budapest Memorandum, there is only one way to achieve that: bring Ukraine into NATO so that it is protected under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, by which an attack on one is an attack on all.

The risk associated with this course of action is great, including a wider war with Russia that would inevitably involve American casualties. But the risk of failure in Ukraine is also great, with a weakened West and an ascendant Russia. The course of action is clear if the United States hopes to successfully end this horror show, and make the world a safer, more democratic place. It also would send a powerful signal to China that the United States is not to be intimidated. Honor and global security come at a price, but the question remains whether the United States and its allies can or will make this commitment.